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This thesis asks ‘what does europeanisation mean for the strategies and practices of 
grassroots green groups in Europe?’ and aims to identify the conditions under which 
these groups become ‘europeanised’.  I identify three process of europeanisation: 
direct europeanisation – when an actor connects directly to the EU, indirect 
europeanisation – when an actor connects to a europeanised member state and 
passive europeanisation – when actors europeanise outside of state mechanisms.  
The grassroots green movement has largely evaded studies of europeanisation and so 
it is through examining europeanisation at this ‘base’ level, closest to the citizens, 
that this research makes an original contribution to our understanding of the variables 
that mediate the process of europeanisation and to our understanding of grassroots 
green activism in Europe.   
 
This thesis takes its analytical framework from social movement theory and uses 
political opportunity structures and frames as domains in which it looks for evidence 
of europeanisation.  Within these domains I distinguish between European and 
europeanised activity, teasing out the role of the nation state in mediating 
europeanisation at a grassroots level.  Two cases are examined: anti-road protest and 
anti-GM protest in Britain, France and Italy between the period 2007-2010. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that there is some evidence of europeanisation within 
grassroots green groups.  It encourages a more nuanced understanding of 
europeanisation as a process that can occur outside the state and amongst actors who 
do not seek to impact the EU.  It finds that both strategic and ideological 
considerations shape the political opportunity structures to which movements direct 
themselves.  It also finds that the fit between the frames used in protest and the 
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‘If European integration has long been an élitist project, its evolution involves 
growing pressures ‘from below’ – from social movement organisations and NGOs’ 




Across Europe, grassroots environmental activism now routinely takes place; every 
day, in every country.  But what does it mean to mobilise in a political environment 
that includes an ‘additional’ and powerful level of government:  the European 
Union? What political opportunities are available when the national – and sub-
national – are supplemented by a European level?  How do activists ‘frame’ – that is, 
how do they construct and diffuse the meanings of environmental problems?  Is this 
frame becoming a more common one across Europe?  These are the questions that 
this thesis seeks to answer.  It offers insights into what europeanisation means for the 
mobilisation strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement in Europe and 
contributes to the nascent literature on the europeanisation of social movements. 
 
In this thesis europeanisation is taken to mean the process of constructing and 
diffusing formal and informal rules, beliefs and norms that originate in the EU and 
2 

are interpreted by Member States. For environmental activism this process is 
important: it shapes the domestic and supranational political structures in which 
environmental policies are made, in which institutions and their actors operate, and 
in which new norms and practices become diffused between policy-makers and 
publics.  In short, europeanisation means that the context in which green movements 
operate has changed.  This thesis offers two core areas of potential change: political 
opportunity structures (POS) (the structural features of a political system that shape 
the conditions for social movement action) and frames (action oriented sets of beliefs 
and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a social movement group). 
These two areas of analysis, drawn from the literature on social movements, are 
examined here as ‘domains’

 where one might expect to find evidence of 
europeanisation amongst social movement actors.  These two concepts are explored 
further in section 1.3 of this chapter. 
 
The overall argument of this thesis is that the process of europeanisation occurs in 
ways that the existing europeanisation framework is unable to capture.  Specifically, 
I identify three types of europeanisation:  
• Direct europeanisation, caused by interaction between a national or sub-
national actor

 and the European Union. Examples would include a social 
movement lobbying the European Commission, a Regional Government 
implementing European Union legislation or a political party sending 
 
2
 Featherstone and Radaelli also use the concept of  ‘domains’ of europeanisation which they define 
as: ‘the  domains where the effects of europeanisation are supposed to materialize’ (2003: 35) . 
3
 ‘Actor’ here refers to social movements, interest groups, political parties, institutions or states. 
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representatives to the European Parliament.  This concept maps on to my 
definition of European POS and frames outlined later in the chapter. 
• Indirect europeanisation, caused by interaction between an actor and 
europeanised agents (policies, parties, institutions) at a national level.  This 
could be a social movement lobbying their national or local government 
about their implementation of an EU policy, local chapters of a political party 
discussing their position with the party’s European representatives, or small 
businesses getting advice from their city’s European Officer.   This idea is 
represented in the europeanised political opportunity structures and frames 
that are presented in this thesis. 
 
• Passive europeanisation, caused by the emergence of pan-European 
relationships without the premeditated aim of addressing the European 
Union’s national or supranational institutional impact.  Examples of this 
process include social movement groups forming a pan-European network to 
share beliefs and strategies on an EU policy or the diffusion of pan-European 
understandings through European social media.  Passive europeanisation is 
reflected in aspects of the europeanised frames and political opportunity 
structures presented later in this thesis. 
 
Direct and indirect europeanisation are premeditated – actors seek to take advantage 
of ‘European’ opportunities such as additional points of institutional access, funding 
or European networks.  Passive europeanisation is implicit and does not involve any 
4 
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explicit attempt to connect to European opportunities.  Rather, the construction and 
diffusion of europeanised rules and norms is implicit and occurs as a by-product of 
other channels of interaction such as networking. 
 
Although other scholars have used the terms direct, indirect and (rarely) passive 
europeanisation, my thesis clarifies their meaning and adapts them to non-state 
actors.  Existing definitions are inconsistent, contradictory and, as explained below, 
unsuitable for application to social movements.  Bache and Marshall emphasise the 
issue of intention in their definitions.  Direct europeanisation is ‘the intended impact 
of an EU initiative’ and indirect europeanisation ‘the inadvertent impact of an EU 
initiative’(2004: 5-6 - emphasis my own).   Schimmelfennig similarly identifies 
intentionality as a distinguishing factor:  
[d]irect mechanisms are those in which the EU takes a pro-active stance and 
intentionally seeks to disseminate its model and rules of governance beyond 
its borders.  By contrast, indirect ones are those in which either non-EU 
actors have the active part or the mere presence of the EU generates 
unintended external effects (2010: 8).   
 
However, Sciarini et al. use the same terminology to stress the distinction between 
formal and informal negotiations with the EU – direct europeanisation is 
‘international negotiation between [a country] and the EU’ and indirect ‘when a non-
EU member state adapts unilaterally to existing EU rules’ (2004: 354-355).  These 
writings on direct and indirect europeanisation therefore offer two points of interest:  
notions of intention (to become europeanised), and formality (of interaction with the 
EU).  Furthermore, the concepts of direct and indirect are most commonly deployed 
5 
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in explaining the europeanisation of non-EU states such as Switzerland, where direct 
europeanisation refers to the negotiation of bilateral or international agreements with 
the EU and results in domestic change. Meanwhile, indirect europeanisation is the 
unilateral adoption of EU rules into domestic norms (Fontana, 2009; 
Schimmelfennig, 2010; Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004).   
 
Defining direct and indirect europeanisation in this way raises two problems.  First, 
these understandings overlap with other similar concepts.  For example, Auel uses 
the term ‘passive europeanisation’ to refer to ‘national parliaments...as the mere 
objects or victims of europeanisation processes’ (Auel, 2006: 249) – which straddles 
the distinctions offered by Bache et al. between the concepts of ‘direct and indirect 
europeanisation’ and ‘voluntary and coercive europeanisation’.  Do national 
parliaments knowingly have europeanisation forced upon them (coercively) or is it 
an inadvertent consequence of EU initiatives (indirect)?  This tangle of concepts 
makes it difficult to identify the logic at work and harder still to study empirically.   
 
A second problem is that these authors do not address the level of governance at 
which europeanisation occurs.  It is assumed that direct or indirect europeanisation is 
something that happens to states (or national parliaments) as a result of their 
interaction with the EU.  But what of sub-state actors?  What of non-state actors?  
There is no way to capture the kinds of europeanisation process that occur at a more 
local level.  By distinguishing between the europeanisation processes that occur as a 
result of direct and indirect connections to the EU, we are able to differentiate 
6 
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opportunities that exist at national or European levels of governance.  And by 
unravelling ‘passive europeanisation’ from these opportunities, we are able to 
capture the processes of europeanisation that are not mediated by the state. 
 
Within the political opportunity structures and frames examined in this thesis I 
distinguish between European and europeanised domains.  The key point of 
difference is the degree of direct connection to the European Union; in this way these 
domains map onto the three kinds of europeanisation outlined above.  In the case of 
European POS and frames the connection to the European Union is a direct one – 
actors intentionally seek political access at the European level, or frame an issue 
explicitly as European.  They are evidencing direct europeanisation.  In the case of 
europeanised POS and frames actors knowingly seek European-inspired 
opportunities or frames at a national level, or they may tap into europeanised 
opportunities through engaging with new allies or sharing frames across European 
borders.  Their connection to the European Union may be, but does not have to be, a 
premeditated one.  In this europeanised domain they evidence indirect and, or 
passive europeanisation. 
 
I argue that a grassroots or local green group will be europeanised to the extent that it 
is able to connect to either a European or europeanised domain.  The extent to which 
these actors are europeanised varies across protest area, across countries and varies 
between the two domains of POS and frames.  Finally, I also argue that opportunities 
for grassroots groups to europeanise are not contingent on their professionalisation or 
7 
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institutionalisation – even the most informal and grassroots-based actors can show 
evidence of europeanisation.   
 
My approach in investigating what this changed context means for the strategies and 
frames of the movement is explicitly comparative.  I explore environmental protests 
on two issues: genetically modified (GM) crops and road-building.  I present findings 
on protests on both issues across three EU Member States: France, Italy and the UK.  
In comparing these six individual campaigns, I identify two core ‘domains’, drawn 
from social movement studies, where one might expect to find evidence of 
europeanisation in grassroots groups: political opportunity structures (POS) and 
frames.  Within these two domains, I identify the opportunities for social movements 
to experience direct, indirect or passive europeanisation.   
 
The original contribution to social science of this thesis is threefold.  First of all, it 
makes a theoretical contribution to the study of europeanisation by accounting for 
europeanisation that occurs outside of the state.  Scholars of europeanisation have 
focussed their attention on policies (S. J. Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004; Schmidt & 
Radaelli, 2002), policy processes (Bomberg, 2007; Daviter, 2007) and political 
parties (Bomberg, 2002; Hines, 2003; Ladrech, 2001).  It is only very recently that 
attention has been turned to the non-institutionalised field of social movements 
(Císa & Vráblíková, 2010; della Porta & Caini, 2009; McCauley, 2008a, 2008c).  
The most important consequence of earlier, institution/policy-centred body of work 
is the privileged role it affords to state.  For example, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) 
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identify three mechanisms of europeanisation: domestic adaptation to a European 
institutional model, altered domestic opportunity structures, and altered beliefs and 
expectations.  In all cases the state is the actor that adapts and alters.  In a similar 
vein Green Cowles et al. (2001) have isolated the idea of ‘goodness of fit’ as a 
mechanism of europeanisation where the degree of europeanisation experienced by a 
state is determined by how well their domestic policies and institutions fit with those 
of the EU.  All of these mechanisms hinge on the role of the state.  It is the state that 
mediates the effects of europeanisation for the actors within it.  While this is 
undoubtedly true, it does not give adequate consideration to those actors who do not 
work with the machinery of the state by, for instance, participating in policy-making 
or receiving state funding.  How might a grassroots social movement experience 
europeanisation if not through the state?  The first significant contribution of this 
thesis therefore is to develop an understanding of the processes of europeanisation 
that account for both state and non-state actors. 
 
The second contribution made here is to the social movement literature.  First, 
scholars of social movements have largely neglected to examine europeanisation.  
Although there is a growing body of work on the transnationalisation of movements 
(Doherty, 2006; Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rootes, 2005; 
Tarrow, 1998, 2006), this focus is at the expense of investigating the specific 
processes associated with the impact of European integration.  Where work on 
europeanised social movements has begun to take place, it has very rarely considered 
the grassroots level of the social movement spectrum (Rootes, 2002a); rather it 
concentrates on the activities of professionalised social movement groups or NGOs 
9 
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in Brussels (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2001).   It is through 
examining europeanisation at this ‘base’ level, closest to the citizens, that we are able 
to expand our understanding of the empirical effects of European integration on 
average European citizens (even if it is arguable whether ‘activists’ are ‘average 
Europeans’).  We gain a better sense of how europeanisation is refracted at different 
levels of governance and at different levels of political mobilisation.   
 
Secondly, I problematise the idea of social movements as ‘non-institutionalised’ 
actors.  Although this feature is cited as one that defines social movements, in reality 
social movement actors sit on a long spectrum where the divide between NGO and 
grassroots group is more blurred than the literature suggests.  For example, while 
Friends of the Earth Europe may be easily identified as an NGO, the local chapter of 
the organisation in Edinburgh may share many more characteristics with 
neighbouring grassroots groups than with its alma mater.  In the context of 
europeanisation this overlap between non-institutionalised grassroots group and 
institutionalised NGO is important.  For instance if, as the literature suggests, the EU 
is most accessible to institutionalised groups (Börzel & Buzogány, 2010; della Porta 
& Caiani, 2007; Rootes, 2002a), these NGO groups are the actors most likely to 
experience europeanisation.  But the relationship between europeanisation and social 
movement groups is more subtle than this – NGOs and their national and local 
chapters mediate the degree of europeanisation at a grassroots level.  This thesis 
highlights the importance of a more nuanced definition of social movement, 




The third contribution of this thesis is a deeper empirical understanding of 
environmentalism in Europe.  As studies of EU integration are concerned with the 
emergence of a new political order or a new way of ruling, environmental issues and 
protest are especially interesting areas of study.  As Dryzek et al. (2003: 2) argue, 
‘environmentalism is tied up with some contemporary developments that may, in the 
end, produce a new kind of state whose emergence is of comparable historical 
significance to the earlier emergence of the liberal capitalist state and then the 
welfare state’.  Certainly, the European Union, through its internal market and its 
related competencies, has had an impact upon green actors  (Bomberg, 1998, 2002; 
Bomberg & Carter, 2006; Jordan, 2000; Landman, 1999).  Furthermore, green 
movements are especially fertile ground for studying new social movements (NSMs) 
in Europe because, in many ways, they are typical of these NSMs  (Doherty, 2002: 
21).  By studying  EU environmentalism through the lens of the green movement, we 
are able to examine the interplay of a dynamic and often contentious policy area that 
is simultaneously trans-boundary and highly localised. The unique, emerging layers 
of governance that European integration delivers create a political environment for 
environmental activism that is both distinctive and deserves exploration. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 




How has europeanisation altered the mobilisation strategies and practices of 
grassroots green groups in Europe? 
 
In particular, I am interested in the way that europeanisation shapes the political 
opportunity structures within which a movement operates, and the way 
europeanisation shapes and/or diffuses the frames that they construct.  While 
focusing on these specific questions, I engage with wider questions that arise from 
the existing literature on europeanisation and social movement studies: 
 
• Where does the europeanisation of social movement predominantly occur – at 
the domestic or European level? 
• To what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the 
degree of movement europeanisation? 
 
The first of these sub-questions is posed in response to scholarship on multi-level 
governance, political opportunities, and supranational environmentalism.  In their 
research on organised social movements in Europe, della Porta and Caini (2009: 14) 
identify what they call ‘crossed influence’; that is, pressure at the national level to 
change decisions at the European level, or pressure at the European level used to 
change decisions at the national level. Meanwhile, Marks and McAdam (1996: 275) 




[W]e expect - in fact, can already discern - significant changes in the locus 
and form of social movements as a result of European integration.... So 
instead of the rise of a single new social movement form, we are more apt to 
see the development and proliferation of multiple movement forms keyed to 
inherited structures and the demands of mobilisation in particular policy 
areas. 
 
Finally, Poloni-Staudinger (2008: 535) draws attention not only to the supranational 
nature of europeanised arenas, but also to the supranational nature of 
environmentalism in particular: 
The European Union (EU) presents us with a unique case of supranational 
governance, particularly concerning its relation to environmental policy-
making. Growing environmental awareness among European citizens in the 
1960s and 1970s gave rise to demands for more attention to environmental 
issues at the supranational level. 
 
Where do these ideas intersect?  We are led to understand that European integration 
has brought additional levels of influence to be exploited by social movement actors. 
They are using these new arenas to apply European pressure at national level and 
national pressure at a European level.  And these multiple dimensions are especially 
acute in the case of environmental issues.    But, of course, other questions inevitably 
arise.  How then do these opportunities shape the process of europeanisation?  Is 
europeanisation greatest when grassroots groups are pursuing their agenda 
domestically or at the level of the EU?  Are local and grassroots groups still within 
the reaches of the process of europeanisation?   

The second of the sub-questions I have highlighted – ‘to what extent does the degree 
of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of movement europeanisation?’ – 
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stems from strands of literature linked to those outlined above.  If social movements 
are to take advantage of new levels of governance and new political opportunities 
that have emerged as a result of European integration, will they then need to become 
institutionalised

  (della Porta & Caiani, 2007; della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; 
Rootes, 2002a, 2005)?  Indeed, for some, the processes of europeanisation and 
institutionalisation are synonymous: ‘[e]uropeanisation...refers to process of 
institutionalisation that are specifically related to the EU and European integration’ 
(Waterhout, 2008: 25).  For others, institutionalisation is a conscious social 
movement strategy.  For example, Rootes (2002a: 398) argues: 
Whether or not environmentalists respond to the opportunities the EU 
presents will depend not merely upon the experience of national politics but 
also upon their preferred styles of political action.  Action at the European 
level is most attractive to those whose styles of action are participatory only 
at elite level and for whom consultation, negotiation and lobbying are 
congenial. 
 
For his part, Van der Heijden (1997: 33) posits that the development of this 
institutionalised style of action is largely dependent on the political opportunity 
structures within which a movement operates: 
[T]he degree of institutionalisation to a large extent is determined by the 
specific political opportunity structure within which a social movement has to 
perform. In other words: in one country there will be more institutionalisation 
than in another depending on the political opportunity structure. 
In short, these authors would lead us to believe that a social movement will be 
europeanised to the extent that they are able to adapt their action repertoire to these 
new European-level opportunities, and their ability to adapt will depend, in part, on 
their degree of institutionalisation.  However, I argue that the reality of 
 
4
 I define institutionalisation as ‘a movement away from extreme ideologies and/or the adoption of 
more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention’ (Tarrow, 1998: 207). 
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europeanisation is more nuanced than the institutionalised/grassroots dichotomy 
suggests.  The interconnectedness of grassroots and more professionalised groups 
blurs the boundaries of institutionalisation.   
 
As for the behaviour of activists at the grassroots level of the movement, many 
authors suggest that the more local and grassroots-based groups within a social 
movement are, the less likely they are to ‘institutionalise’ (della Porta & Diani, 2006; 
Rootes, 2002b, 2003b; Tarrow, 1998).  Yet, others argue that the protest cycle of 
radicalisation and institutionalisation can be broken.  Of the non-violent direct action 
and social justice movements, Doherty (2002: 25) writes: 
...it seems possible that they will be able to continue without significant 
institutionalisation.  Both types of groups are strongly opposed to 
institutionalisation and may be able to sustain activity that complements that 
of better-resourced EMOs

 and green parties.  This is because they are rooted 
in communities whose culture is opposed to institutionalisation, but which 
have the commitment and resources to sustain grassroots activism. 
 
These ideas pose a quandary.  If europeanisation is felt most keenly by the most 
institutionalised actors, because they are best able to connect to the new European-
level opportunities

, then where does that leave grassroots groups?  Are they forced 
to adopt institutionalised strategies or might they be able to europeanise without 
institutionalising?  I investigate this question further when I distinguish between 
European and europeanised in chapters three and five. 
 
5
 Environmental Movement Organisations (EMOs) 
6
 The social movement literature holds that ‘the structure of EU institutions has tended to encourage 
lobbying rather than public protest’ (Rootes, 2003b: 250) which favours those social movement 
groups with more professionalised and institutionalised action repertoires See also (Ruzza, 2011). 
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1.3 Defining the Terms 
 
Defining Europeanisation 
The 1990s were characterised by a ‘europeanisation turn’ in political science 
scholarship.  It represented a development beyond the traditional studies of European 
integration that sought to theorise the process of integration itself and provide data to 
show what new EU actors and policies looked like.  Europeanisation, in contrast to 
these traditional integration studies, was interested in the impact of this integration 
on Member States.   
 
The origins of this development have been portrayed in different ways.  Jordan et. al 
(2007: 3) trace the convergence of three different streams of research: the impact of 
European integration on the national level, the examination of individual EU policies 
and focus on the European sources of domestic change.  Alternatively, Featherstone 
and Radaelli (2003: 6-12) identify four different ways in which europeanisation has 
been applied: as an historic phenomenon, transnational cultural diffusion, 
institutional adaptation, and finally as policy adaptation.  The exact origins of 
europeanisation research may be debatable, but agreement is widespread that it has 
emerged as a valued currency among scholars of the EU. 
 
The fashionable, or even ‘faddish’ (K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli, 2003: 3) 
application of europeanisation has proven, however, to be a double-edged sword.  
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The breadth of its application is confused by the breadth of its definition. Within the 
body of literature on europeanisation, four key debates over definitions bubble to the 
surface: 
1. Europeanisation as a top-down process 
Works based on this idea see europeanisation simply as the effect of European 
integration on member states. This understanding of europeanisation insists that: 
what matters for domestic actors and institutions is how the delegation to the 
European level affects policy outcomes in the domestic arena.  Put another 
way, who are the winners and losers from the EU? (Hix & Goetz, 2000: 3-4) 
 
The ‘mechanisms of europeanisation’: institutional compliance, political opportunity 
structures and the framing of expectations – as outlined by Knill and Lehmkuhl 
(1999) – are central to this genre of literature . 
 
2. Europeanisation as a reflexive process 
A reflexive view of europeanisation focuses on a kind of ‘feedback loop’ whereby 
EU policy impacts upon domestic actors, and those actors in turn shape EU policy 
(Börzel, 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2000; S. J. Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004).  Bomberg and 
Peterson (2000: 7) define europeanisation along these lines as: 
a complex process whereby national and sub-national institutions, political 
actors, and citizens adapt to, and seek to shape, the trajectory of European 





3. Europeanisation as ‘goodness of fit’ 
In this instance europeanisation is: 
 the extent to which domestic institutions have to change in order to comply 
with European rules and policies (Green Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001: 
7).   
 
Where EU policy fits well with national policy, there will be limited need for 
adaptation and thus limited europeanisation.  Where national and EU policies do not 
sit well together at all, it becomes very difficult to adapt to Europe and again there is 
limited scope for europeanisation.  Europeanisation is best evidenced, then, by cases 
of moderate adaptation.  This conceptualisation is commonly aligned with ideas of 
top-down europeanisation.  
 
4. Europeanisation as convergence. 
This definition sees europeanisation as a process of homogenisation amongst 
Member States.  Representative of these scholars are Mény et al. (1996: 8-9), whose 
work focuses on the: 
progressive emergence of a bundle of common norms of action, the evolution 
of which escapes the control of any particular member state and yet 
decisively influences the behaviour of public policy actors 
 
The first of these definitions - ‘europeanisation as a top-down process’ – takes a 
managerial approach to the process that reduces it to one of policy generation in the 
EU and policy implementation in the Member State.  It is, I argue, flawed for two 
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reasons.  The first is that, in intertwined political systems, it is very difficult to isolate 
the causation of x EU policy on y Member State – the ‘net change’ between the time 
before and time after a European policy is introduced (Vink & Graziano, 2007b: 9). 
Secondly, this understanding of europeanisation does not encompass other processes 
at work: the cognitive, normative or transnational dimensions of europeanisation are 
all missed.  The definition offered by Radaelli (2000: 4) is a good antidote to this 
approach because it captures both the informal and formal processes at work.  For 
him europeanisation is: 
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic 
of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.  
 
The second definition – ‘europeanisation as a reflexive process’ – recognises the 
ability of national actors to be shaped by and to shape the policies and politics of 
European integration.  The strength of this approach, as Börzel and Risse (2000: 1) 
explain, is that ‘as far as the EU is concerned, we will get a more comprehensive 
picture if we study the feedback processes among and between the various levels of 
European, national, and subnational governance’.  This definition is a persuasive one 
because it is able to accommodate the policies, practices and norms that are 
developed by Member States and then ‘uploaded’ back to the supranational level in 
order to inform the future direction of EU integration.  This idea is central to the 




The third approach to europeanisation – as ‘goodness of fit’ – depicts different 
mechanisms or policies as the variables that account for the degree of institutional 
change at a national level.  But this interpretation cannot account for other 
mechanisms of change such as institutionalisation or transnationalism

 between 
states. Furthermore, the idea of ‘goodness of fit’ only works when there is an explicit 
EU model or policy with which domestic structures must ‘fit’.  Where 
europeanisation occurs through softer mechanisms such as socialisation or regulatory 
competition then this interpretation becomes problematic (K. Featherstone & C. M. 
Radaelli, 2003: 14-16).   
 
Finally, I do not subscribe to the idea that europeanisation is synonymous with 
convergence because as Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 33) note ‘there is a 
difference between a process and its consequences’.   This approach would not be 
able to account for the effects on interest representation (Eising, 2007) or 
administrative adaptation (Laffan, 2007), for example. 
 
In this thesis, I refine these varying conceptions of europeanisation to create my own.  
Europeanisation is: the process of constructing and diffusing formal and informal 
rules, beliefs and norms that originate in the EU and are interpreted by Member 
States.   Key to this definition are three ideas:  
 
7
 I define transnationalism here as ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across 
the borders of nation-states’ (Vertovec, 2009: 1) 
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(1) europeanisation does not rely on the straightforward implementation of policy 
but may be manifest in informal processes and ways of doing things; 
(2)  europeanisation is a two-way process where the EU and Member States have 
an impact on one another;  
(3) europeanisation may be observed to occur between member states as policies 
and  practices are diffused and reinterpreted. 
 
Europeanisation then works vertically with impact flowing between the EU and the 
Member States. But it also works laterally, with impact ‘taking on a life of its own’ 
and being diffused between states.  

Defining the Green Movement 
The second definition central to this thesis is that of the ‘green movement’.  This 
study presents findings on the activities of a variety of actors involved in each of the 
case study campaigns: from political parties to environmental movement 
organisations (EMOs) to grassroots activists living in a protest camp.  Thus, it is 
important to be especially precise in defining the parameters of this term.  First of all, 
what do we mean by a social movement?   Doherty (2002: 7) draws on the work of 
della Porta and Diani (2006: 14-16) to provide us with a very helpful point of 





(1) They must have a consciously shared collective identity 
There must be a shared sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’.  This identity is forged through 
shared frames and ways of interpreting the world around them, but also shared 
cultures and practices. McAdam et al. (2001: 21) underscore the importance of this 
element of ‘otherness’ in their definition of social movements: 
A social movement is a sustained interaction between mighty people and 
others lacking might; a continuing challenge to existing power-holders in the 
name of a population whose interlocutors declare it to be injustly suffering 
harm or threatened with such harm. 
 
(2) They must act at least partly outside political institutions 
The act of protest is a key dimension to this criterion.  The movement will perceive 
established, democratic political institutions as an inappropriate arena for their 
arguments and will take their claims, at least in part, into to the public domain.  In 
practice, however, this protest does not need to be directed at those in power – it 
might take the form of challenging the legitimacy of certain social practices.  
Doherty offers the example of green activists in Manchester who dressed up as aliens 
visiting Earth for the first time; milling about amongst Christmas shoppers they 
asked to know more about the curious pursuit of consuming ever more material 
things.  This was not an act of protest in the conventional sense, but in their parody 






(3) Social movements are characterised by non-institutionalised networks of 
interaction 
Although there may be a variety of different movement groups within a movement, 
the ties that bind them are loose and do not have to be formalised in membership of a 
particular umbrella organisation.  There are two important institutionalised actors 
that may still be considered part of the movement (in the case of the green movement 
at least): green parties and environmental movement organisations.  Doherty (2002: 
12) notes that: 
since green parties are formally organised political parties working within 
political institutions they might appear to be outside the green movement.  
Yet most theorists choose to include them as part of the movement because of 
the strong bonds between most green parties and other parts of the green 
movement. 
 
He also observes that ‘those EMOs that do not challenge the existing political or 
social system are not part of the green movement’.  Within the networks then must 
be actors who challenge the established socio-political arrangements – whether they 
are professionalised or not matters only to the extent that they offer this challenge.  
In principle then an institutionalised actor such as an environmental movement 
organisation may be part of the green movement if they challenge political and 







(4) They must reject, or challenge dominant forms of power 
Ideas about what is wrong and who may be held responsible occur in the 
construction of social movement frames – in the discourses, activities and 
interactions of social movement groups.  However, this attribute of a movement does 
make it easier to assess what is not a movement.  A collection of groups that engage 
in protest against a given issue is not a movement if their agenda does not challenge 
the underlying ideologies and power structures (such as capitalism); protests against 
fox hunting or vivisection are not social movements, for example. 
Using the framework outlined above, do the actors in the case study campaigns 
(outlined in chapter two) qualify as a social movement?  Certainly the local 
grassroots groups are easily identified as falling within the social movement 
typology.  More difficult are professionalised actors.  Doherty asserts that EMOs 
who do not challenge the existing socio-political system cannot be classed as part of 
the social movement.  Whilst this might be true of the European offices of these 
organisations, it is important to note that they are not representative of the full 
spectrum of actors within their group.  Marks and McAdam (1999) and Tarrow 
(2006: 175) observe: 
[T]here is a disjunction between European environmental umbrella groups, 
like those that are connected through the EEB
	
, and their national chapters.  
First, while the former engage heavily in the politics of expertise favoured by 
the European Commission, the latter use a combination of routine and 




 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) 
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In fact, the relationship may even stretch beyond disjunction if ‘Brussels-level 
umbrella groups do not always enjoy the support of their member organisations who 
are more engaged in national politics and protests’ (Tarrow, 2006: 173).  This point 
serves to highlight how very local the local chapters of an EMO or an NGO can be.  
The local chapter of an organisation such as Friends of the Earth will have far more 
in common with grassroots groups in the same area than with Friends of the Earth 
UK or Friends of the Earth Europe.  Of course, the extent to which the local chapters 
of EMOs are removed from national and supranational administrations will vary 
between organisations.  As we will see, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is far more 
centralised than Friends of the Earth, for example.  Nonetheless, the fact that local 
chapters tend to be situated much more in the grassroots level of work than the label 
‘EMO’ means that, where appropriate, I include them as actors in the case study 
movements.  A similar situation also applies to Green political parties.  In many 
countries, the parties were formed from the environmental movement itself and, 
despite professionalization, retain strong ties to the more radical politics of the 
national green movement groups – especially true in the case of the UK.   
 
For this reason, in cases where local grassroots groups work with local chapters of 
EMOs or political parties, I include them in my analysis of the movement.  Where 
appropriate I make the distinction between these different kinds of actors.  But when 
they act at in small numbers, at a local level and form part of a formal or informal 
network (i.e. when they meet the other criteria stated above), then I group them 
together under the banner of grassroots groups.  Grassroots here refers to informally-
co-ordinated, small-scale, localised protest. 
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The above four dimensions provide a guide for how we may identify the ‘movement’ 
part of green movements – but what of the ‘green’?  One of the key divisions 
between actors concerned about the environment is between those who are ecologists 
and those who are environmentalists.  The difference is essentially one of ideology.  
Dobson (2000: 2) explains: 
environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental 
problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental 
changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption and 
ecologism holds that  a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes 
radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world and in 
our mode of social and political life. 
Whilst it is important to understand the ideological nuances that separate 
environmental actors, this division is not a central concern of the work presented in 
this thesis.  I use the term ‘green’ as an overarching label within which actors sit on 
an ideological spectrum of ‘shades of green’.  Here, the green movement may be 
composed of deep ecologists or ‘dark greens’, as well as modernising 
environmentalists or ‘light greens’.  But they may (and often do) still work side-by-
side on specific campaigns.   I therefore use the term ‘green’ to apply to the full 
spectrum of actors with environmental concerns. 
 
Having outlined the contours of what it is to be a social movement and what it is to 
be green, I arrive at a definition of green movement.  Rootes’ definition addresses the 
four dimensions of a social movement presented above, but is also able to 
accommodate the spectrum of actors that work on local-level campaigns.  The green 
movement therefore is: 
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a loose non-institutionalized network that includes, as well as individuals and 
groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying 
degrees of formality, that is engaged in collective action, and that is 






Defining Political Opportunity Structures  
concept of POS, part of a ‘political process’ approach to social movement study, 
has been developed over the past 20 years as a means of explaining social movement 
emergence and success.   The essential message is that activists do not choose their 
modus operandi in a vacuum – their goals and their tactics are contingent on the 
political context in which they are operating.  The strength of political opportunity 
structures therefore lies in its capacity to explain the differential mobilisation of 
similar movements between countries and at different points in time. 
 
Political opportunity structures as a concept has evolved over the course of the past 
40 years, starting with Eisinger’s (1973) analysis of protest in different American 
cities in which he identified the openness or closure of the local public administration 
as a key variable in explaining the protests.  These two variables of ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ political systems have been added to (by considerations of electoral systems, 




 Rootes applies this definition to the environmental movement whereas I apply it to the green 
movement.  My definition of green movement however accommodates a full spectrum of 




Two main streams of thought have emerged: those who favour the static aspect of the 
variables (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1993; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 
1992) and those who emphasise a more dynamic interpretation (Imig & Tarrow, 
2000; Tarrow, 1998).  Their variables and a broader discussion of the political 
opportunity structures approach are presented in chapters three and four. At this 
stage, it serves us to present only the variables that are operationalised in this thesis.  
McAdam (1996: 26-27) provides a useful synthesis of the commonly agreed 
variables: 
1) the openness or closure of the state 
2) the stability of elite alignments 
3) the availability of elite allies  
4) the state’s capacity for repression 
 
In this thesis, I concentrate my attention on the first three of these variables.  I do not 
concern myself with the state’s capacity for repression because I consider this to be 
an overarching theme of the political opportunity structures rather than a discrete 
variable on its own.  This interpretation leads me to develop my own definition of 
political opportunity structures as the structural features of a political system that 
shape the conditions for social movement action.  The core structural features 
explored here are: the strength of the state to implement its policies, the openness of 









Frames became the subject of increased academic attention during the 1980s, when 
sociologists began to develop further the ideas of beliefs within social movements.  
They sought to understand how meanings were constructed, diffused and used 
strategically.  From this perspective, Benford and Snow write (2000: 613): 
social movements are not viewed as carriers of extant ideas and meanings 
that grow out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events or existing 
ideologies.  Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively 
engaged in the production and maintenance for constituents, antagonists and 
bystanders or observers.  
 
Furthermore, because frames are a product of collective negotiation, they are the 
embodiment of the diffusion of social movement ideas.  In this way, they are 
particularly well suited to capturing transnationalism and, in this case, 
europeanisation within social movements. 
 
In chapter five, I provide a more comprehensive discussion of framing and the 
current literature.  Here I present the three functions of social movement frames, and 
offer a working definition.  Snow and Benford (1988: 199) identify the three 
properties of a frame as:  
1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in 
need of alteration;  




3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action. 
 
In my own analysis of frames, I synthesise these diagnostic, prognostic and 
mobilising functions into two areas of analysis: mobilising frames (what is the issue? 
Who is affected?) and problematising frames (who is responsible?)  The above three 
functions and two areas of analysis sit within my definition of frames as action 
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a 
social movement group. 
 
1.4 Research Design 
 
My research questions have been shaped by two established approaches from social 
movement theory: political opportunity structures and framing.  The overarching 
question to be investigated is ‘how has europeanisation altered the mobilisation 
strategies and practices of grassrootsgreen groups in Europe?’  Within this remit two 
nested questions emerge:  
 
• Where does the europeanisation of social movement predominantly occur – at 
the domestic or European level? 
• To what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the 




The theoretical background to this approach lies in the competing perspectives of 
political science and social movement research into europeanisation.  While political 
science accounts have privileged the study of green policies (Buller, Lowe, & Flynn, 
1993; Jordan, 2000; Liefferink & Jordan, 2002) and parties (Bomberg, 2002; 
Bomberg & Carter, 2006; Hines, 2003), and therefore privileged the role of the 
national or supranational state, social movement scholarship has focussed on the 
trans-nationalisation of these movements rather than the specific processes associated 
with the impact of European integration (Doherty, 2006; Doherty & Doyle, 2006; 
Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rootes, 2005).   The research questions detailed above are 
informed by both of these pools of literature,  using europeanisation ideas about 
‘goodness of fit’ (Green Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001) which suggest the 
importance of the role of the state, alongside social movement theory about the role 
of political opportunity structures and frames (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996).   
In this section I explain the overall design for the project in light of the research 
questions: the variables examined and case selection.  Information about the data 
collection methods chosen and the ethical issues and implications for the participants 
is included in the appendices. 
 
Variables 
A good deal of academic attention over the past ten years has been devoted to the 
appropriate research design for studying europeanisation (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 
2009a, 2009b; Falkner, 2003; Howell, 2002; Liebert, 2002; Saurugger, 2005).  One 
of the fulcrums of this debate is the direction in which europeanisation flows.  For 
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those who take a top-down approach (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; Saurugger, 2005), europeanisation is the independent 
variable.  They seek to explain the impact that europeanisation has on policies or 
polities using approaches such as ‘goodness of fit’.  For those who take a bottom-up 
approach and therefore consider it an independent variable, (McCauley, 2011; C. 
Radaelli, 2004, 2006; C. M. Radaelli, 2008) ‘europeanistion should not be 
considered as “something that explains”, but rather “something to be explained” by 
mainstream social science’ (McCauley, 2011: 1). 
In this research project we ask ‘how europeanised is the green movement and how do 
we measure it?’. So, in this instance, europeanisation is something to explain the 
behaviour of the green movement. Europeanisation thus must be treated as an 
independent variable.   
 
However, it is important to note that this choice does not mean that europeanisation 
must only ever be considered an independent variable.  Indeed, I concur with those 
who argue that europeanisation is a reflexive process.  Therefore, whilst it is a 
process capable of shaping the green movement, so in turn may the movement shape 
the process of europeanisation.   In this thesis, however, I choose to examine 
primarily one direction of the flow of influence, whilst acknowledging that this 
direction forms part of a broader picture.  Figure 1.1 below illustrates how this sits 




Also illustrated in this figure are what I have called ‘domains of europeanisation’, 
and which may be considered intervening variables – the channels through which 
europeanisation flows, mediating the impact of europeanisation upon the movement.  
These variables are drawn from two areas of social movement theory: political 
opportunity structures and frames.  This thesis examines to what extent these 
domains, which are also variables, are conduits for europeanisation and to what 









Figure 1.1: The variables in the europeanisation of social movements 
 
Case study selection 
Case studies have developed a strong pedigree within qualitative research design.  In 
contrast to other approaches such as experimental or historical methods, which 
EUROPEANISATION  DOMAINS SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
Political opportunity structures 
Frames 
Independent variable          Intervening variables             Dependent variable 
IMPACT 
 Shows the reflexive cycle of europeanisation 
 Shows europeanisation having a differential impact on social movements 
Shows europeanisation having a differential impact on social movements 
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usually concentrate on a very limited number of variables, ‘[o]ne of the strengths of 
case studies is that they attempt to understand the significance of particular factors 
within the whole case rather than screening out this context’ (de Vaus, 2001: 247).   
Given the aim of this research project, to investigate the various factors at play in the 
complex and highly contextualised process of europeanisation, a case study design 
was deemed the most appropriate approach. 
 
The cases I selected for my research were chosen according to a number of theory-
based and practical considerations.   The countries and policy areas were also chosen 
for their capacity to produce ‘contrasting results for predictable reasons’ or 
‘theoretical replication’ (Yin, 1994: 18).   Given these choices, it was important to 
hold some factors constant and to make the cases truly comparable.  From the 
literature on political opportunity studies, it is clear that a cross-national comparison 
will be helpful in establishing how the process of europeanisation manifests itself.  
Reising (1998: 10) writes:  
 
the Europeanization of protest occurs displaying systematic cross-national 
differences. These differences are, as the results suggest, related to the 
differential between the constraints of the actors' domestic environments and 
the common-to-all evolving opportunities on the level of European politics. 
 
One of the least contested claims in the literature on POS is that the concept is most 
useful when applied to cross-country analyses.  Furthermore, the strong pedigree of 
the multiple case study method means that in order to answer these research 
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questions, I needed a multiple country study. In selecting the countries there were 
three main criteria:   
 
1. All countries should be Member States of the European Union in order to 
isolate the effect of the European Union as opposed to other transnational 
processes such as globalisation. 
Previous studies of europeanisation have found a strong relationship between the 
degree of europeanisation and the policy area within member state administrations 
(Jordan, 2000; Jordan & Liefferink, 2007; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002).  Based on this 
evidence, it was decided that all of the case studies countries should have been 
member states of the European Union since 2004 (EU 15) and therefore subject to 
the same legislative history within the EU, the same policy making regulations and 
influences.  In this way the ‘national impact of the EU’ variable may be held as 
constant as possible. 
 
2. All countries needed to have an active green movement in order to compare 
systematically the opportunities and frames used at a local level 
A second consideration was the nature of environmentalism within each of the case 
study countries.  Although I was comparing specific grassroots and localised 
protests, some of these groups were affiliated to larger EMOs or to small but vibrant 
grassroots groups.  If there were not similar levels of activity across the spectrum of 
environmental groups in each country, then these relationships and the frames that 
they constructed would not be easily comparable. 
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3. I need to speak the languages of the countries chosen in order to 
communicate with local-level actors for whom English may not be a second 
language. 
 
The final consideration was based on the grassroots nature of the research.  Because I 
would be interviewing members of the general public in my case study countries, I 
needed to be able to speak to them in their own language.   This choice broadened 
the number of actors that I was able to speak to beyond only English-speakers, and 
also allowed the participants to express themselves more openly. 
 
Beyond comparing the europeanisation of grassroots green groups across EU 
member states, I decided to introduce a second comparative dimension to the project.  
By studying protest in two policy areas, I was able to generate richer insights into 
how europeanisation diffuses to a grassroots level.  To this end, two areas were 
selected: genetically-modified crop protest and road-building protest.  Both of these 
areas are subject to European Union legislation, although they differ in two 
interesting ways: the degree of EU regulation, and the way that these policies are 
implemented at a national level.   
 
Let us first consider the degree of EU regulation.  Genetically modified crops are 
subject to much more binding and comprehensive regulation than road-building 
projects.  The EU has approved the cultivation of two kinds of genetically modified 
maize in Europe (MON 863 and MON 810) and legislation on the cultivation of 
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those crops is binding in each Member State.  Despite the ‘safeguard clause’ that 
permits individual member states to effectively impose a national moratorium, the 
ability to impose this control in practice is limited.  For example, in September 2011 
the European Court of Justice ruled that France’s de facto moratorium on the 
cultivation of GM crops was illegal (Reuters, 2011a).  In the field of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), Member States are tightly bound by EU regulation.  
McCauley (2011: 8) notes ‘The anti-GMO movement...is indeed a particularly 
interesting case for studying Europeanization processes due to the marked 
involvement of EU policy and legislation on GMOs’.  This close involvement 
contrasts with road-building policy, where decision-making is largely devolved to the 
level of the Member State.  While the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network 
(TEN-T) provides guidance and funding for road-building proposals, these proposals 
are generated by the Member States themselves.  Koopmans (2007: 187) underscores 
the important explanatory power that different ‘issue areas’ or policies have in the 
process of europeanisation: 
‘These analyses reveal that the share of Europeanised claims diverges 
strongly across issue fields. In issue fields where European competencies are 
strong (e.g. monetary and agricultural politics), public debates are strongly 
Europeanised...In the other four issue fields that we studied (immigration, 
troop deployment, pensions and retirement, and education) Europeanisation 
tendencies were much less strong. This is less a result of a lack of media 
interest in European issues than of the fact that most decision-making 
competencies in these fields have thus far remained on the national level.’ 
 
In exploring two policy areas with differential degrees of regulation, I am able to 
generate insights into the relationship between the degree of europeanisation within a 
movement and the degree of EU legislation at a national level. 
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Furthermore, the two policy areas are contrasted in the way they manifest themselves 
on the ground.  The cultivation of GM crops results in trial sites in the case study 
countries around which a particular incidence of protest may evolve; indeed many of 
the anti-GMO groups studied in the case of France and the UK had their roots in 
such protest.  In recent years, however, the commercial or trial cultivation of GM 
crops has declined as environmental protesters across Europe have expressed 
concern.  The current campaign of the anti-GMO movement in each of the case 
studies is therefore one of awareness-raising. There is no specific ‘incident’ (for 
example a local trial site) around which they mobilise, but they fight to keep public 
opinion turned against GM crops and to change national and EU decisions on the 
cultivation, import and labelling of GMOs.   
 
Road-building projects are different. They result in a specific tangible site (or 
proposal) around which social movement groups may mobilise.  This local emphasis 
changes the focus of social movement groups from a long-term awareness raising 
strategy to one of immediate action.  It changes the way in which the issue is framed, 
the kind of mobilisation strategies pursued, and the kind of actors likely to get 
involved. 
 
In summary, I have chosen to compare two areas of environmental protest: GM crops 
and road-building.  I have studied both of these areas within three European 
countries: France, Italy and the UK.  Within each of these cases, I look at the role 
that political opportunity structures and frames play in determining the degree of 
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europeanisation of the green movement. Figure 1.2 illustrates this investigative 
matrix. 
 
France Italy UK 
POS POS POS 
GMOs 
Frames Frames Frames 
POS POS POS 
Roads 
Frames Frames Frames 
 
Figure 1.2: Matrix illustrating the units of analysis 
 
Time-frame 
I chose to study the six case study campaigns over a period of time, focussing mainly 
on the period 2007-2010.  The reasoning for this is both logistical and informed by 
research theory.   
First of all, it was important to follow the groups over a period of time, rather than to 
get a snapshot of events.  This time-frame enabled me to capture any adaptations to 
the actors’ frames or networks or modifications to their action repertoire.  Within this 
time period, I conducted two periods of fieldwork across my case studies, in the 
autumns of 2008 and 2009.  A second reason for this time-frame is that it represented 
a significant period of activity for two of the road campaigns under consideration.  
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2007 is the year that new plans for the Italian Corridoio Tirrenico were established 
and also the year that the A65

 in France began construction.  In the case of the UK 
reference, a slightly longer time-span is necessary to capture the arc of the 
campaigns.  In the case of the A701

, by 2007 the proposed re-routing of the road at 
Bilston Glen had been suspended for two years due to funding constraints.  I 
therefore also make reference in my analysis to part of the campaign which took 
place in the years from 2002, when the proposal was approved by the Scottish 
Executive.   
 
In the case of the GMO campaign in Devon, it is also important to reference the 
years previous to 2007 when the roots of the contemporary anti-GMO movement 
were grown in the field trials of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Therefore, the 
timeframe of the study is not tightly-bound.  But it does offer a framework within 
which to concentrate analysis and offers scope to accommodate the changing 






 The Corridoio Tirrenico or ‘Tyrrhenian Corridor’ is a road expansion and diversion project planned 
for a section of existing road along the Tuscan coastline.  This project, together with the others 
mentioned below, is outlined further in chapter 2. 
12
 TheA65 is a new motorway built between Bordeaux in France and Pau on the Spanish border. Work 
was completed December 2010. 
13





Data Collection Methods 
The research design of this thesis, like much social movement analysis, adopts a 
qualitative approach.  The research methods are therefore very much grounded in this 
qualitative tradition.  I rely on a triangulation of methods to enhance the robustness 
of my findings: case studies, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis.   
The process of sourcing these materials and conducting fieldwork is discussed in 
detail in Appendix 1. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.  The first two chapters outline the 
theoretical background to the work, the research design and the cases studied.  
Chapters three to six use the case studies to explore political opportunity structures 
and frames, analysing what europeanisation means for environmental actors in these 
domains.  The seventh chapter draws comparative conclusions from the case studies 
before chapter eight highlights the conclusions of the thesis and suggest further 
avenues of exploration. 
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical background to investigating europeanisation 
and the green movement, introduced the research questions that guide the thesis and 
defined the key terms.  It has also outlined the contribution that this work makes to 
scholarship on europeanisation and on social movements.  The chapter then 
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presented the comparative research design used in the thesis – it outlined the 
variables chosen, the process of case study selection and the research methods 
employed. 
 
Chapter two offers a descriptive outline to the six individual case study campaigns.  
It begins with an overview of GMOs and road-building in the context of European 
integration before focussing on the specific campaigns.  I present the main issues, 
actors and activities in each case.  This background serves to contextualise the 
analysis that follows in subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter three conceptualises political opportunity structures in more detail.  It 
reviews the way in which POS is used to explain differential social movement 
behaviours and the range of variables developed by scholarship in this area.  I draw 
on this work to create my own working definitions and then apply them to the 
national level.  This national framework acts as a basis to develop European and 
europeanised political opportunity structures.  I argue that a social movement will 
show evidence of europeanisation to the extent that it is able to connect to either of 
these sets of political opportunities.  This chapter concludes with an outline of the 
national political opportunity structures in each of the case study countries that 




Chapter four applies the theoretical framework of the previous chapter to my case 
study campaigns.  It first presents European political opportunity structures, 
examining each campaign in turn for evidence that they were able to connect to these 
structures.  Europeanised political opportunity structures are then addressed in the 
same manner.  It illustrates that there is evidence of social movements groups 
connecting to both European and europeanised POS and offers explanations for why 
each campaign experiences these opportunities differently.  
 
Chapter five centres on social movement frames.  Here, the contours of frames are 
outlined – I review the way in which frames have been used to explain how social 
movements recruit and mobilise support.  The main ‘framing tasks’ are presented and 
I distil this literature into my own definition of frames.  The baseline of how frames 
work at a national level is used to illustrate the possibility of capturing both 
European and europeanised frames.  As in chapter three, I argue that a social 
movement will show evidence of europeanisation to the extent that it is able to 
connect to either of these sets of frames.  I present the three distinctly national ways 
in which ‘the environment’ is framed in each of our case study countries.  The 
chapter concludes with an overview of the national environmental masterframe in 
each of the case study countries. 
 
Chapter six applies the concepts of European and europeanised frames to the six case 
study campaigns.  I begin with European frames, examining each campaign in turn 
for evidence that the social movement groups were able to connect to this frame.  
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Europeanised frames are addressed in the same way.  I demonstrate that there is 
evidence of social movements groups connecting to both European and europeanised 
frames and I offer explanation to account for the differential uptake of national, 
European and europeanised frames. 
 
Chapter seven draws comparative conclusions from the analysis in the thesis.  The 
findings are reviewed along three axes: by protest issue, by country and by domain.  
Within each of these areas the evidence for direct, indirect and passive 
europeanisation is discussed.  I illustrate how europeanisation is refracted differently 
through each of these variables and highlight the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of europeanisation for actors who work outside of the mechanisms of 
the state.  The degree of variation amongst the spectrum of social movement actors is 
also identified.   
 
Chapter eight situates these findings in two important debates in social and political 
science: the theories of European integration – particularly multi-level governance, 
and the prospects for a europeanised green movement.  I argue that although the 
green movement may have access to new levels of governance as a result of 
European integration it does not follow that they are able to exercise influence at all 
of those levels.  It follows therefore that a europeanised green movement seems a 
distant prospect, although further work on conceptualising a europeanisation 






2 Cases, Countries and Controversies 
 
‘Civil society actors are, at the same time, critical towards the EU, but also 
(potential and actual) entrepreneurs of europeanisation.  They legitimize Europe 
while criticizing it’ 





In the previous chapter I outlined the research question of this study: what does 
europeanisation mean for the strategies and practices of the green movement?  We 
established the research design being to investigate this question, noting that case 
selection was important.  Here, the cases have been selected along two different 
dimensions: country (France, Italy and the UK) and protest area (Genertically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) and road-building). This affords us the opportunity to 
draw cross-national and cross-issue comparisons.   
 
In this descriptive chapter I outline the contours of these case study issues and case 
study countries in order to contextualise the analysis in the following chapters.  The 
chapter begins by explaining the way in which GMO and road-building legislation 
has played out at the European and national levels, and how associated protest has 
developed alongside it.  It then moves to outline the specific protests in France, Italy 
and the UK against Genetically Modified (GM) crops and road-building.  In France 
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we examine the anti-road protest against the construction of the A65 between 
Langon and Pau in the Aquitaine region of Southern France.  Also in Aquitaine, one 
of France’s largest maize-growing regions, I study the ongoing campaign against 
GM crops.  In Italy, I evaluate the campaign against the Corridoio Tirrenico road 
running along the Tuscan coast and the anti-GMO campaign in that same region, the 
first of the Italian regions to declare themselves GMO-free.  Finally, in the UK I 
investigate the campaign against the re-routing of the A71 at Bilston outside 
Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in Devon, again the first region 
in the country to declare itself GM-free.   
 
Within each of these case study campaigns I describe three important features: the 
issue at stake, the actors involved and the activities of the social movement groups 
involved.  In order to assist the reader I also provide a brief table at the start of each 
case outlining the main actors involved and any necessary translations.  The overall 
aim of this chapter is to provide a background to the case study campaigns over 
which I layer analysis in the following chapters. 

2.2 Anti-Road and Anti-GMO Protest in Context  

i) Road Policy and Protest 
With regard to road-building projects in Europe and associated protest, the EU’s 
responsibilities for legislating on transport policy are deep-rooted in the Treaty of 
Rome and latterly the development of the Single Market.  Stevens explains how in 
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the early development of transport policy ‘France, Germany and Italy...with large 
territories, and dispersed populations, were much more accustomed to extensive 
State intervention in the provision of both road and rail transport, and wanted a 
common transport policy that would allow such intervention to continue ’(2003: 38-
39).  The preference for national autonomy over road-building projects is one that 
has persevered, and is well-illustrated in the EU’s legislation in this area. 
 
The EU’s main instrument of influence over road transport policy is through Trans-
European Transport Networks (TEN-Ts), established by The Treaty on the European 
Union in 1992 which ‘must aim to promote the development of Trans-European 
Networks as a key element for the creation of the Internal Market and the 
reinforcement of Economic and Social Cohesion’ (European Union, 2008).  The 
main function of the Network, through its managing body the Trans-European 
Transport Network Executive Agency(TEN-T  EA), is to ensure that integrated 
transport networks for rail, road, air and water are available to serve all of Europe in 
order to maintain economic competition and to support the single market.  Making 
the network sustainable and meeting the environmental challenge that the network 
poses also fall under the TEN-T’s remit.  The Network is resourced by a number of 
EU financial instruments such as the TEN-T Programme, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Regional Development Fund and European Investment Bank's loans and 
credit guarantees and provides organisational resources to assist with cross-border 
cooperation  (European Union, 2011).  On 19 October 2011 the European 
Commission adopted a proposal to renovate the existing TEN-T network, making the 
development of core ‘corridors’ more of a priority and focusing spending on a 
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smaller number of projects.  The TEN-T is designed to support and facilitate the 
work of Member States rather than to dictate where roads should be built.  
 
A consequence of responsibility for transport policy lying at the level of the member 
state is that environmental protest against road-building is therefore also most 
commonly directed at this national level. In the UK this was most obviously manifest 
in the 1989 ‘Roads to Prosperity’ programme, promising £23 million investment in 
the country’s road infrastructure over 30 years – a scheme which, coupled with new 
evidence about the environmental consequences of road transport, resulted in the 
infamous road protests of the 1990s.  Occupations at Twyford Down and the 
Newbury Bypass attracted significant press attention and spawned the creation of 
numerous local groups and national organisations including Transport 2000, Road 
Alert! and Alarm UK (Doherty, 1998; Plows, 2006; Rootes, 2003a).  The anti-road 
protest of this time has been called ‘the first significant example of environmental 
protest by a New Social movement in Britain’ (Doherty, 1999: 276) and created a 
legacy of localised anti-road activism and of non-violent direct action which, as the 
case below shows, continues today.   
 
In France and Italy the context of anti-road protest is less memorable.  There is a 
significant history of public-private partnerships in the road sector in France and 
Italy, making grand national road-building programmes less necessary because 
contracts are negotiated on an individual ad hoc basis with only partial state finance.  
As a consequence, anti-road protest too operates on an ad-hoc basis without – against 
the Treno Alta Velocità (High Speed Rail Network) for example  (della Porta, 2006b) 
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or the Somport Tunnel (Hayes, 2000).  In the following sections we examine the 
interplay between European and national legislation in specific instances of GMO or 
road-building protest.   
 
ii) GMO Policy and Protest 
The use of GM crops has courted scientific and political debate since advances in 
technology the 1970s made their widespread application possible.  Also known as 
genetic engineering or recombinant-DNA technology, the European Union defines 
GMOs as ‘organisms in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way 
that does not occur naturally by mating or natural recombination (European Union, 
2006: 3).   
 
Unsurprisingly GM goods have a substantial legislative history within the European 
Union
14 
supplemented by a number of auxiliary regulations and recommendations 
adopted to support these actions.  In the context of these case studies, the most 
significant of these was Article 23 or ‘the safeguard clause’ in Directive 
2001/18/EEC which allowed Member States to restrict or refuse the use or sale of 
GMOs in the territory.  The clause was invoked by Italy, France and the UK at points 
throughout the late 1990s and 2000s
15
.  Most recently, and in response to this 
resistance, the EU has proposed using subsidiarity for GM legislation, allowing 
 
14
 This legislation falls into five themes: (1) the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms, (2) the deliberate release onto the market of GMOs (3) placing onto the market GM food 
or animal feed (4) intentional and unintentional movement of GMOs between Member States of the 
European Union and third countries, (5) labelling and traceability of GM products (European Union, 
2006: 4-5) 
15
 The Safeguard Clause is currently in operation in 6 Member States: Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary and Luxembourg. Italy has said that it will refuse the cultivation of GMOs but has 
not done so formally (European Commission, 2010: 34). 
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Member States to decide whether GM crops may be cultivated on their land 
(European Commission, 2010: 36).   
 
One of the most notable aspects of the legislative procedure surrounding GMOs is 
the difficulty with which consensus is reached.  Abels notes that ‘in all cases where a 
competent authority approved the market release of a GMO, a competent authority in 
another member state raised objections and in so doing initiated the comitology 
procedure’ (Abels, 2002: 7).  The consequences of a divisive technology and a 
complicated legislative system suggest an increased scope for anti-GMO protesters 
to articulate their concern publically and gain empathy while the cumbersome EU 
legislative process is underway.  Kettnaker asserts ‘it is when the EU’s legislative 
process progresses too slowly or deviates markedly from the public preference that 
consumer campaigns are most likely to have an effect.  That this effect seems to have 
been greatest on national corporations is one of the complexities of the emerging 
European polity’ (2001: 227). 
 
Against this legislative background Kettnaker notes that ‘since the mid-1990s, there 
has been considerable grass-roots resistance in Europe to the cultivation of 
genetically modified plants and their use in food products.  Before the first half of 
1996, the protest was mostly confined to sporadic local campaigns against 
experimental fields of genetically modified crops’ (Kettnaker, 2001: 205).  This was 
followed by two ‘waves of protest’ throughout the EU Member States – the first 
from 1996-1997 developed in Central European countries like Austria, Switzerland, 
Germany and then Italy.  A second wave gathered Britain and France on board 
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(Kettnaker, 2001: 210).  Analysis of public attitudes to GM crops in the 
Eurobarometer surveys show a steady decline in support between 1996-2010: in 
France support fell from 43% to 16%, in Italy from 51% to 24% and in the UK from 
52% to 44% (European Commission, 2010: 40).  Since the protest of the 1990s and 
the decline in public encouragement for GMOs, the focus of anti-GMO campaigning 
has been largely awareness-raising.  Groups seek to maintain pressure on 
governments and consumers not to endorse GM production.  This earlier protest 
means that the field trials of GM crops are few and far between, so the case studies 
we consider now are united in this continued effort. 
 
2.3 Protest in France 

i) The French Anti-Road Campaign 
ACTORS TRANSLATION 
ARLP (Alternative Régionale Langon Pau)   Langon Paul Regional Alternative 
SEPANSO (Fédération des Sociétés pour 
l’Etude, la Protection et l’Aménagement de 
la nature dans le Sud-Ouest) 
Federation of Societies for 
Environmental Protection and 
Management in the South West 
Amis de la Terre Friends of the Earth 
France Nature Environnement France, Nature, Environment 
Greenpeace  
Réseau Action Climat France  Climate Action Network France 
World Wildlife Fund(WWF)  
European Environmental Bureau (EEB)  
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i) The Issue 
This case centres on the proposal to build the A65 motorway which bridged the 
150km from Langon in the Gironde, through Les Landes, to Pau in the Pyrénées 
Atlantiques.  The A65 is also known as the Autoroute de Gascogne.  It is a four-lane 
toll motorway (the projected completed in December 2010), and was designed to 
offer a quicker route between Bordeaux and Pau than the existing RN134, RD932 
and RD934 roads which were thought to be congested. 
  
The road drops down from Langon to intersect with the A62, and then passes down 
through the Gironde and the eastern parts of the Landes until it merges with the 
bypass around Aire-sur-l'Adour.  It then continues to head south through northern 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques to join the A64 (Bayonne-Pau-Tarbes-Toulouse) at Poey-de-
Lescar, near Pau (see Fig. 2.1).  Now finished, the new road also integrates with the 










          Figure 2.1: The route of the A65 
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The road is being built in Public-Private Partnership, with construction being 
initiated by the Comité Interministériel d’Aménagement et de Compétitivité du 
Territoire (CIACT) (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Development and 
Competitiveness) in early 2008.  In partnership with CIACT is a purpose-built joint 
venture called A’LIENOR, which is composed of two companies: Eiffage Group – 
road construction and SANEF (Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de l'Est de la 
France) – finance and tollroad construction. There was a four-year construction 
period allowed and then a 55-year concession on the toll.  A’LIENOR asked for a 
500m subsidy for the concession (Aliénor). 
 
The controversy surrounding this project is framed both in environmental/ecological 
and economic terms.   These concerns centre around 1) the ecological implications of 
the path of the road, 2) the environmental impact of road-building with regard to 
climate change and 3) the questionable economic benefit of the road’s construction 
(ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b: 4). 
 
Construction of the road will require the use of 2,000 hectares of countryside and its 
path will cut through part of the Landes Forest.  This is Europe’s largest maritime 
forest and a National Park.  The tract of the forest which will be destroyed is also 
home to a number of species protected under Annexes II and V of the European 
Habitats Directive.  Amongst these are the last population of white-footed crayfish in 
Les Landes and the very rare False Ringlet butterfly.  The habitat of the white-footed 
crayfish will be completely destroyed by the road, suggesting their inevitable 
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extinction.  The False Ringlet butterfly’s habitat will be partially destroyed and the 
population may not recover from the disturbance.   
 
Concerns are also raised about the more general changes in the forest’s local climate 
which may be brought about by the road’s path.  The forest’s pines are used to tap 
resin and provide a drainage system and root infrastructure in the sloping foothills of 
the Pyrenees.  Campaigners argue that the microclimate the trees create is vital to the 
local farming industry.  They note that the drainage and irrigation systems in place 
have taken years of development and that the A65 will disrupt their balance (ARLP 
& SEPANSO, 2008b: 21). 
 
In addition to the direct ecological implications of the road, campaigners are also 
framing the A65 as part of a larger climate change debate.  The joint dossier of 
ALRP and SEPANSO on the A65 draws on the science of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC), CO2 emissions and the goals on carbon emissions reduction 
(2008b: 8-9). 
 
Finally, the third area of controversy concerns the declared economic benefits that 
the road will bring.  The A65 was proposed on the basis of low (but increasing) 
traffic flows between Langon and Pau, the isolation of parts of the region and 
improved transport links particularly with Toulouse.  Campaigners however are 
sceptical about the reality of these claims.  They argue that the better communication 
links need to be concentrated on the two end of the axis, not on the link between the 
two (ARLP Dossier A65, p.13).  The path of the road will also bypass many of the 
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smaller, isolated communities by several tens of miles and so the new access will be 
‘complètement inutil’ – completely useless (Interview, anti-road activist 30/10/08).  
The A65 project follows another roads project in the region, the Itinéraire à Grand 
Gabarit (IGG) (Heavy Load Relief Road) which focussed on the road link between 
Bordeaux and Toulouse directly – a European Parliament-decreed ‘Infrastructure of 
national Interest’ (Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit, 2003).  The A65 therefore presents the 
most current piece in the road transport puzzle for the South West corner of France. 
 
ii) The Actors  
The main group which has mobilised against the A65 is ARLP (Alternative 
Régionale Langon Pau – Langon Pau Regional Alternative).  Their campaign is 
supported by the environmental organisation SEPANSO (Fédération des Sociétés 
pour l’Etude, la Protection et l’Aménagement de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest – 
Federation of Societies for the Management and Protection of Nature in the South 
West) – one of the smaller and independent of such organisations, but it is not a 
grassroots group and does rely on a small amount of state funding.  Although these 
are the two main groups involved in the campaign, press communications also bear 
the logos of Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), France Nature Environnement 
(FNE – France, Nature, Environment), Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat France 
(Climate Action Network France), and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF).   
 
The ARLP was a grassroots group.  It was established as a direct response to the A65 
road project in 2006 and was composed largely of residents of the Gironde region 
opposed to the road, occupants of those villages most directly affected by the new 
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road’s path (namely Bostens), and shares some duel membership with other 
environmental groups in the region like Amis de la Terre.  Very few of its members 
had been involved in any kind of protest activity before, in fact for some of them it is 
‘the first time that they have taken an interest in politics at all’ (Interview, anti-road 
activist 31/10/08).  Overall, the group’s membership drew on a wide cross-section of 
the local community; some of the group’s younger members belonged to a 
community arts organisation, and use their various artistic abilities to further the 
ARLP agenda, other members were involved in protest or in environmental issues for 
the first time.  The group was organised and innovative; it had a comprehensive 
website, a YouTube presence, and used the breadth of membership to create a 
campaign that was representative of a wide variety of local interests. 
 
SEPANSO’s involvement in the campaign is more legalistic, ‘une attaque juridique’ 
(Interview, 06.11.2008).  As an organisation it concerns itself with all aspects of 
protecting the natural patrimony of the Aquitaine region of France.  A member of 
France Nature Environnement which is in turn a member of the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), SEPANSO is institutionalised.  There are 16 salaried 
staff in the office, paid for by the local government, and a number of volunteers.  
Overall, they are involved in the management of 10 nature reserves and 30 councils 
and committees with various environmental objectives.  At an international level 
they have had representation at the EEB, at Rio 92 and Rio+10.  With regard to the 
A65 campaign, SEPANSO have been able to use their access to information and 
resources to keep abreast of developments and to campaign through official 
channels.                                                                                        
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iii) The Actions 
The protest repertoire of ARLP was a creative one.  Actions included a wheelbarrow 
race in the main square of Mont-de-Marsan; the wheelbarrows contained characters 
playing the roles of Alain Rousset (President of the Aquitaine Regional Council and 
Deputé of la Gironde), Alain Juppé (former Prime Minister, Minister of Ecology and 
Sustainable Development and Mayor of Bordeaux), Henry Emmanuelli (Deputé for 
Les Landes) and Jean-Jacques Lasserre (President of the Pyrenées-Atlantiques 
Council) racing for the title of the biggest local bétonneur – ‘concrete-layer’.   The 
race made the headlines of the local news on France 3 Aquitaine and considerable 
local media coverage.  A clip of the race was also posted on YouTube.  The ARLP 
also took a carnival float to the Parade Climatique in Paris in 2007 a climate change 
protest event organised by national environmental NGOs.  The float featured ‘DJ 
Borloo’ a DJ-ing caricature of Jean-Louise Borloo, Minister for Ecology, Energy and 
Sustainable Development playing a famous club mix dubbed with a rap about the 
A65 (see figure 2.2). Once again, clips of the rap were posted on YouTube and on 








           Figure 2.2:  DJ Borloo on a float at the Parade Climatique 
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In a similarly creative vein ARLP formed a spin-off group of planteurs volontaires 
(volunteer planters) a word-play on the faucheurs volontaires (volunteer reapers) 
who are well-known in France for their destruction of field of GM crops.  The 
planteurs planted trees on various tracts of the proposed A65 route, posting updates 









Figure 2.3: A poster advertising the first Planteurs Volontaires action 30/03/07 
    
These more original acts of protest were supplemented with traditional action 
repertoires: unravelling banners down the side of buildings, in this case the Pey-
Berlan Tower in Bordeaux, giving TV and radio interviews, and creating a petition. 
 
However; the over-riding characteristic of the anti-A65 protests is its relative 
professionalisation.  In spite of the ARLP group being a grassroots group with little 
or no previous campaign experience it has developed a striking action repertoire 
which has attracted considerable local and national press coverage.  It developed a 
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website, participated in studio discussions on the local news and posted videos on 
YouTube to reach a wider audience.  Together with the professional environmental 
expertise of SEPANSO it launched a sustained attack on the proposals at local, 
regional and national levels.  

ii) The French Anti-GMO Campaign 

ACTORS TRANSLATION 
Amis de la Terre Friends of the Earth 
Aquitaine Alternatives  
Collectif Aquitaine Avenir Sans OGM The Aquitaine GMO-Free Future 
Collective 
Collectif Aquitaine des Faucheurs Volontaires Aquitaine Collective of Volunteer 
Reapers 
Greenpeace France  
l’Association pour la Taxation des 
Transactions pour l’Aide aux Citoyens (Attac) 
France 
- Attac Landes côtes sud 
- Attac Marsan 
- Attac Born 
Association for the Taxation of 
Transactions to Help Citizens 
Les Verts The Green Party 
 
Parti des Socialistes Européens European Socialist Party 
Vigilance OGM 33 GMO Vigilance 33 





i) The Issue 
The French case chosen for this thesis is the anti-GMO movement in Aquitaine.  The 
South West corner of France has the highest concentration of maize farming in the 
country, indeed, in Europe, and as a consequence has been the focus of the majority 
of GM maize trials (Eurostat, 2009).  The Aquitaine region is therefore well-versed 
in the anti-GMO arguments and hosts a number of grassroots and institutionalised 
opposition groups. 
 
Although French public policy was broadly supportive of GMO technology up until 
1996, the French government and people have developed a history of unease with 
GM technologies that has peaked in recent years.  Common to the European timeline 
of concern outlined above, Graham Hayes pinpoints the origins of concern in France 
to the 1st November 2006 when the newspaper Libération ran a front page article 
entitled ‘Alerte au soja fou!’ (Beware the mad soya!) explicitly linking GM crops to 
a number of recent food security scares such as BSE (Hayes, 2006: 01), a 
development that was of particular concern to France because of the importance of 
beef exports to its economy. 
 
The agricultural dimension of the problem is key to France’s relationship with 
GMOs.  The division of opinion between the two powerful agricultural trade unions 
the Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants d’agricole (FNSEA – National 
Federation of Agricultural Syndicates) in favour of GMOs and the Conféderation 
Paysanne (CP – Countryside Confederation) against, is characteristic of the deep 
divisions running through the different governments and government policies which 
have overarched the debate. 
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Several u-turns may be observed within French GMO policy from supporting the 
introduction of GMO products to a complete moratorium, positions usually 
corresponding to a change in government.  In addition to this instability, there was a 
perceived lack of early consultation with the general public which fuelled feelings of 
unrest.  Hayes notes that ‘hitherto treated as an issue of technoscience 
regulation...cordoned off from public debate within dedicated institutional structures 
such as the Commission du Génie Biomoléculaire (CGB), the development of GMOs 
in France henceforth became a highly charged political issue under the twin issues of 
social protest and sustained media attention’ (Hayes, 2006: 01).  The prominent 
profile of French anti-GMO protest has been maintained and currently finds itself at 
an all-time high, the outline of which is presented below. 
 
ii) The Actors 
Within Aquitaine and its various departments, the dominant anti-GMO voices are 
those of the subsidiary groups of NGOs.  In particular, l’Association pour la 
Taxation des Transactions pour l’Aide aux Citoyens (Attac – Association for the 
Taxation of Transactions to Help Citizens), and its local subsidiaries: Attac Landes 
côtes sud, Attac Marsan, Attac Born.  Attac defines itself as a ‘movement for popular 
education’ (Attac France, 2009)  and, although not limited to environmental issues 
takes a firm stand against GMOs.  Other organisations include Greenpeace France, 
and its subsidiary group in Bordeaux, and Amis de la Terre and its subsidiary in 
Landes.  They are closely linked to the national and international anti-GMO 




The grassroots face of anti-GMO protest is represented by a local group – Vigilance 
OGM 33 (33 is the number of the department of Gironde in Aquitaine) and the 
faucheurs volontaires (volunteer reapers) – Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate their logos 
with emblems of ‘investigation’ and ‘reaping’.  Their support for the faucheurs is an 
important part of their identity, and a number of faucheurs share membership with 
the group.  The faucheurs volontaires in the region are a collection of individuals 
operating at a grassroots level to ‘reap’ the GM crops planted in trial sites.  They are 
united by common membership of local environmental groups, including chapters of 
larger EMO, and in spite of their grassroots approach they are recognised alongside 













Although they did not comprise part of the European-level networks of actors such as 
GMO-Free Europe, Vigilance Aquitaine 33 does have membership of Maison de la 
Nature et de l’Environnement (House of Nature and the Environment) – an 
 
16
 It should be noted that the faucheurs volontaires are not specific to the region, they are a movement 
of civil disobedience that took root at the Larzac protests of 2003 and have gathered a regional 




overarching networks of environmental organisation working in Aquitaine which 
provides them with both material resources and expertise at a local level.  An 
example of the breadth of actors at work in Aquitaine, from political parties down to 
the faucheurs is illustrated by the regional coordination network: Collectif Aquitaine 
Avenir Sans OGM (Aquitaine GMO-Free Future Collective).  Launched in 2006 to 
coordinate anti-GM campaigns, signatories of their charter included
17
: the political 
parties Les Verts and Parti des Socialistes Européens (the European Socialist Party), 
NGOs Amis de la Terre and Greenpeace, local organisations such as Aquitaine 
Alternatives and the grassroots activists the Collectif Aquitaine des Faucheurs 
Volontaires (Aquitaine Collective of Volunteer Reapers).  In this way, the grassroots 
face of the anti-GMO movement is only a small part of it – and the action repertoires 
deployed reflect the breadth of groups involved. 
 
iii) The Actions 
The nature of the GM crop debate – a national and a highly local issue, and one with 
considerable public sympathy – means that the role of the anti-GM campaign is to 
apply pressure at the relevant points – national, local government and the general 
public.  With France’s moratorium currently in place there are no current crop trials 
and therefore no flashpoints around which the groups may mobilise.  For this reason, 
there appears to be a long and well developed history of coordination amongst the 
various local and national organisations in the area. 
 
17
 The full list of signatories is: Accueil paysan 24 ; Aquitaine Alternatives ; Association du Causse de 
l’Isle : Comités Attac ; Bergerac ; Développement Durable ; Fédération Bio d’Aquitaine ; Bioservice ; 
Comité de vigilance OGM 47 ; Confédération Paysanne d’Aquitaine ; Collectif Aquitain des 
Faucheurs Volontaires ; Greenpeace ; Horizon Vert ; I.D.E.A.L ; L.C.R. ; PCF ; Les amis de la Terre 
des Landes et Dordogne ; Fédération Sepanso ; Parc Naturel Régional Périgord Limousin ; Périgord 
sans OGM ; PS ; PSE Parti des Socialistes Européens  and Les verts (L'Ecologie Les Verts, 2006) 
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The actions of the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine may be divided into two main 
areas: direct and non-direct action.  The non-direct action represents the vast majority 
of the work done, by both grassroots and organised interests.  The most typical 
actions join together this spectrum of actors into coordinated awareness-raising 
campaigns.  For example, an action of 29 March 2008 saw Vigilance 33, Attac 33, 
Greenpeace, Amis de la Terre, Non aux OGM and local organic farmers assemble in 
Bordeaux city centre for an anti-GMO awareness campaign.  There were public 
speakers, music and flyer-drops.  They are supplemented by a rolling tide of 
individual actions: stands at local environmental awareness days, film screenings and 
flyer-drops in public places – town squares, outside supermarkets etc and writing to 
local mayors to express concern.  All of those interviewed belonging to these groups 
were able to give several examples of having participated in several of these 
activities. 
 
The grassroots face of the movement – Vigilance 33 and the faucheurs also have a 
repertoire of more direct action, designed to attract media attention.  For example, at 
the sentencing of José Bové for his part in the destruction of a field of GM maize 
Vigilance 33 held a ‘solidarity picnic’ outside the courthouse.  Equally the manifesto 
of the faucheurs makes their strategy of non-violent action clear.  Faucheurs are 
advised not to act alone, not to carry secateurs or scythes with them, and to carry a 
piece of ID so that they may be formally identified by the police.  Their strategy 
involves destroying fields of GM crops through their physical presence, by rolling 
around in the plants, by picnicking in the field or playing sports.  Unlike similar 
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sabotage activities in the UK which took place at night to avoid arrest (Doherty & 
Hayes, 2007),  the faucheurs hope to attract as much attention as possible. 
 
2.4 Protest in Italy 
 
i) The Italian Anti-Road Campaign 

ACTORS TRANSLATION 
i Verdi The Green Party 
il Partito Democratico The Democratic Party 
Legambiente Environmental League 
WWF  
Italia Nostra Our Italy 
Stop al consume di territorio Stop Developing the Land 
Comitato per la Bellezza Committee for Beauty 
Movimento Ecologista Ecologist Movement 
Soccorso Ambientale Marremmano 
(SAM) 
Maremma Environmental Assistance 
SOS Maremma  
Comitato Stop Autostrada  Stop the Road Committee 
Associazione di promozione sociale  
(ARCI) 
Association for Social Benefit 
Coordinamento Toscano Produttori 
Biologici 
Tuscan Organic Producers Network 
Forum Ambientalista Toscano Tuscany Environment Forum 
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Medicina Democratica Democratic Medicine 
“L’Alternativa” Bibbona The Bibbona Alternative 
La sinistra per Castagneto The Left for Castagneto 
Partito di Communisti Italiani (PdCI)  Italian Communist Party 
Partito Rifondazione Comunista (PRC)  Communist Refoundation Party 
Comitato Tirrenica a Basso Impatto Tyhrennian Low Impact Committee 
Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito Secure the Aurelia Immediately 
Committee 
Comuni di Capalbio The Municipality of Capalbio 
Montalto di Castro  
Manciano e Cellere Manciano and Cellere 
Coldiretti Farming Trade Union 
Cia Farming Trade Union 
il Comitato del Priorato The Municipality of Priorato 

i) The Issue 
The Italian case centres on a proposal with a 30 year history to build a Corridoio 
Tirrenico (Tyrrhenian Corridor) between Grossetto in Tuscany and Cività Vecchia in 
Lazio.  The existing S.S. 1 Aurelia road which runs close to the West coast of 
Tuscany and skirts around the edge of the Maremma National Park would be 
replaced by the Corridoio further inland.  The most controversial tract, between 
Grosseto and Rosignano Marittimo, will cut through the National Park, and has 




The project is based in the long-term inadequacy of the existing S.S. 1 Aurelia, 
specifically a 20km tract between these two towns which is the Variente Aurelia 
(Alternative Aurelia) – see Figure 2.6 for the route of the road.  This tract is 
particularly winding, without a central barrier and is peppered with many narrow 
crossings.  In 1991 the Società Autostradale Tirrenica – SAT (Tyhrrenian Motorway 
Association) which was initiated in 1968 with the specific aim of designing and 
administering the construction of a road between Livorno and Civitàvecchia, put 
forward a proposal with an ‘internal’ trajectory.  Their proposal was immediately 
dismissed by the Department for the Environment with the support of assorted 
environmental organisations and local interests.  Subsequent proposals were 
submitted, with the support of ANAS (the national motorway agency) in 1996 and 
1999.  A change of government and the approval of the First Strategic Infrastructure 
Programme meant that in 2001 ANAS’ proposal was approved in principal.  Since 
then, the SAT and ANAS have continued to debate the details of the project with the 
Tuscan Regional government and the environmental lobby.  To date, the project is in 








Fig. 2.6: The proposed trajectory of the Corridoio Tirrenico 
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The controversies around this road centre primarily on 1) the decision to build a new 
road in place of renovating the existing one, and 2) the planned trajectory of the new 
road. It has been framed as an environmental/ecological disaster, an economic issue 
and a safety problem. 
 
The decision to build a new road rather than renovate the existing one has been 
countered by two main oppositional arguments.  The first is that the existing tract of 
road is so dangerous, that not to renovate it but to supplement it with an alternative 
road would be irresponsible.  The second is economic: that the costs of building a 
second road are far higher than the figures of the Tuscan regional government 
suggest.  The toll which would be applied to the road has not yet been revealed, and 
the campaign suggests that it would be excessive, especially in light of the fact that 
some of the organic farms in the path of the road would be forced to close or to lose 
their organic status.  Figure 2.7 indicates one of the farms that would be implicated 








Figure 2.7:  One of the organic farms that would be affected by 
the Corridoio Tirrenico 
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The ecological concerns regarding the impact of the road are also framed in terms of 
the local history.  For example, the route the road will take will pass through the hills 
of Tarquinia, Manciano, Magliano, Pitigliano and Scansano – famous for their 
ancient Etruscan heritage and dotted with archaeological museums.  A campaign 
flyer from Legambiente describes the area as ‘ricca di storia, cultura e natura’ – rich 
in history, culture and nature (Legambiente, -).  The campaign also draws attention to 
the fact that the road will cut through the vineyards of Morellino di Scansano (red 
DOC) and Pitigliano (white DOC) which are amongst the most rapidly expanding 
vineyards in Italy.  The wine-producing capacity of the area is of particular 
importance to Tuscany and its agritourism industry, and the Strada del Vino colli di 
Maremma (Maremma Hills Wine Route) would be cut in two by the motorway.  The 
dominant frame for the ‘no campaign’ is the agricultural patrimony of the area. 
 
ii) The Actors 
The campaign against the Corridoio Tirrenico is characterised by a great breadth of 
actors. Some have been political parties; I Verdi, il Partito Democratico; 
international or national NGOs; Legambiente, WWF, Italia Nostra, Stop al consume 
di territorio, some local environmental organisations; Comitato per la Bellezza, 
Movimento Ecologista, Soccorso Ambientale Marremmano (SAM) and a dedicated 
community group; SOS Maremma.  There is evidence of cooperation between the 
NGOs with regard to the road, through joint publications for example (Emilliani, 
Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004) or through the umbrella group Comitato 
Stop Autostrada (Stop the Road Committee).18  There is also the ‘Comitato Aurelia 
 
18
 The Comitato Stop Autostrada is composed of the following groups and organisations:  Arci Bassa 
Val di Cecina; Arci Val di Cornia-Elba; Coordinamento Toscano Produttori Biologici; Forum 
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Sicura Subito’19 (see the table at the beginning of this section for a full list of these 
actors with translations where appropriate).  
 
The overall effort between these groups appears very disjointed.  Only Amici della 
Terra and I Verdi make reference to the campaign on their websites.  SOS Maremma 
mentions a day of information and action with ‘other environmental associations’.  In 
practice, the campaign against the road is an organic one, with individuals rather than 
environmental groups taking the lead in organising action. 
 
iii) The Actions 
The action repertoires of the protest groups reflect these divides.  While the NGOs 
have produced expert studies (see previous section), the grassroots mobilizations 
have involved a physical presence.  For example SOS Maremma organised an 
information desk at the Fest’ambiente environmental festival and Fiera Quattro 
Passi ‘Better World’ festival in Grosseto and Treviso respectively in August and 
September 2009.  They have also organised bike rides and other similar events to 
raise the profile of their campaign in the local communities, as well as reaching out 
to local organic farmers whose crops may be affected by development.   
 
Due to the long history of the campaign, the legal wrangling and the expert 
consultations required to approve the proposals the campaign has largely been 
    
Ambientalista Toscano; WWF; Legambiente; Medicina Democratica; “L’Alternativa” Bibbona; “La 
sinistra per Castagneto”; PdCI (Italian Communist Party) ; PRC (Communist Refoundation Party); 
COMITATO TIRRENICA a BASSO IMPATTO 
19
 The Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito is composed of the following groups and organisations: i 
Comuni di Capalbio, Montalto di Castro, Manciano e Cellere, le associazioni Italia Nostra, 
Legambiente, WWF, il Movimento Ecologista and Comitato per la Bellezza, the agricultural trade 
unions Coldiretti and Cia, il Soccorso Ambientale Maremmano and il Comitato del Priorato 
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dominated with the large environmental NGOs and political parties, with the 
institutional gravitas to negotiate with the Regional Government.  The grassroots 
actors, from with the local chapters of EMOs or SOS Maremma were instrumental in 
gathering public support to attend the public consultations.   
 
ii) The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign 
 
ACTORS TRANSLATION 
The Tuscan Regional Government  
Greenpeace Italy  
Amici della Terra (and their local composite chapters 
such as Amici della Terra Firenze) 
Friends of the Earth 
Legambiente The Environmental League  
WWF  
Associazione Italiana Agricutura Biologica Italian Association of 
Organic Farming 
Slowfood Italia Slowfood Italy 
Coldiretti Agricultural Trade Union 
 
i) The Issue 
The Italian case study of the anti-GMO movement is that of the work in Tuscany.  
Although there is a grassroots element to its campaign, it is a largely institutionalised 
movement which is concentrated in the region’s capital – Florence.  In order to 
understand the background to the anti-GMO sentiment in this area it is helpful to 
consider it in its national context. 
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Italy was a relative late-comer to the GM debate but quickly became one of Europe’s 
most anti-GM countries, with polls consistently suggesting that the general public 
have high levels of distrust towards GMOs.  In the most recent data available from 
2008 of the 20 regions in Italy, 16 had declared themselves anti-GM (GMO-Free 
Europe, 2011).  The consequence of this high level of public distrust has coupled 
with high levels of local government support. 
 
The GM crop debate is of particular economic significance to Italy in comparison 
with the other case study countries by virtue of its prominent fruit and vegetable 
export market of which a significant proportion is organic (Bertolini and Guidone 
2001: 143).  This economic imperative has raised the stakes in the government’s 
stance on GM issues.  Alongside France and other European countries in February 
1997 the Italian government invoked the safeguard clause banning the 
commercialization of bt-176 maize on its territory but quickly revoked decision in 
light of the trade implications.  The stance of Agricultural Ministers has also been 
inconsistent: Giancarlo Galan was more sympathetic to GM research than his 
successor Saverio Romano who has expressed his intention to “build a wall to block 
the invasion of GMOs which are jeopardising our country’s production...we have to 
prevent them for getting a foothold in our markets”
20
 (Romano, 2011).   
 
The anti-GM issue of particular pertinence to Tuscany because of the agro-
alimentary patrimony.  They are famous for the wines, cheeses and truffles and this 
has meant that the local public are particularly sensitive to agricultural issues.  A 
 
20
 Original text - mi impegno ad alzare un muro altissimo per bloccare l'invasione dell'Ogm che sta 
mettendo in crisi le nostre produzioni...Impediremo che gli ogm possano avere spazio nel nostro 
mercato – translation my own. 
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study of the rise of anti-GM sentiment across Europe notes that, in Italy ‘as the 
debate continued throughout the summer of 2000 many stakeholder positions were 
shifting, in particular those who represented food producers, retailers and consumer 
organisations... Consumer perceptions, with regard to the importance of Italian food 
quality, was a key theme in defence of maintaining traditions and high standards.’ 
(Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & Weldon, 2001: 43). 
 
ii) The Actors 
The Tuscan case is an especially strong example of the importance of food quality 
and agricultural patrimony to the campaign – it is a self-declared GM-free region.  
This is turn has dictated the kinds of actors involve in the protests.  Unusually, one of 
the most important actors is The Tuscan regional government who has banned the 
cultivation of GMOs from its territory since 2000, as well as the procurement of any 
crops containing GM products.  They were one of the founder signatories of the 
Florence Charter (signed 4 February 2005) which called for the ability for regions to 
act autonomously in banning the cultivation of GM crops from their borders, to call 
the European Commission to impose sanctions on irresponsible GM practices and to 
push for transparency in the cultivation of GM crops.  As such, the Regional 
government is a high-profile anti-GMO actor with the legislative powers to act on 
that, and they have dominated the protest activities. 
 
In light of the institutionalised nature of much of the anti-GM sentiment in Tuscany, 
unsurprisingly the social movement actors are also institutionalised.  The main social 
movement actors in this area are Greenpeace Italy, Amici della Terra (and their local 
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composite chapters such as Amici della Terra Firenze), Legambiente, WWF and 
aided by agro-alimentary interest groups such as Associazione Italiana Agricutura 
Biologica and Slowfood Italia, as well as the farmer’s association Coldiretti.   
 
There have not been any recorded field trials of GM crops in Italy, due in no small 
part to the Regional Government’s ability to veto any proposals.  As such, the field 
actions taken in the UK and France have not occurred, and the grassroots groups that 
one might expect to evolve as a result have been ‘squeezed out’.  In the subsequent 
chapters, the grassroots face of the movement therefore refers to the local chapters of 
environmental NGOs and the informal accords between local organic farmers who 
provide each other with support for their businesses. 
 
      iii) The Actions 
As in the other case study countries, the action repertoires of the anti-GMO groups 
revolve around public education: information tables and flyer-drops in public areas 
and outside supermarkets.  These activities are supplemented by ad-hoc highly 
localised activities from the organic farming community – who have visited schools 
or provided farm visits.   The most high-profile of the grassroots groups’ activities is 
their participation in Fest’ambiente – an annual environmental festival held near the 
Maremma natural park.  Organised by Legambiente, they rely on the participation of 
local environmental groups, including organic food producers to promote the anti-
GMO message amongst others.  The festival is national, high-profile, and well-




2.5 Protest in the UK 

I) The UK Anti-Road Campaign 
 
ACTORS 
No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) 
Bilston Glen Protest Camp 
TRANSform Scotland 
The Scottish Wildlife Trust 
The RSPB 
The Scottish Association for Public Transport 
The Cyclists Touring Club 
Friends of the Earth Scotland 
Loanhead Environment and Conservation Group 


i) The Issue 
The case study selected here is one of protest against a road planned for a village on 
the outskirts of Edinburgh.  Bilston is a village seven miles south of Edinburgh with 
the A701 running through it.  In 2000 Midlothian Council was granted permission by 
the Scottish Executive to re-route the road from the City Bypass at Straiton to Milton 
Bridge, north of Penicuik, cutting through the woodland next to the village – Bilston 
Glen. This woodland is a site of special scientific interest.  See Figure 2.8 for the 












Figure 2.8: The proposed trajectory of the A701 
 
In 2000, Midlothian Council applied to the Scottish Executive for planning 
permission to re-align the A701. This process required a dual carriageway to replace 
the existing roadway as the A701, from the Edinburgh by-pass to Penicuik.   
Although the project was originally intended to be funded by PPL, part of the biotech 
Roslin Institute, it was later decided that it would be funded by the Council.  The 
Executive granted permission for the construction of the road, and commissioned 
Halcrow Ltd to investigate the issues connected with the road and to suggest option 
for a sustainable transport strategy.  When Halcrow presented their report in 2004 the 
key recommendations raised concern for the environmental impact of the road 
(Midlothian Council, 2004).  Since 2005 plans have effectively lain dormant when 
other transport improvements were developed including the amelioration of three 
junctions on the existing A701 and bus priority lanes (City of Edinburgh Council, 




Opposition to the possibility of the future construction of the road is based on two 
main objections.  The first of these is the ecological value of the woodland through 
which is would intersect: the Glen has been identified as a Site of Special Scientific 
Interest for its geological history, and is also the site of large wildlife colonies 
including numerous badger sets.  The second objection is based on the increased 
traffic and development on greenbelt land which would result from the road.  This 
angle is most closely aligned to climate change issues. 
 
ii) The Actors 
The Bilston case is unusual in the vibrancy of grassroots protest that assembled 
against the road.  Two main grassroots groups emerged.  Opposition to the proposal 
was headed by the No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) and a protest camp at 






                                Figure 2.9: The Bilston Glen Protest Camp 
 
NAAG was a group composed of local residents, who organised purely in response 
to the proposed bypass, seeing it as a Trojan horse for further development of the 
area as well as detrimental to local wildlife and shifting the balance on public/private 
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transport. (Spokes, 1999).  When the proposal to build the road was suspended in 
2005 the group dissolved, although would no doubt return should the construction 
plans develop further. 
 
The continuing presence of activists in the camp is designed to blockade the arrival 
of any workforce on site should construction begin, and also to raise awareness of the 
road’s proposals as well as issues of social and ecological injustice more generally.  
The camp declares itself against:  
 
‘The needless destruction of ancient woodland habitats! 
The needless construction of roads! 
The destruction of Greenbelt land  
Genetic manipulation of plants and animals  
The expansion of biotech research facilities and Bayer 
& the persuit (sic) of corporate profits!’ (Bilston Glen Anti-Bypass Site) 
 
 
The camp is populated by a number of seasoned environmental activists, some of 
whom have a history of protesting in other sites across the country. 
 
Other opposition included much larger environmental movement organisations: 
TRANSform Scotland – a sustainable transport alliance, the Scottish Wildlife Trust, 
the RSPB, the Scottish Association for Public Transport, the Cyclists Touring Club 
and Friends of the Earth Scotland as well as local group the Loanhead Environment 






iii) The Actions line spacing and ‘Actions’ 
The camp activists worked closely with NAAG during the early years of the 
campaign and organised ‘open door’ evenings to encourage participation.  Other 
actions included candlelit vigils in the woods and marching to Council offices to 
present petitions.  This work was documented on YouTube and is designed to attract 
maximum public exposure.  The protests techniques used echo many of those used in 
previous anti-road campaigns across the UK, and reinforce the non-violent direct 
action heritage of this protest area (Doherty, 1999).  They were keen to attract a wide 
audience and maintained a website which invited people to their open camp or to 


















The NAAG also used non-violent direct action to raise public awareness to the 
proposals using a very conventional action repertoire.  For example, they organised 
protest walks along the proposed route of the bypass, or marches to the Scottish 
Executive.  They also engaged directly with Midlothian Council by writing to them 
with their objections (Transform Scotland, 1999). 
 
II) The UK Anti-GMO Campaign 

ACTORS 
Totnes Genetix Group (TOGG) 
Local chapters of environmental movement organisations such as Friends of the 
Earth 
Ad hoc groups of farmers 


i) The Issue 
The case study being considered here is that of the anti-GM movement in Devon.  
This is a region with a strong agricultural tradition and has been the location of GM 
trials.  The most high profile of these trials was in 1998 when GM maize was planted 
close to Riverford Organic Farm.  In the same vein as the faucheurs volontaires, 
locals organised a campaign resulting in the arrest of two women charged with 
removing GM maize by hand. A public meeting was held in Totnes at which 300 
people demonstrated unanimous support for the action and the charges were 
eventually dropped.  The impact of this action on public opinion however was 
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profound.   Such was the anti-GM sentiment in Devon both amongst the public and 
within local government that in 2003 it declared itself the first GM-free county in 
England (BBC News, 2003) although this is an aspirational statement of intent rather 
than legally binding arrangement.  Local authorities can request special status 
through Article 19 of the EU’s Deliberate Release Directive which allows specific 
areas to be excluded from a specific GM plantation, although this mechanism has not 
needed to be used in Devon since public opinion and Council sentiment made it an 
unattractive site for field trials. 
 
The anti-GM story here echoes other stories unfolding across the UK at that time.  
Doherty and Hayes note that unlike in France and Italy which had strong links with 
farmers, GM protest in the UK targeted at power in a more de-territorialized way – 
there is a far weaker relationship between the land and alimentation in Britain 
(2007).  GM crops in other protests across the UK therefore were framed more as an 
issue of food safety, of particular concern in Great Britain in light of the devastating 
effects the BSE, foot and mouth and bird flu crises had on consumer confidence in 
food products (Shaw, 1999; Toke, 2004).  The example of Devon and the action to 
defend an organic farm is slightly unusual in the context of other protests happening 
nationally. 
ii) The Actors 
The organisation which was formed in Devon as response to the Riverford Farm 
situation was very much of its time.  Totnes Genetix Group (TOGG) was formed in 
1998 and became one of the most important grassroots groups fighting GMOs in the 
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late 1990s.  They are composed of local residents from all walks of life and ages 
united purely by their stance against GM crops rather than any other larger 
environmental issues.  They describe themselves as: 
 
‘a non-hierarchical collective and form part of a national network of groups 
and individuals known as GEN (the Genetic Engineering Network). All 
ToGG work is done on a voluntary basis and expenses are funded purely by 
donations’ (TOGG, 1998). 
 
 
Although reduced in number since the 1ate 1990s, TOGG still plays an active role in 
the anti-GM activities of Devon and maintains links with other anti-GMO campaigns 
across the country. 
 
Other groups were involved in the campaign, mainly local chapters of environmental 
movement organisations such as Friends of the Earth, but also ad hoc groups of 
farmers. 
 
iii)  The Actions 
During the height of their campaign in the late 1990s-2000s TOGG produced the 
newsletter Genetix Update and was active in the national Genetic Engineering 
Network.  TOGG still campaigns with awareness-raising strategies in the local area – 
it holds a stall every Saturday in Totnes town centre for example.  Its work is in the 
company of local chapters of much larger EMOs such as Friends of the Earth which 
were particularly active in 2003-2004 to encourage individual UK regions to declare 
themselves GM free through the production of briefing documents (Friends of the 
Earth, 2004).  Since then, TOGG’s GMO campaign has been supplanted with other 
83 

issues although their stance is unchanged.  TOGG remains the only truly grassroots 
and active face of anti-GM protest in Devon and its campaign and action repertoire 




This chapter has provided an outline of both GMO and transport policy in the context 
of the European Union.  It has also presented a description of the issues, actors and 
activities at work in each of the six case study campaigns.  Although this chapter 
serves only to contextualise the analysis that follows, some early themes emerge: 
differences between policy areas, between countries and between the kinds of actor 
involved at a local level.  The chapters that follow tease out these differences in more 






3 Political Opportunity Structures: Context 
       and Cases                                                                        
_________________________________________
 
‘[T]he overt collective action that constitutes the organised, sustained, self-conscious 
challenge to existing authorities is best understood if it is related to political 
institutions, and to what happens in arenas of conventional party and interest group 
politics’ 
(Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992: 239) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In chapters one and two we outlined the methodology and introduced the cases used 
to address the core question: what does europeanisation mean for the strategies and 
practices of the green movement?  We suggested that the impact of europeanisation 
is not direct, but mediated through a number of intervening ‘domains’.  This chapter 
explores one such domain – political opportunity structures (POS) – and asks: what 
is the impact of europeanisation on grassroots green groups as mediated through 
political opportunity structures?    
 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold.  First it explores how structures at the European 
and national level shape the europeanisation of grassroots movements, and the role of 
the state in that process.  For organised interests like political parties or 
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environmental movement organisations direct involvement with the state is 
inevitable; in the case of grassroots or localised social movement groups however the 
relationship cannot be taken for granted.  Grassroots groups are constrained by their 
political environment in a different way: they are more fluid, more spontaneous and 
more autonomous than organised interests. With differing degrees of access to the 
state along the spectrum of social movement actors, how will these individual 
grassroots and localised groups experience europeanisation? 
 
The second aim of this chapter is to distinguish between European and europeanised 
political opportunity structures.  This distinction is important because it helps to 
disaggregate the influence of the EU.  I distinguish between POS that have been 
created at the European level by virtue of the existence of the EU institutions and 
their sub-structures (European political opportunity structures)  and domestic 
political opportunity structures that have shifted as a result of the processes of EU 
integration (europeanised political opportunity structures).   This approach 
highlights the reflexive nature of the process of europeanisation i.e. the ability of 
European integration to impact upon member states, and for member states and their 
actors to impact upon the process of European integration.  This distinction between 
European and europeanised also expands our understanding of POS in a 
transnational context, beyond the common juxtaposition of purely national or 
European opportunity structures.  Finally, this distinction teases out the three process 
of europeanisation that I identified in chapter one: direct, indirect and passive 
europeanisation.   
87 

This chapter examines the contours and core dimensions of POS in three parts.  It 
begins with a definition of domestic POS as outlined in the literature.  The chapter 
draws on this understanding, and develops it further to present my own definition of 
political opportunity structures and the variables on which I focus.  I also present two 
linked, but distinctive political opportunity structures: European POS and 
europeanised POS.  The last section provides an overview of the national POS in 
each of the case study countries as a foundation to understand the platform on which 
the social movement groups are working. 
 
3.2 POS and Social Movement Activity 
 
The concept of POS, part of a ‘political process’ approach to social movement study, 
has been developed over the past twenty years as a means of explaining social 
movement emergence and success.  If New Social Movement theory, outlined in 
chapter one, is able to explain what a social movement looks like, POS explains how 
it operates.  The essential message of the political process approach to studying 
social movements is that activists do not choose their modus operandi in a vacuum – 
their goals and their tactics are contingent on the political context in which they are 
operating.  This message has been refined by scholars of political opportunity 
structures to delineate more clearly what we mean by ‘political context’.  By 
observing this context scholars have been able to answer the questions: why have 
different social movement groups chosen to act differently at different points in 
time?  Is their action determined only by beliefs or by the environment in which they 
act?  Why will the same beliefs be mobilised differently in different countries? 
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The concept of political opportunity structures originated in the 1970s from Peter 
Eisinger’s analysis of protest in different American cities in which he identified the 
openness or closure of the local public administration as a key variable in explaining 
the protests (Eisinger, 1973).  This first variable has been added to by other variables 
such as electoral stability (Piven & Cloward, 1977) and the availability of elite allies 
(Gamson, 1990) and further developed into an overarching theoretical framework.  
From this body of literature one distinction is most apparent: some analysts 
emphasise the (static) institutional while others underline the more dynamic 
structures of political opportunity.  
 
Eisinger (1973) laid the foundations for those who interpret POS as more rigid, static 
institutional opportunities.  Within this tradition of static POS the definition 
developed by Kriesi et al. (1992; , 1995) is the most recognised.   They identify four 
structural variables that determine social movement behaviour: 
 
(1) national political cleavage structures 
These are the existing patterns of political conflict with in a state.  These patterns 
have ‘deep societal roots, a long history and are institutionally embedded so that it 






(2) institutional structures of the state 
States are categorised on a spectrum of weak to strong, where weak states are defined 
by their openness on the input side (generating policy) and by their lack of a capacity 
to impose themselves on the output side (implementing policy).   Conversely, strong 
states have a high capacity to impose themselves.  The internal structure of the state 
institutions – the extent to which they are coherent or fragmented – will determine 
the overall strength or weakness of the state (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & 
Guigni, 1992: 222). 
 
(3) Prevailing strategies of the state towards challengers 
These are the informal procedures or strategies for addressing challengers are either 
exclusive (repressive, confrontative, polarising) or integrative (facilitative, 
cooperative, assimilative) (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992: 223).   
 
(4) alliance structures 
This refers to the configuration of power within a state and the presence or absence 
of specific interests from government (Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 
1995: 53). 
 
Their typology contrasts with the work of other scholars such as Tilly (1978) and 
Tarrow (1998), whose POS variables emphasise the more dynamic nature of the 
opportunities: ‘people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political 
90 

opportunities and constraints change, and then by strategically employing a 
repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are the used by 
others in widening circles of contention’ (Tarrow, 1998: 28-29).  With this 
perspective in mind he identifies four alternative variables of political opportunity 
(1998: 165-167): 
 
(1) the opening up of access to participation for new actors 
Access to participate in the political process is placed on a spectrum from open to 
closed.  The suggestion is that neither fully closed, nor fully open opportunities to act 
produce the greatest level of social movement protest, rather they are more likely to 
emerge at intermediate levels of opportunity where neither fear of repression nor the 
temptations of institutionalisation are dominant. 
 
(2) shifts in ruling alignments  
Instability in the alignment between ruling powers, chiefly through electoral 
instability, creates uncertainty amongst supporters and encourages more marginal 
actors to become involved. 
 
(3) availability of influential allies 
A social movement is encouraged to take action when they have influential allies 
who are able to support them – to act as negotiators on their behalf, to grant them 




(4) cleavages within and among elites 
Resource-poor groups are incentivised to take action when there is a division 
amongst the ruling elites and their chances of inserting themselves into the debate are 
greater. 
 
Although clearly distinct, these two classifications of political opportunity structure 
from Kriesi et al. and Tarrow do share the same basic premise: to distinguish 
between the formal institutional structures of a state, and the less formal power 
relations that define it at any one time.  McAdam (1996: 26-27) synthesise these 
approaches to develop four variables that represent a consensus on political 
opportunity:  
 
1) the openness or closure of the state 
2) the stability of elite alignments 
3) the availability of elite allies  
4) the state’s capacity for repression 
 
 
I draw on these pre-existing classifications to develop my own definition of political 
opportunity structures as the structural features of a political system that shape the 
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conditions for social movement action.21  I focus my analysis of POS on three 
structural features in particular that are pertinent to this study: the strength of the 
state to implement its policies, the openness of the state to third party interests and 
the access that the state affords to elite allies.  I feel that these are the dimensions 
which best represent the political systems in the chosen case study countries; the 
fourth variable ‘state repression’ is better seen as an overarching lens for the general 
political opportunity structures of a state – the way in which the first three variables 
manifest themselves.  I return to these dimensions of national political opportunity in 
section 3.3 when I develop them into a framework for European and europeanised 
POS. 
 
As the variables outlined above show, political opportunity structures are able to 
capture some of the more nuanced institutional arrangements with a state.  Rather 
than treat the nation state as a monolithic entity, POS insists ‘that it be treated as 
diffuse institutions, structurally coherent and yet flexible, capable of enormous 
coordination between its different bodies but also, historically, reflecting 
considerable internal discord, unevenness and in some cases, even subversion among 
its member constituents (Cunningham, 2002: 185).  The ability to capture these 
nuances gives POS two specific advantages in our examination of social movement 
activity at multiple layers of governance.  The first of these is its ability to provide 
cross-national comparison between movements, and the second is its ability to make 
sense of emerging political structures at a supra-national level and to connect these to 
social movement behaviour. 
 
21
 A fuller definition of political opportunity structures appears in the following pages. 
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The strength of political opportunity structures in providing cross national 
comparison has been well documented, even by those who remain critical of the 
approach (Koopmans, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Rootes, 1999; 
Saunders, 2009).  Because it isolates a number of structural variables within a 
political system it can ‘explain the different success, strategies, action repertoires, 
levels of mobilization, and organizational structures’ of a movement in different 
countries (Van der Heijden, 2006: 28).   Indeed, although concerns have been 
expressed that political opportunity structures ‘risks becoming a “dustbin” for any 
and every variable relevant to the development of social movements’ (della Porta & 
Diani, 2006: 17) these concerns are less pointed when the concept is applied in cross-
national comparison where ‘differences in political opportunity structures often 
concern the most stable and deeply rooted aspects of political systems, and are thus 
structures beyond reasonable doubt’ (Koopmans, 1999: 108).   
 
A second strength to the political opportunity structure approach is that it is able to 
capture emerging opportunities within ‘new’ polities such as the European Union.  It 
has been established that with deepening European integration ‘authority and policy-
making influence are shared across multiple levels of government: sub-national, 
national and supranational’ (Marks et al. 1996 in Ciaffi, 2001: 115).  This in turn, 
argues Gualini, has led to a ‘re-framing of intergovernmental relationships that 
displays new opportunity structures for policy actors as well as resistance to new 
institutional compromises’ (2003: 618). There is greater possibility for a number of 
actors to create alliances around conflicts within and between their national 
governments, to take advantage of the new European-level allies that are emerging, 
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and to engage in new political fora.  A framework for capturing these new 
opportunities at a national and supranational level is offered in the following section. 
3.3 Tracking Movement Europeanisation Through 
POS 
 
In this section I further develop my argument about why we might look for evidence 
of europeanisation within POS and what such evidence might look like.  The task is 
challenging given that ‘political opportunity may be discerned along so many 
directions and in so many ways that it is less a variable than a cluster of variables-
some more readily observable than others’ (Tarrow, 1988: 430).  My own definition 
of POS as the structural determinants of opportunity for social movements to act 
draws from this literature
22
 but focuses on three structural dimensions that are most 
pertinent to the countries being addressed in this thesis.  I first present domestic 
political opportunity structures and then outline what these look like once the 
European dimension is added.  

i) Domestic POS 
The variables of domestic political opportunity structures presented here are based on 






 See (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 1995; Tarrow, 1988) 
23
 Of course POS exist at a sub-national level as well as the national (domestic) and supranational 
levels discussed here.  Although they are not within the scope of this study it is worth noting that such 
opportunities add to the dynamism of European integration. 
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1.  The strength of the state 
This corresponds to the state’s political output structures (whether a state is ‘strong 
or ‘weak’ in effectively implementing its policies). This dimension includes ideas of 
centralisation and it also synthesises the ideas of scholars who examine the stability 
of ruling alliances as a separate variable (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996).  There 
is an assumption here that policies are more effectively implemented when the state 
is centralised (strong) and when it has control of market participants (financial 
resources) (Kitschelt, 1986: 63-64).  France is the ‘strongest’ of the case study 
countries - it is usually classified as centralised with stable leadership, while Britain 
is semi-centralised and Italy is the ‘weakest’ by virtue of being decentralised and 
having the least stable balance of ruling elites. 
2.  The openness or closure of the state to third party interest 
The second of these dimensions corresponds to the political input structures (whether 
a state is ‘closed’ or ‘open’ to a wide variety of economic and civil society actors).  
In ‘open’ states policies are also often renegotiated in the process of being 
implemented, so this variable refers to the formalised structures available for the 
mediation of diverse interests at all stages of the policy cycle.  It also considers the 
multiple access points to government at a national and supranational level such as 
working groups and other fora for the negotiation of interest (Scruggs, 2003: 13).  In 
this way, the degree of centralisation of the state is also a consideration within this 
dimension, because it accounts for the multiple levels of government and therefore 
multiple access points for civil society engagement.  However, the openness of the 
state is distinct from the first dimension in its treatment of centralisation because it 
focuses on the extent to which centralisation limits opportunities for actors to be 
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involved in the creation of policy, rather than the strength of the state in 
implementing policy.  An example would be Italy where the decentralised nature of 
policy-making increases the openness of the system, with a number of 
institutionalised channels of access.  In Britain the structure is also open with 
mechanisms for formal and informal inclusion.  The most closed of the case study 
countries is France – a product of its centralisation. 
3.  Access to elite allies for third party interests 
The third of these dimensions is perhaps the most interesting for this study.  It 
concerns the ability of a movement group to access elite allies – usually agents of the 
state such as members of parliament, or influential lobbyists.  Access here is shaped 
by structural features such as the electoral system, but also to contextual 
opportunities that can vary over time such as a sympathetic political party.  In Italy 
and France, the presence of Greens in national government within the past decade 
has historically afforded environmental actors the opportunity to have their voice 
heard.  By contrast in Britain the electoral success of the Green Party in Westminster 
was only realised in 2010 when the first M.P. won her seat; as such movements’ 
access to national government elite allies has meant being generally limited to a 
minority party with little recent experience in government.   
 
It must be added that this relationship between social movement and elite actors does 
not need to rely on access to the very top figures of government. As Dryzek et al. 
point out, ‘equally important is what is normally classified as “administration” or 
“implementation”.  It is here that ... impact can be felt in the development of 
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alternative forums for discussion, informal consultations with movement 
representatives regarded as legitimate participants, and the acceptance of alternative 
studies and information provided by environmental groups’ (2003: 137).  Crucially, 
for movement groups ‘[t]he effects of such processes will not appear in legislation or 
executive orders, but rather in the kind of details of local decisions’ (2003: 137).   
 
The definition offered above maintains the analytical distinctiveness of political 
opportunity structures by focusing on the strictly political opportunities caused by 
configurations of power, rather than on some of the wider political resources that 
facilitate movement action such as party funding or public opinion.  By focusing on 
these fixed political structures I can discount variables that alter over time or that are 
contingent on other factors, which maintains the analytical sharpness of POS as a 
tool.
24
    These three dimensions also separate out the formal institutional structures 
such as the electoral system or the degree of centralisation of the state, from the less 
formal structures of power relations or political culture within a given country such 
as public opinion or economic context.  Finally, this definition of POS, which draws 
most closely from the those offered by  (McAdam, 1996) and Tarrow (1998),  is 
important because it emphasises the dynamic nature of the opportunities.   This 
emphasis on dynamism is more appropriate in the constantly developing arena of 
European integration.  In this context the structural configurations of power are 
 
24
 Gamsen and Meyer have stressed the necessity to maintain the political, structural, variables of 
political opportunity structures: ‘the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger 
of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – 
political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts.… It 
threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that 
form the context for collective action. Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at 
all’ (1996: 275). 
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subject to both national and European influences and are therefore buffeted by two 
forces rather than one; power shifts between the European, national (and sub-
national) political levels.  Perhaps inevitably, given the processes of European 
integration, ‘the domestic POS becomes increasingly complemented by new forms of 
opportunities for protest that form within the framework of EU politics’ (Reising, 
1998: 5).  I argue that these resultant political opportunity structures fall into two 
distinct categories.  First of all, political opportunity structures have been created at 
the European level by virtue of the existence of the EU institutions and their sub-
structures.  These I call European political opportunity structures.  Secondly, 
domestic political opportunity structures have shifted as a result of the processes of 
EU integration.  These I call europeanised political opportunity structures.   

ii) European POS 
European POS are created at the European level.  They amend the three core 
dimension of domestic POS as follows: 
 
1. The strength of the EU 
In the national context this dimension of POS refers to the political output structures 
(whether a state is able to effectively implement its policies).  In the case of EU 
studies, however, it is more pertinent to consider implementing policy areas in which 
the EU has competence and where the national construction of policy is ‘outsourced’ 
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to the EU.   Put simply – European opportunities are more likely where EU 
competence is strong.  
 
2. The openness or closure of the EU to third party interest 
The opening up of new institutional configurations within the European Union which 
can create new channels of influence.  Within the context of European integration 
this dimension refers to the movements’ ability to lobby EU institutions directly.   
 
3. Access to elite allies for third party interests 
This dimension refers to the appearance of new constellations of allies at the level of 
the European Union.   
These allies may include, but are not confined to political parties with representation 
in the European Parliament.  They may also be Brussels-based networks of non-
governmental actors such as Trade Unions or NGOs.  The European Environmental 
Bureau would be one such example. 
 
These dimensions of European POS suggest therefore that social movements are 
more likely to experience europeanisation if they: 
1) Work within a policy area tightly bound by European implementation 
requirements 
(The strength of the EU) 
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2) Have direct access to institutional channels of influence at the EU 
(The openness of the EU) 
3) Have access to new allies at a European level whose presence is a direct 
result of European integration 
 (The access to elite allies) 
These European dimensions evidence the process of direct europeanisation outlined 
in chapter one.  The connection between the social movement actor and the European 
Union one is an intentional one, and it is made with the EU at the European level, 
rather than connecting to domestic manifestations of EU opportunities. 

iii) Europeanised POS 
Europeanised POS are structural opportunities at a national level which result 
indirectly from European integration, rather than those which appear at the level of 
the EU itself.  Kassim (2003: 105) observes that ‘membership of the European Union 
has had important organizational consequences for [national] government.  
Responding to both the obligations of membership and the incentives to “get things 
right in Brussels”, all member states have put in place structures, procedures, and 
processes designed to manage their input into EU policy-making’.  When one is 
looking for evidence of the europeanisation of a social movement through its 
interaction with europeanised opportunity structures, it is not enough to look only at 




1. The strength of the EU 
The ability of a state to implement EU policy at a national level is the result of 
domestic adaptation to the EU – the creation of new competencies within 
government departments for example.   
 
2. The openness or closure of the EU to third party interest 
The creation of structures at a national or sub-national level that are a direct result of 
the EU such as a local ‘European Office’ or national MEPs.  One could say that a 
green group becomes europeanised to the extent that it appeals directly to these new 
structures. 
 
3. Access to elite allies for third party interests 
New constellations of allies at the national or pan-European level that may not 
emerge as a direct response to the EU, but that are to some extent engaged with EU 
policy.  Importantly, actors are able to look for allies outside of their national 
boundaries.  An example would be ‘GMO-Free Europe’ – a pan-European network 
of institutional and social movement actors seeking to tackle GM policy over which 
the EU has competence, although their level of activity is purely national. 
 
These dimensions of europeanised POS suggest therefore that a green group could 
experience europeanisation to the extent that it: 
1) Responds to the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy  
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(The strength of the EU) 
2) Appeals to national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making 
(The openness of the EU) 
3) Engages with new allies at a national or pan-European level whose work is 
informed by, but does not necessarily directly address, EU policy 
(The access to elite allies) 
 
These dimensions of europeanised POS evidence the process of indirect 
europeanisation outlined in chapter one because they connect social movement 
actors with European opportunities at a national level.  To the extent that making this 
connection to the EU is implicit, then a social movement will also demonstrate 
passive europeanisation.   
 
The distinction between European and Europeanised POS is crucial:  we might well 
expect that the europeanisation of social movements could look very different in 
different countries as a result of the varying political opportunity structures.  
Although European POS might be common to all, europeanised POS will manifest 
themselves differently because of the different national political opportunity 
structures.  Reising (1998: abstract) writes  
‘the europeanisation of protest occurs, displaying systematic cross-national 
differences.  These differences are…related to the differential between the 
constraints of the actors’ domestic environments and the common-to-all 
opportunities evolving on the level of European politics’.   
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This idea is pursued in the following section, which compares the political 
opportunity structures at work in the anti-road and anti-GM campaigns in Italy, 
France and the UK. 
 
3.4 National POS: Case Countries 
In order to contextualise theanalysis of social movement protest that follows in the 
next chapter, it serves to first provide a broad outline of the national political 
opportunity structures in each of the case study countries.  This section provides 
generalised descriptions that in turn provide a baseline against which the 
europeanisation of individual protests may be measured.   

i) POS in France 
The political opportunity structure in France is distinctive amongst the case study 
countries because of the relatively high degree of centralisation of the state – what 
McCauley has called ‘strong and passively exclusive’ (McCauley, 2011: 6). 
 
i) The strength of the state 
Kriesi et al. have typified France’s POS as a strong state, exclusive and repressive of 
challengers (1992: 222).  They write: 
Because of its strength, the state can often choose merely to ignore 
challenges; if it does react, however, it will most likely confront the 
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challenger with repression.  Moreover, since the state is strong, the challenger 
is neither likely to have veto power, nor is he likely to obtain substantive 
concessions (1992: 223).   
 
The French state is strong by virtue of its centralisation.  It is able to implement and 
police its own policy agenda with greater autonomy than the other case study 
countries considered here.  In spite of this, a number of ‘opportunity windows’ have 
emerged when the political structures of the country have shifted.  These 
opportunities might be precipitated by changes of government, changes in the 
configuration of ruling elites (mayors and national ministers for example) or even by 
protracted legal processes. (McCauley, 2011: 7).
25
  In this way, the opportunities for 
social movement action are available, but are more contingent than in the two other 
case study countries because of the strength of the state.  
 
ii) The openness or closure of the political system 
Of all of the countries studied, France is closest to the notion of the closed state.  It is 
highly centralised, with a strong tradition of excluding civil society actors.  As 
McCauley notes  ‘pluralist intermediation, particularly the inclusion of civil society 
actors, does not fit well within a French context’ (2008b: 155).  According to the 
traditional POS typology of open and closed states this centralisation may be 
expected to suggest a dynamic movement outside the state.  But evidence points to a 
less than vibrant French environmental movement.  Fillieule (2003) remarks on low 
 
25
 For examples of social movement groups taking advantage of such circumstances see (Berny, 2009; 
Hilson, 2002; McCauley, 2007, 2008c, 2011). 
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numbers of protest events compared to other movements, but also a low turnout at 
such events which he attributes to several factors:  years of Socialist government 
privileging economic over environmental concerns,
26
 the growth of French Green 
party les Verts, fragmentation and institutionalization within the movement, and a 
universal acceptance of environmental principles which ‘dilutes’ the ability of the 
movement to act.   
 
In the context of this ‘dilution’ a green party presence in government from 1997 
meant that the institutionalisation of the green movement swiftly followed, so rather 
than strong movements we find strong professional environmental movement 
organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (see Fig. 3.1).  At the 
same time, paradoxically, the passively exclusive nature of the state means that 
‘movements are excluded from traditionally corporatist forms of national policy-
making’ (McCauley, 2011: 6).  Fillieule notes that: 
‘the relative pacification of the environmental movement can be related to its 
co-optation by the state...at the local level this phenomenon is all the more 
strong since local institutions finance more and more expert reports, and try 
to obtain the associations agreement to their public policy, the best way of 
doing so being the creation of ad hoc associations totally dependent for their 
resources upon the local government’ (2003: 73).   
 
In France it seems the centralised state and co-opted local groups do not offer the 
political structure necessary to facilitate grassroots social movement access. 
 
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 Fillieule and Ferrier explain that socialist governments privileged economic questions over 
environmental concerns because they sought to demonstrate their competence as a political power 
(Fillieule & Ferrier, 1999: 17) 
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Fig. 3.1: Les Verts in Government 
 
The French Green Party Les Verts entered government between 1997 and 
2001.  Although they have not managed to re-establish this electoral success 
over the past ten years, they have continued to benefit from four seats in the 
National Assembly and six MEPs. 
 
There is a long history of environmental representation in French elections, long 
before Les Verts came into existence.  There has been an ecology candidate at 
every French Presidential election since Friends of the Earth supported René 
Dumont in 1974.  In spite of this tradition of environmental representation, success 
came late to Les Verts.  This delay may be attributed in part to the fact that they did 
not grow out of a convergence of social movements like their German colleagues 
Die Grunen, but out of an electoral entente of ecological organisations’ (Adkin, 2002: 
317) which made negotiating alliances more difficult.   Another of the reasons for 
their struggle to gain support was born with their decision in 1986 to declare 
themselves outside of traditional party politics ‘ni droit ni gauche’ (neither right nor 
left).  It was another ten years before the party would climb back onboard with 
traditional politics, but its eventual participation in the coalition of the gauche plurielle 
(Plural Left) led to electoral victory in 1997.  The arrival of environmental seats in the 
Assemblée Nationale and the entry of Les Verts into both parliament and 
government altered the political opportunity structure of the state for the French 
environmental movement.  The following year Convergences Écologie Solidarité  
(Ecological Solidarity Convergence) joined Les Verts and by 2000 they had two 
government portfolios: Dominque Voynet as Minister for the Environment, and Guy 
Hascoët as Junior Minister for Overseas Development and Cooperation.  In spite of 
these portfolios, opinion is divided about the degree of political success les Verts 
have actually experienced. While Hayes argues that they had buttressed their 
position as the most important of France’s competing green formations (2002: 1) 
Knapp and Wright take a more sceptical line: ‘Les Verts should not, however, be 
viewed simply as a party of the government: their experience of office within the 
gauche plurielle alliance has 
 been at best a partial success, hotly debated after the event’ (Knapp & Wright, 
2006: 209).  Their questionable policy success notwithstanding, the arrival of Les 
Verts into mainstream French politics did change the opportunity structure for the 
green movement - there was a new ‘presence, attitude and influence of political 
allies’ (Hayes, 2002: 19).  The presence of these allies however has caused the 
well-theorised phenomenon of professionalisation with the movement, forcing it to 
fracture into those who choose to persue their strategies for change outside of the 
political system, and those – the majority - who saw opportunity in this new channel 
of influence.  The consequence of this debate was to squeeze the more radical, 
deeper green groups who form the foundation of a social movement out of the arena 
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and it is commonly argued that while Les Verts held office ‘party organisation has 
not coexisted alongside a vibrant social movement’ (2002: 40).    
 
iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests 
One of the parameters that dictate the movement’s access to elite allies is the history 
of Les Verts in government.  In 1997 the entry of les Verts into both parliament and 
government altered the political opportunity structure of the state for the French 
environmental movement.  The following year Convergences Écologie Solidarité 
joined Les Verts and by 2000 they had two government portfolios: Dominque Voynet 
as Minister for the Environment, and Guy Hascoët as Junior Minister for Overseas 
Development and Cooperation.  The Greens thereby buttressed their position as the 
most important of France’s competing green formations (Hayes 2002: 1).  For the 
movement then, there was a new ‘presence, attitude and influence of political allies’ 
(Hayes 2002: 19).  The subsequent electoral failures of the party have diminished 
their power as an ally, and they are ‘only slowly recovering’ (Carter, 2005: 210) but 
the legacy of their role in government and the networks of influence which resulted 
from that time may prove to have endured, at least in part. 
 
The exclusion of the grassroots face of the green movement is a familiar tale even in 
the most inclusive states.  Coupled with the exclusionary nature of the French state, 
the absence of pluralism in the policy-making process even for EMOs means that an 
alliance between a grassroots group and an EMO is not necessarily beneficial if the 
EMO itself is unable to capitalise on any access to elite allies.  In other words, access 
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to allies is only as strong as the allies themselves.  Nevertheless, there is still a robust 
network of institutionalised EMOs working in France from which the grassroots 
groups may draw support, as the case studies presented in the next chapter will 
demonstrate. 
 
ii) POS in Italy 
 
The POS in Italy may be characterised as a case of formal inclusion with a weak 
decentralised state.  For this reason collective action in Italy has been described as 
‘overwhelmingly institutionalised’  (Diani & Forno, 2007: 164).  We examine below 
the Italian national POS according to the categories of opportunity laid out in the 
introduction. 
 
i) The strength of the state 
The central state in Italy is relatively weak, due not least to its changing kaleidoscope 
of coalition governments. Even during the well-documented period of domination by 
the Christian Democrat Party between 1946 and 1992 there were no fewer than 28 
coalition governments.  More recently political parties have broadly aligned 
themselves with the centre-left coalition or centre-right coalitions, undoubtedly the 
result of a change in the electoral system away from proportional representation.  
Historically, Italy has relied on almost pure proportional representation (PR) to elect 
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members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
27
  The consequence of PR and 
party list in the 2006 and 2008 elections was to incentivise each of the centre-right 
and centre-left blocs to pack their coalitions with as many small parties as possible in 
order to achieve a plurality of the vote and gain the requisite 55% majority.  This 
strategy increases the “blackmail” potential of small parties before they even get into 
parliament (Benedetto, 2008) and contributes to a weak government.  For social 
movement groups this weakness could theoretically afford  a degree of traction to 
challenge and to police the effective implementation policy.  However, as the case 
studies illustrate, it does not necessarily make the political system more accessible 
because social movements need the political and financial capital to take advantage 
of the formal institutional opportunities.  At a grassroots level in particular, these 
resources are scarcely available. 
  
ii) The openness or closure of the political system  
Italy is a highly decentralised state which has led to it having ‘highly fragmented, 
both vertically and horizontally, policy making structures’ (Koutalakis, 2003: 12).  
This decentralisation creates a more porous system which is open to a wide variety of 
interests at different levels.  The processes of administrative decentralisation which 
began in Italy in the 1970s meant that the various interrelated aspects of 
environmental policy were divided between the different levels of local government, 
changing the access points to power and shifting the power alignments between 
political bodies.  Regions were put in charge of their own energy policy while 
 
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 Between 1993 and 2005 the system moved towards an additional member system which relied on 
75% of votes cast under a first past the post system and the remaining 25% under PR, but in 2006 the 
system moved back again to proportional representation and a party list. 
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provinces gained greater control over their forests and communes over urban traffic 
and emissions of central heating systems.  (Marchetti, 1996: 307-8).  As Rootes 
notes, ‘[T]he revival of enthusiasm for “participation from below”, a reaction to the 
implosion of the old political order in the course of the 1990s, has favoured the 
convergence of, and collaboration among a wide variety of actors’ (2007: xiii) and 
opened the gates for the formation of localised pluralist policy coalitions with 
considerable access.   
 
iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests 
The environmental movement in Italy has been classified as being ‘in an advanced 
process of institutionalisation’  (della Porta & Andretta, 2000: 37)
28
 and this 
assessment hints at a burgeoning network of alliances between the political elites and 
the movement itself.  Predictably, the (hyper)decentralisation outlined above has 
generated points of friction between the different levels of government who are able 
to lay the blame for inadequate environmental policies at the feet of their partner 
institutions.  Social movements are therefore likely to find a sympathetic partner at 
one of these, sometimes competing, levels of government. 
 
This open opportunity structure presents a double-edged sword for the green 
movement.  On one hand della Porta notes that  
given the territorial structure of representation…protests are often capable of 
achieving the support of local politicians. These [politicians] may fear a loss 
 
28
 See also (Biorcio, 2000). 
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of electoral support, and are then willing and able to press for a re-location of 
the “public bad”, pushing elsewhere the troubled question of allocation 
(2006b: 3).  
 
Conversely however, this openness also enables local government to move into the 
space normally occupied by grassroots movements and dilutes the dichotomy 
between civil actors and government agencies.  This dichotomy is required by the 
movement because it acts as the focus for political action and it helps to frame the 
movement as ‘an alternative’.   This blurring is one aspect of an open opportunity 
structure which may not be favourable for the movement because institutionalisation 
represents an erosion of their raison d’être. 
One avenue through which green groups may historically have been expected to 
access elite allies is through the participation of i Verdi in the Centre-Left coalition 
governments of the 1990s – see Fig. 3.2.  I Verdi entered government for the first 
time with the election of Romano Prodi’s l’Ulivo coalition in 1996, while i Verdi 
ministers were also present in the governments of Massimo d’Alema (1998) and 
Guiliano Amato (2000).   In such situations it has been hypothesised that ‘[w]hen 
allies are present in government, we can expect that groups will be more likely to 
have their demands met and voices heard domestically’ (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 
537) see also (Koopmans, 1999)).  Based on this information one might therefore 
characterise the Italian opportunity structure as open, because of the green 





Fig. 3.2: I Verdi in Government 
 
According to theories of political opportunity and movement 
institutionalisation (Doherty, 1992) the role of i Verdi in Italian government 
suggests that environmental concerns would be absorbed into the machinery 
of the state rather than flourishing in civil society.   
Since 1990 the two green parties in Italy, Liste Verdi (Green Lists) and Verdi 
Arcobaleno (Rainbow Greens) have been united as Federazione dei Verdi 
(Federation of the Greens) or simply i Verdi, twice becoming part of government.  As 
part of the coalition l‘Ulivo (The Olive Tree) they won the 1996 elections and i Verdi 
headed up the Ministries for the Environment and for Agriculture in the centre-left 
governments of Prodi, d’Alema and Amato.  They were relegated into opposition by 
l’Ulivo’s failure in the 2001 elections, marking a gradual drift in the party to the far 
left.  I Verdi were back in power again however after success in the 2006 general 
elections as part of the winning coalition L’Unione (The Union) and held positions as 
Minister for the Environment, and Under-Secretary for Economy and Finance.  
However, as part of their ongoing shift to the left in December 2007 they joined 
forces with the Refoundation Party, the Party of Italian Communists and Democratic 
Left to form a new coalition La Sinistra-L’arcobaleno (The Left-The Rainbow) which 
failed to win enough support to enter parliament in the 2008 election, nor did they 
find success in the European elections called the following year. In November 2011 
La Federazione dei Verdi launched a new political coalition Ecologisti e Reti Civiche 
(Ecologists and Civic Networks) based on a highly grassroots model of civic 
participation.  Their popularity will be put to the test in the next Italian general 
elections in 2013.  Undoubtedly, the participation of i Verdi in national government 
afforded new elite allies and new points of access for environmental movement 
groups in Italy who had previously found themselves on the periphery.  The success 
of minority parties such as the greens relies on the strength of their coalition and of 
the political context of the time - Forno writes how in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the political upheaval in Italy strengthened the position of parties like the greens 
because ‘rather than sponsoring protest, in fact, these actors collected the various 
sources of resentful’ (Forno, 2003: 2).  I Verdi have been especially well placed to 
act as elite allies to the environmental movement because they have been able to 
combine the receptiveness to far-left politics and radical rethinking of social systems 
that many social movement groups espouse, with the legitimacy and political 
resource of a role in government.  In this regard, they have been the perfect ‘bridge’ 
between social movement actors and policy-makers.  Social movement actors have 
been able to take advantage of the often-shifting constellation of alignments within 
the party itself, as well as the constantly evolving political coalitions within which the 
party sits.  I Verdi have been able to provide two key political opportunities to the 
green movement in Italy therefore – participation in government has afforded them a 
legitimacy that makes them elite allies for the movement, and the flux of the internal 
and external political positions has given the movement opportunity to intersect the 
debates.   
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However there are two factors which restrict the availability of elites allies to the 
movement.  The first of these concerns the number and strength of elite allies in 
government.  For instance, as a result of the 2001 and 2006 elections i Verdi retained 
a small number of seats in parliament but in 2008 they failed to pass the threshold. 
The victorious centre-right coalition, as may be expected, has been far less 
sympathetic to environmental concerns
29
 - most recently withdrawing all public 
funds from the renewable energy industry (Migliaccio, 2011).  The second restriction 
on elite allies for the green movement is due to the fact that the environment ministry 
in Italy is relatively new (dating from 1986) and possesses rather weak 
organizational resources (Koutalakis, 2003: 14).   As a consequence, it is does not 
wield much influence within government.   Both of these factors mean that although 
there are elite allies available to the movement, the allies themselves may be 
relatively weak and movement access thus not especially fruitful. 
 
A further political opportunity structure within Italy which determines the 
availability of elite allies concerns abrogative referenda which allows Italians to 
force a vote on legislation which has already been passed.  Although the obstacles to 
this process are considerable
30
, abrogative referenda (progetti di legge di iniziativa 
popolare) have had considerable impact – not least of which was the change in 
electoral system from PR to semi-majoritarian in the 1990s.  The environmental 
movement has also historically taken advantage of this initiative to campaign on the 
 
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 (Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 1995) argue that in general elite allies on the left are 
more responsive to environmental issues than their colleagues on the political right.  
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 In order for the referendum to succeed 500,000 eligible voters across five regional councils are 
required to sign a petition, the petition and its subject matter must be approved by both courts and at 
least 50 per cent of the eligible voting population need to vote in the subsequent referendum.  The 





.  In this way, environmental groups from local chapters 
of national or international organisations have been able to collaborate with cross-
party initiatives to change legislation.  By collaborating with these local chapters, 
movements benefit from their access to elite allies within political parties. 
 
iii) POS in the UK 
The UK is a particularly difficult country to classify in terms of its domestic POS.   
‘The problem [of identifying formal institutional arrangements] is especially 
acute in a “stateless”’ society like Britain, in which the absence of a written 
constitution and the prevalence of custom and convention makes the 
identification of stable political opportunity structures particularly difficult’ 
(Rootes, 1999: 7).   
 
However, in broad terms, the political opportunity structure in the UK may be 
classified as a ‘case of informal inclusion, characterized by a strong state (hence a 
closed opportunity structure on the formal side) and inclusive dominant strategy 





 In 1987 they collaborated with a coalition of political parties to rule out nuclear energy plants in 
Italy; and after three negative referenda the government was forced to phase out nuclear entirely.  The 
role of i Verdi in government in the 1990s helped to maintain the moratorium, but with the election of 
Berlusconi’s pro-nuclear government in 2008 and the announcement that there would be a ‘nuclear 
revival’ a second referendum was called to revoke the decision.  WWF Italia, Greenpeace and Amici 
della Terra together with a number of political parties including i Verdi, Ecologia Libertà, and 
Ecodem campaigned for ‘no to nuclear’. 80,00 valid signatures were presented to the parliament on 21 




i) The strength of the state 
Although usually classified as a strong state, Britain has experienced the most recent 
and significant shifts to its political opportunity structure by virtue of the process of 
devolution formally began in 1997.  In that year the opportunity structure for social 
movements shifted, creating the opportunity for them to lobby at multiple levels of 
government.  In particular, because environmental policy is substantially devolved, 
there is greater scope to lobby at subnational and national levels in this area. 
 
ii) Openness or closure of the state 
With regard specifically to environmental interests the green party has never formed 
part of the government in Britain and is unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future; 
consequently environmental concerns have a history of being kept out of the state.  
However, Rootes is correct to argue that: 
`the characterisation of a national political opportunity structure needs to be 
carefully qualified. British governments have responded to different 
movements in a more differentiated way than a strictly structural conception 
of political opportunities would allow. They have, in particular, been more 
accommodating to the environmental movement than to the anti-poll tax 
movement or to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’ (Rootes, 1999: 6).   
 
In this sense, although the opportunity structure is generally closed, it is still able to 
accommodate specific types of environmental interests and has shown itself open to 




iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests 
Whilst the discussions of France and Italy have focussed on the co-option of 
branches of the green movement into government, the situation in Britain is quite 
different.  Rootes notes that here ‘uninstitutionalized environmental protest persists’ 
(2003b: 21).   One attributable factor is Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system 
which, without a regional concentration of strength, buttresses the position of the 
dominant parties and  makes it difficult for the greens to emerge as a serious force in 
general elections (Carter, 2006: 748). Therefore, the elite allies of national 
parliament historically available in France and Italy are much less available in the 
UK where there is only one green MP in Westminster and two in the Scottish 
Parliament – see Fig. 3.3.
32
 
Fig. 3.3: The Green Party in Government 
 
The Green Party of England and Wales has been one of the slowest in Europe 
to achieve a seat in parliament and has never formed part of government.  
Since 2010 they hold a seat in the UK parliament while the Scottish Green 
Party finds representation with two MSPs in the Scottish Parliament.  
The Green Party has its roots in the PEOPLE party, formed in 1972, which evolved 
into the Ecology Party in 1975 and finally the Green Party in 1990.  They enjoyed 
their first electoral victories in the 1999 European elections, returning two MEPs who 
also retained their seats in the European elections of 2004 and 2009.  In 2010 the 
party returned their first ever MP in Westminister.  In Scotland, a separate but allied 
organisation since 1990, the Scottish Green Party, won two MSPs in the 2005 
general election.  In Wales the Welsh Green Party is a semi-autonomous party 
within the Green Party of England and Wales, but has yet to penetrate the Welsh 
Assembly, it also lost its only County Council seat in 2004.  Although the UK Green 
Party in fact holds the worldwide record for percentage of votes in a national election 
– winning 15% in the 1989 European elections, Dryzek et al. note that the First Past 
the Post electoral system means that these votes have not, until very recently, 
translated into seats (2003: 54).  Their poor electoral prospects, have made it easy 
for the green movement to discredit them, as well as their politics (Rootes, 1992: 
186).  Unusually, the politics of the Green Party have often been more radical than 
those espoused by the mainstream environmental groups.  It has been observed 
 
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 The Scottish Parliament uses the Additional Member electoral system which is more favourable to 
smaller parties, but in spite of this the Scottish Green Party still only has two MSPs in office. 
117 

that ‘The British Green Party and its precursor, The Ecology Party, did provide the 
main platform for a very visible and radical critique of established policies and 
political practices, of a sort not engaged in by the main environmentalist groups’ 
(Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlosberg, & Jernes, 2003: 54).  Unlike the situation in 
the two other case study countries, where a high degree of professionalization is 
required in order to access Party resources, in the UK the Green Party has a far 
stronger relationship with the deeper green and more radical politics of grassroots 
groups than its corresponding numbers in other countries.  The role of the Green 
Party therefore in shaping political opportunity structures for the green movement 
has played out in a distinctive way – that is characterised by decentralised 
representation in Scotland and Wales, and by a deeper green ideology than that 
found in many of the environmental groups whom one would expect to be well 
placed to take advantage of these political opportunities. 
 
In spite of this lack of political representation, elite allies are more readily available 
in Britain in the form of environmental independent bodies with direct access to 
government policy-makers such as the think tank Green Alliance, or – until 2011 – 
the government’s independent advisory body the Sustainable Development 
Commission.  The culture of pluralism in Britain has afforded environmental NGOs 
access which, in turn, it has been able to pass on indirectly to local chapters across 
the UK.  The overlapping membership of much grassroots activism with membership 
of local EMOs means that at even at a grassroots level, access to elite allies is closer 
in Britain than one would expect given the formal structures in place. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In summary, the concept of political opportunity structures has historically allowed 
scholars of social movements to do two things: to examine the national political 
context in which a social movement acts, and to use these findings to help explain 
why a movement structures itself in a particular way and why it pursues its chosen 
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strategy.  I have developed a definition of political opportunity structures as the 
structural features of a political system that shape the conditions for social 
movement action and developed and presented a set of four variables that constitute 
political opportunity structures at a domestic level.  The strength of this POS 
approach lies in its application to cross-country case studies and its ability to capture 
emergent political opportunity structures at a supranational level.  In this way I am 
able to compare national POS to identify why grassroots groups act in different ways 
in different countries and to then apply this knowledge to examine the POS at a 
European and europeanised level.  In so doing we can capture the three processes of 
europeanisation: direct, indirect and passive. 
 
I find that the domestic POS in Italy, France and UK are indeed different.  Within 
each of the three structures of political opportunity on which I focus (strength of the 
state, openness, an availability of allies) the case studies could be positioned on a 
sliding scale.  With regard to the strength of the state France has the strongest, most 
centralised arrangement – with Italy’s highly decentralised state at the other end of 
the scale and the UK in the middle.  Consideration of the openness of the state 
reconfigures this order with the UK the most open, France the most closed and Italy 
positioned in the middle.  Finally, examining the availability of allies we find access 
is limited in each of the countries although Italy is the most fertile ground for elite 
access, followed by the UK and then France.  Clearly, there are national differences 
that may be observed, but without the same access to domestic state opportunities 
will grassroots groups still experience europeanisation?   
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To answer this question I have developed in this chapter the European dimension to 
POS – differentiating between two kinds of political opportunity structures at this 
level.  Those that have been created at the European level by virtue of the existence 
of the EU institutions and their sub-structures I call European political opportunity 
structures.  Those whose domestic political opportunity structures have shifted as a 
result of the processes of EU integration I call europeanised political opportunity 
structures.  This nuanced understanding of two linked but separate concepts allows 
us to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the way in which evidence of 
europeanisation may be found in a social movement’s relationship to POS.  Rootes 
writes that ‘because environmental protest is mobilized or targeted mainly at the 
local or national levels, it is shaped primarily by the habits and dynamics of local and 
national politics’ (2003b: 251).  In the next chapter we apply this framework of 
European and europeanised POS to our case studies to investigate the extent to which 
this holds true.  Does the level of governance at which protest is directed impact the 





4 Political Opportunity Structures: European 
        and Europeanised 
______________________________________________ 
 
‘When people come together to pursue collective action in the context of the modern 
state they enter a complex and multifaceted social, political and economic 
environment.  The elements of the environment have manifold direct and indirect 
consequences for people’s common decisions about how to define their social change 
goals and how to organize and proceed in pursuing those goals’ 
 
(McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson, 1991: 46) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we outlined the contours of political opportunity structures 
(POS) and focused on three important dimensions: the strength of the state to 
implement policy, the openness of the state to third party interests and the 
availability of elite allies to social movements.  We also examined these dimensions 
in each of the case study countries.  Finally, we discussed how europeanisation may 
be evidenced by a movement connecting to either European or europeanised 
political opportunity structures and in so doing evidence direct, indirect and passive 
europeanisation processes.  The aim of this chapter is to apply these concepts to the 
case studies of anti-road and anti-GMO protest in Italy, France and the UK.  The 
chapter is guided by the overarching question, what is the impact of europeanisation 




The chapter is divided into two main sections that examine first the evidence for 
European and then for europeanised political opportunity structure.  Within each of 
these sections, the three countries, and the environmental protest within them is 
systematically interrogated.  In France we examine the anti-road protest against the 
construction of the A65 between Langon and Pau in the Aquitaine region of Southern 
France.  Also in Aquitaine, France’s largest maize-producing region, we study the 
ongoing campaign against GM crops.  In Italy, we evaluate the campaign against the 
Corridoio Tirrenico road running along the Tuscan coast, and also the anti-GMO 
campaign in that same region – the first of the Italian regions to declare itself ‘GMO-
free’.  Finally, in the UK we investigate the campaign against the re-routing of the 
A71 at Bilston Glen near Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in 
Devon in the South West of England – the first of the English regions to declare 
itself GM-free.  The chapter concludes by reviewing the evidence of what 
europeanisation means for the green movement, and how this is manifest in the POS 
with which a movement connects. 
  
4.2 European POS in Evidence 
In chapter three I outlined a set of variables which constitute a European political 
opportunity structure.  A social movement actor will be europeanised to the extent 
that it is able to connect to these European POS where they will:   
 
1) Work within a policy area tightly bound by European implementation 
requirements 
 (the strength of the EU) 
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2) Have direct access to institutional channels of influence at the EU  
(the openness of the EU) 
 
3) Have access to new allies at a European level whose presence is a direct 
result of European integration  
(the availability of elite allies) 
 
The intentional and direct connection between the social movement actor and the 
European Union in this case evidences direct europeanisation processes at work.  In 
the section that follows I illustrate the extent to which the social movement actors in 





The French Anti-Road Campaign 
 
The decision to build the A65 from Langon to Pau resulted in a project which was 
relatively swiftly developed in comparison to the Italian example.  Since 1992 when 
the road was first included in the National Roads Programme it took only 14 years 
for plans to be approved and designated ‘d’utilité publique’.  Works commenced in 
2008 and the road was opened in December 2010. 
 
The A65 Autoroute de Gasgogne was designed to improve transport links from 
Bordeaux to Pau on the Spanish border, with a view to improving trade access 
between the two countries.  The A65 also intercepts the road between Bordeaux and 
Toulouse creating a more robust road network in the South of France.  The road was 
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not part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) so it was not a 
‘European’ priority, but that has not stopped the campaigners from engaging with 
European POS through connecting to another area of EU legislation: the 
environment. 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
With regard to the strength of the state, this lack of European legislation vis-à-vis the 
proposal to develop the road is important.  The road network in France relies heavily 
on private companies, so public-private partnerships for road-building and 
maintenance are common.  The country’s transport infrastructure is extremely well-
maintained and comprehensive which means that it is a significant economic 
resource and one which is highly centralised.  Because the A65 was driven by 
national rather than EU transport policy and received no EU funding there were not 
the same opportunities for Alternative Régionale Langon-Pau (ARLP) and 
Fédération des Sociétés pour l’Etude, la Protection et l’Aménagement de la nature 
dans le Sud-Ouest (SEPANSO) to appeal directly to policymakers or allies making 
transport policy.  They did however engage indirectly with European POS through 
connecting to EU environmental policy – another area tightly bound by EU 
implementation requirements.  In 2009 ARLP, SEPANSO and Friends of the Earth 
Landes filed a formal complaint to the European Commission based on the fact that 
the road would cut through eight sites protected under Natura 2000.  They were well 
versed in European Union legislation and were able to base their complaints on 
contraventions of specific items of European Union legislation.  The report mentions 
for example ‘the decree of 18 December 2006 which declared the A65 project to be 
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of ‘public utility’ violates article 6.2 of the directive 92/43/CEE’ (SEPANSO, 2008: 
10).   In this way they were able to connect to European implementation 
requirements in environmental rather than transport legislation, thereby showing 
evidence of connecting to European political opportunity structures. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
ARLP, although a grassroots group, was able to leverage its network of partners to 
access EU channels of expertise.  That expertise and access was demonstrated by 
their appeal to the European Commission which was comprehensive and well-versed 
in European Union legislation.  A member of ARLP explained ‘SEPANSO get a bit 
of funding and have someone just dedicated to looking at the EU.  We were able to 
go to them for advice and they helped us to prepare our case’ (Interview 4/11/2009).  
Although this access to institutional channels of influence at the EU is limited by 
comparison with large EMOs, it is the closest link demonstrated by any of the case 
study groups in any of the countries, and is significant in its demonstration of the 
possibility for grassroots groups to engage directly in the EU political system. 
 
iii) Access to elite allies 
Finally, ARLP’s access to elite allies was more comprehensive than the literature 
would expect of a grassroots campaign.  The group benefitted from an organised and 
diverse membership.  Its collaboration at an early stage with SEPANSO leant it 
legitimacy and the ability to access other larger EMOs who had direct contact with 
elite actors.  For example, ARLP issued press releases co-signed by Friends of the 
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Figure 4.1: ARLP co-signed press release – 15/10/08 
 
One of the members of ARLP explained that although this partnership was useful, it 
was difficult to navigate: 
‘We were really keen not to be seen as NIMBYs.  The big environmental 
associations are keen to distance themselves from NIMBYism and are 
concentrating on the larger discourses.  Also, because of the context of the 
Grenelle de l’environnement33 we needed to pacify the one Minister who 
would listen to us during the negotiations.  The others didn’t want to 
compromise their position and they thought the battle was already lost’ 
(Interview, 17.11.2009). 
 
This extract draws out an interesting question specific to grassroots social movement 
groups operating in a European context – to what extent does collaborating with 
professionalised organisations in order to access channels of influence at the EU 
level mean ‘concentrating on the larger discourses’ and in so doing distancing 
themselves from their ‘grass roots’?  The tension here between the degrees of 
institutionalisation within social movements is one of the reasons why although 
 
33
 The Grenelle de l’environnement was an environmental roundtable with multi-party, civilian and 
public service representation.  It took place in 2007 with a view to generating environmental 
legislation to be acted at a French, European and international level. 
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European POS may not be desirable for a grassroots group, they may still choose to 
engage with other organisations who can help them to access European political 
opportunity structures, because it is a more effective way of running their campaign.  
 
To summarise, in the case against the A65 in Aquitaine, there is evidence of the 
grassroots elements of the campaign connecting to European political opportunity 
structures.  Although ARLP recognised that they could not appeal the road directly 
under the auspices of TEN-T guidelines, they did recognise that that project would 
be bound by other EU legislation – in particular in the area of environmental 
protection – and utilised this to stall the project.  They also connected to SEPANSO, 
a more professionalised organisation with a European expert who was able to guide 
them in putting their case together and how best to influence the EU.  Finally, 
although they were able to use the campaign against the road to network with EMOs 
who had a European presence such as Greenpeace or Amis de la Terre, their role was 
largely symbolic and ARLP did not at any point engage with the European offices of 
these organisations.  Overall, the campaign against the A65 provides evidence of 
ARLP connecting to the first two dimensions of a European political opportunity 
structure, but not the third – we can conclude that they were partially able to connect 




The French anti-GMO Campaign 
 
 
The anti-GMO movement in France, as with elsewhere in Europe, reached fever-
pitch in the mid 1990s.  Greenpeace France was one of the chief mouthpieces and 
innovators of this movement and worked closely with other organised interests, both 
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EMOs and farming trade unions to stabilise the French moratorium on GM crops.  
Alongside this organised vein of protest were a number of field actions, most notably 
the work of the faucheurs volontaires, the ‘volunteer reapers’ who captured the 
headlines across Europe.   
 
In part due to such protest, the legacy of this period of protest is that 22 of the 23 
regions in France have declared themselves GMO free and ‘France has witnessed the 
growth of a distinctively vicious societal response to the release of GMOs’ 
(McCauley, 2011: 7).  In Aquitaine, which has a strong agricultural economy the 
issues of GM crops is especially pertinent.  The strategy of grassroots activists 
remains primarily one of awareness-raising: the well-known anti-GM campaigner 
José Bové has been tried in a local court and the media profile of the campaign is 
high. 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
With regard to the strength of the polity, GMO policy is centralised by national 
government.  With the moratorium on the commercial growing and importation of 
GM crops decided by central government, even decisions regarding individual field 
trials do not lie with regional government.  This means that the pressure which anti-
GMO groups exert on regional government is ‘largely symbolic’ (Interview 
30/10/2008).  Their strategy recognised the EU and national government as the 
ultimate target in changing GMO policy; ‘by persuading people to vote with their 
money against GM crops we hope to counter the business interests which the 
government and the EU holds dear’ (Interview 30/10/2008).   In this regard there is 
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some limited evidence that the grassroots anti-GMO campaign connected to 
European POS by identifying the EU as critical to policy direction at a local level.  
Although the EU was not a direct target of protest, it was, in rhetoric at least, the 
ultimate target. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
The grassroots face of the anti-GMO movement in Aquitaine, as with similar 
campaigns in the other case study countries, shares an overlapping membership with 
more institutionalised EMOs such as Amis de la Terre and Greenpeace France.  This 
connection would indirectly afford them access to institutional channels of influence 
at the EU level, for example through membership of the European Environmental 
Bureau (EEB) and a well-developed lobbying position.  There was no evidence 
however from the documentary analysis or from the interviews I conducted that 
members of the grassroots campaigns sought access to the EU through these 
relationships, nor that they thought it desirable.  In this regard, there is no evidence 
of the anti-GMO campaign connecting to European political opportunity structures 
through institutional channels of influence. 
 
iii) Access to elite allies 
In a related, but distinct arena of European POS, the availability of elite allies at a 
European level was not a recognisable feature of the grassroots campaign.  Although 
there was acceptance that the EU was one of the targets of protest by virtue of their 
legislative powers, the strategy at a local level was to engage residents with the anti-
GMO argument in order that their purchasing preferences did not support a the 
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market for GMOs.  The engagement of the grassroots campaign with the EU was 
once again indirect, and did not capitalise on the possible avenues of access to elite 
allies through overlapping membership with large EMOs. 
 
To summarise, there is considerably less evidence of European political opportunity 
structures in the case of the anti-GMO campaign.  Although there was some 
recognition that EU legislation was important to their local campaign and that 
changing legislation at that level would be to their advantage, the action repertoire 
was designed to connect to regional and national legislation.  For the grassroots 
faucheurs volontaires and Vigilance Aquitaine 33, although there were opportunities 
for them to work alongside professionalised EMOs with representation at the EU, 
there is no sign that they used these connections as a conduit to access this European 
political opportunity structure.  Nor did they use these relationships to access 
European-level allies, either the European branches of their EMO colleagues, the 
European Greens, Agricultural Trade Unions or other elite allies that one might 
expect.  Overall, there is scant evidence of the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine 
connecting to European political opportunity structures. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the evidence for engagement with European POS in the French 
examples illustrates a mixed picture.  In the case of anti-road protest the underlying 
pressure to be ‘taken seriously’ and to reject NIMBYism meant that they exploited 
the opportunities they had to connect to EU legislation and institutional channels of 
influence at the EU level.  In so doing, ARLP connected to European POS.  Like the 
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road protesters, the anti-GMO campaign also benefitted from overlapping 
membership with local chapters of EMOs with European representation, although 
conversely they did not seek to exploit these channels to connect directly with 
Europe; and although they acknowledged the role of the EU in GM crop legislation, 







The Italian Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
Italy has a relatively well established history of road protest, the most high-profile of 
which was the TAV tunnel campaign in 1996
34
.  In Tuscany, the campaign against 
the Corridoio Tirrenico has a developed grassroots element. The Corridoio forms 
part of the development efforts of the Italian government to expand the Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) ‘Corridor 1’ which runs from Berlin to 
Palermo.  The amelioration of the Corridoio Tirrencio to bring it into line with the 
standards required of TEN-T roads (although it is not a TEN-T road in itself) makes 
the Corridoio a transport policy priority for national government with implicit 
European overtones.  The road is also part of the European Route E80 – a road 
network which cuts West to East across the continent, although these Trans-
European Motorways are overseen by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe and are not accountable to the EU.  A consequence of the networked element 
 
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of the road for the anti-road movement is that they are drawn into debating not just a 
regional issue, but also a national and a European one as well. 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
The anti-road campaign however shows very limited evidence of connecting to a 
European POS.  Although road-building is an area bound by European legislation, 
the Corridoio is not part of the network of roads for which the EU is responsible. The 
Tuscan Regional government makes a passing reference to its E80 status its official 
online and paper summaries of the project (Regione Toscana, 2009b) although it 
does not mention the EU explicitly.  Elsewhere however, the EU is seen as integral to 
the road’s raison d’être and development and the Corridoio is framed as part of a 
programme of regional development works that implicitly develop the TEN-T 
(Baracco & Beccattini, 2006).  I have argued that that European POS are evidenced 
by working in a policy area tightly bound by European implementation requirements.  
In the case of the Corridoio the road is not a designated TEN-T road, nor does the 
Regional Government intend to use TEN-T development funds to construct the road.  
In this regard, it does not meet the criteria for a European political opportunity 
structure.  However, the Regional Government’s insistence that the proposed road 
would form part of a pan-European road network, with the inference being that this 
network has its basis in European policy, presents an unusual situation.  Although the 
road is technically a purely national initiative, by framing the road as subject to EU 
policy the Regional Government creates a kind of ‘illusory’ opportunity structure for 
the anti-road movement.  The movement is not able to appeal to the EU to stop TEN-
T funding for the road because no such funding is in place, nor is it able to point to 
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the prerogatives of environmental protection laid down for TEN-T road projects.  In 
this regard, it is unable to connect to European political opportunity structures 
reserved for European legislative initiatives.  Unlike the French example however, it 
is not appealing the road on the grounds of other European legislation that is 
available to it – in particular in the areas of environmental and archaeological 
protection.  There is therefore no evidence of the campaign connecting to the first 
dimension of European political opportunity structures. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
As I noted in chapter two, the anti-road campaign was characterised by the wide 
variety of actors involved: from political parties like i Verdi (the Green Party), il PD 
(The Democratic Party), il PdCI (Italian Communist Party) and il PRC (Communist 
Refoundation Party); international and national NGOs: WWF, Legambiente 
(Environmental League), Italia Nostra (Our Italy) Stop al consume di territorio (Stop 
Territorial Erosion), some local environmental and agricultural interest organisations: 
Soccorso Ambientale Marremmano – SAM (Maremma Environmental Assistance), 
Coordinamento Toscano Produttori Biologici (The Tuscan Organic Producers 
Network); Forum Ambientalista Toscano (Tuscan Environment Forum) and 
dedicated community groups which united all of the above actors: SOS Maremma, 
Comitato Stop Autostrada (Stop the Road Committee).  The grassroots community 
groups were part of these larger networks of actors that encompassed political party 
and EMOs – and these professionalised actors already enjoyed direct channels of 
influence at the level of the EU.  One might have expected the local citizens who 
were part of SOS Maremma to lobby WWF or Legambiente to speak to their 
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European advisors about legal influence the EU might be able to bring to bear on the 
road proposals.  This kind of influence was not forthcoming.  One member of the 
group said: 
I don’t see this as an issue that Europe can help us with – this is an issue for 
us and the Regional Government, only the citizens have the power to stop this 
road by taking action and convincing them not to go ahead with their plans 
(Interview, 21.10.2008) 
 
It must be noted however that although the grassroots element of the movement 
worked alongside those EMOs and political parties who did have the ability to lobby 
the EU directly, the grassroots element itself lacked these links and did not seek to 
utilise the resources of its allies. In this regard, they did not have access to this 
second dimension of European political opportunity. 
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
The grassroots group SOS Maremma and local chapters of the EMOs may not have 
had access to channels of influence at the EU level, but they did have access to elite 
allies.   WWF for example has a European Policy Office in Brussels and 
Legambiente is a member of the European Environmental Bureau, whilst the political 
parties involved in the campaign all have political representation in the national and 
European parliaments, so in this regard the grassroots actors within the campaign did 
in fact have indirect access to allies at the level of the EU.  Although the grassroots 
level of the campaign worked in close proximity, indeed within the same networks, 
as the local chapters of these professionalised bodies there is no evidence that they 
used these connections to exploit their resources at a European level.  Apart from 
establishing a network of commonly-motivated groups they did not seek to make 
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further alliances with actors in Europe.  In fact, as I illustrate in the next chapter, the 
grassroots face of the anti-road movement explicitly tried to frame the road as very 
much not a European project and to situate the campaign at a very local level.  This 
may be one of the reasons why, although a European political opportunity structure 
was available to them through their networks, they chose not to take advantage of it. 
 
 
In summary, the anti-road protest in Tuscany shows no signs of connecting to 
European political opportunity structures.  Although the proposed road was not a 
TEN-T project campaign groups were still able to appeal the road on the ground of 
EU legislation but they chose only to make the connection to regional policy.  
Furthermore, the grassroots groups, through the network they forged with other 
EMOs and political parties could have exploited these links to access the European 
level channels of influence or allies at a European level.  The decision by SOS 
Maremma not to connect to these opportunities means that there is no evidence of 
European political opportunity structures at work in the campaign against the 




The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign  
 
 
In chapter two we noted that there was a high degree of professionalisation amongst 
the anti-GMO actors in Tuscany where larger EMOs dominate - Greenpeace Italy, 
Amici della Terra (and their local composite chapters such as Amici della Terra 
Firenze), Legambiente and WWF; aided by agro-alimentary interest groups such as 
Associazione Italiana Agricutura Biologica and Slowfood Italia, as well as the 
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farmer’s association Coldiretti.  As a consequence there is very little truly 
‘grassroots’ protest of the kind one finds in France and the UK, although there are 
ad-hoc coalitions of organic farmers working to support each others’ businesses and 
to raise the profile amongst their local communities of organic agriculture.  In light 
of this, and in contrast to the road campaign, the most striking feature of the anti-
GMO movement in Tuscany is the institutional support from regional government 
which it enjoys.  The high level of institutionalisation for the movement is 
characteristic of the political opportunity structures within which they operate.  If the 
social movement campaign in this case is characterised by a strong partnership with 
Regional Government, the Regional Government’s campaign is characterised by its 
partnership with the EU and expressed in the strong pan-European networks that it 
helped to forge and the EU lobbying that it has conducted. In this way, the (largely 
professionalised) anti-GM movement shows significant evidence of europeanisation 
through connecting to these pan-European networks. 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
Key to the political opportunity structures at play in the case of the anti-GMO 
campaign in Tuscany is the decentralisation of the policy area.  This gave the local 
chapters of EMOs and their allies support from Regional Government.  Whilst 
environmental protection is reserved for the national tier of government, agricultural 
matters have been assigned regional competence and this cleavage allows for the 
high levels of regional ‘opt-out’ despite the government’s (technical
35
) approval for 
the commercialisation of GM crops within its borders.  Regional government does 
 
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 Although the government has granted approval for the non-commercial cultivation of GM on its 
territory its unofficial position is contrary.  This was outlined in more detail in chapter two. 
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not have the competence to impose a moratorium so they are forced to speak of ‘co-
existence’ (Boscarele, 2007), although in practice, they can choose to reject 
proposals to grow GM crops on their territories.  This regional power has certainly 
been exercised: 16 out of Italy’s 20 regions have opted out and declared themselves 
‘GM-free’ of which the Tuscan regional government was the first in 1997.  The 
ability of the Regional Government to opt out of GM crop trials means that that EU 
legislation is filtered through both national and regional government before locally-
based activists need respond.  Therefore at a local level the anti-GMO campaign does 
not need to appeal directly to EU legislation to reverse local GM crop trial sites.  
However, it is still tightly bound in its more general arguments against GMOs (as a 
threat to localised food production) by EU policy, because it is at this level that 
policy concerning the labelling, commercial cultivation and market in GMOs is 
decided.  In this way, the Tuscan anti-GMO campaign is, in theory, able to connect 
to this European political opportunity structure, although favourable Regional 
legislation dilutes the need for it to do so. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
The Tuscan Regional Government has direct access to institutional channels of 
influence at an EU level through their representation in bodies such as The 
Committee of the Regions.  Furthermore, the local chapters of EMOs are part of a 
larger infrastructure of organisations that enjoy representation in Brussels through 
permanent representations or involvement in the EEB.  In theory this would afford 
the local chapters of EMOs and the ad-hoc coalitions of farmers who work together 
with the Regional Government the opportunity to access those channels too and 
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show evidence of grassroots or local groups connecting to European political 
opportunity structures.  In spite of this, there is no evidence of any of the local social 
movement actors exploiting this path.  One member of a local EMO chapter said: 
‘Our organisation is basically self-financing – I mean, the central 
administration give us a very small amount and I know they receive some 
money from the general public, even some from Europe I think – but 
basically it cost 20 euros to join our group and that subscription fee is what 
keeps us going.  It keeps us autonomous to a large degree, I know some other 
environmental organisations dictate the campaigns from head office – but we 
are free to respond to local issues as we see fit. We are pretty removed from 
the head office and what goes on there’ (Interview, 23.10.2008).    
 
This quote is illustrative of other interview participants in a similar situation, who 
find their local chapter quite removed from the opportunities and access of the main 
party.  In this way, we can say that they do not connect to this aspect of European 
political opportunity structures. 
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
Finally despite limited ‘institutionalised’ channels of influence, the local chapters of 
social movement groups that have been working alongside the Tuscan Regional 
Government have had opportunities to forge new allegiances at a European level.   
The regional government has been instrumental in the creation of two anti-GMO 
networks in Europe.  The first of these dates from February 2003 when the 
International Commission on the Future of Food and Agriculture was formed at an 
international social and ecological conference hosted by the Tuscan Regional 
government
36
.  Moreover, it has published four manifestos on food and agricultural 
issues and has been recognised by UNESCO.  The second resource for the anti-GMO 
 
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 The Commission is composed of an international ‘group of leading activists, academics, scientists, 
politicians and farmers from North and South working toward shaping more socially and ecologically 
sustainable food and agriculture systems’ (ARSIA, 2008). 
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campaign is the active role played by the Tuscan regional government in the 
Network of European GMO-Free Regions and Local Authorities.  The Network was 
born in Brussels eight months after the creation of the International Commission, and 
was headed by Susanna Cenni, the then Tuscan Councillor for Agriculture.  The 
network’s charter was signed in Florence on 17 May 2007 – ‘The Charter of the 
Regions and Local Authorities of Europe on the subject of co-existence of 
genetically–modified crops with traditional and organic farming’ and has been active 
at a European level ever since.  
 
The high level of institutionalisation in the anti-GMO campaign means that one 
might expect that it has access to the network of influential allies created by the 
Regional Government.  For example, in 2009 the Network of European GMO-Free 
Regions and Local Authorities campaigned alongside EMOs like Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace on the ‘Stop the Crop’ action, sending ‘a strong signal to National 
Ministers responsible for GMOs that European citizens do not want GMOs on their 
fields and on their plates’ (The Greens/European Free Alliance, 17.04.2009).  
However, this internationally-coordinated campaign did not make it onto the ground 
in the local chapters interviewed.  One activist said: 
 
I’m aware of the Stop the Crop campaign, and I have signed the petition, but 
only because I heard about it in my regular email.  It isn’t really anything that 
we’re doing here, I don’t know if there are materials at head office that we 
could be using?  We like to support these initiatives, but we tend to work with 
other groups on specific campaigns for Tuscany, or Florence or wherever.  So 
we worked with Greenpeace on a campaign about rubbish collection in 
Florence for example, and we’ve done joint things on GMOs at Festambiente, 
but they haven’t contacted us about Stop the Crops.  I think it’s a European 




It seems that although one might expect a professionalised movement to be able to 
connect to European political opportunity structures, especially when working 
alongside a Regional Government favourable to their ideas this was not borne out in 
practice.  This principle does not appear to translate however to the local chapters of 
the movement or the ad-hoc coalitions of local farmers who work to keep the anti-
GMO agenda on the table.  The favourable local government dilutes the 
‘antagonistic’ element of their awareness-raising campaign, reducing the need to 
combat EU legislation to effect local change.  Furthermore, the local chapters are 
removed both in terms of institutionalised channels of influence, and in terms of 
formal or informal networks, from the resources of the national bases of the EMOs.  
In the case of the anti-GMO campaign in Tuscany, there are scant signs of social 
movement actors connecting to European political opportunity structures.   
 
Conclusion 
In summary, in the case of the Italian local anti-GMO campaign there is very limited 
evidence of the grassroots face of the campaigns connecting to European POS.  
Although in both anti-GMO and anti-road campaigns there was strong participation 
from EMOs that benefit from representation at a European level, the access to 
institutional channels of influence at the EU and allies did not translate into resources 
for the local chapters or the grassroots groups who worked alongside them. 
Furthermore, in the case of the anti-GMO campaign the Tuscan Regional 
Government may have been expected to create further scope for connecting with 
European POS, but their favourable political stance diluted the ability of a grassroots 
campaign to flourish and to take advantage of those opportunities.  What the Italian 
141 

case teaches us is that at a local level, campaigns by local level and grassroots groups 
do not have the ability to connect to European political opportunity structures, even 
by working alongside whose who have connected. 
 
iii) The UK 
 
 
The UK Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
The proposal to realign the A701 through Bilston Glen was one which quickly 
mobilised an opposition campaign composed of seasoned environmental activists and 
local residents.  Since Midlothian Council applied to the Scottish 
Executive for planning permission to re-align the road in 2000 the project has 
attracted controversy, and the No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) was formed.  
The protest camp that was erected in 2002 at Bilston Glen, a patch of woodland 
designated a site of special scientific interest through which the road would cut, 
continues to be active today.  Plans for the bypass have stalled since 2005 when 
funding for the project was declared unavailable, although the permanent presence of 
the protest camp is designed to maintain pressure on the Council not to reopen plans 
to complete the project. 
 
i) The strength of the polity 
The proposal by Midlothian Council to realign the A701 was motivated by a desire 
to improve the local transport infrastructure rather than to tap into any (actual or 
supposed) European road networks – in this regard it is different from the two other 
anti-road protests being considered.  This means that in terms of transport policy, the 
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grassroots campaign was very much not working within the confines of European 
TEN-T implementation requirements.  Like other campaigns the anti-road protesters 
had the opportunity to challenge the road on the basis of alternative pieces of 
European legislation in the areas of environmental protection, emissions reduction or 
noise pollution for example.  NAAG requested the Environmental Impact 
Assessment, the Traffic Study and the Outline Business Case for the road from 
Midlothian Council in order to carry out their own evaluation of the scheme.  
 
We have experienced great difficulty in obtaining a copy of the proposals,  
or even a summary. We believe a copy of the plans should have been  
deposited within the City of Edinburgh – especially given the area-wide  
traffic-generating impacts that the proposal would produce – and that a  
copy should have been made available to NAAG (No Alignment Action 
Group) at  
least. The unavailability of the Traffic Study and the Environmental  
Assessments has been a major hindrance to commenting on the proposal 
(Transform Scotland, 1999) 
 
. 
When these documents were obtained, one activist notes that: 
‘in order to understand the proposals you really need experts in your group 
who know what they’re talking about – retired engineers and so on...We were 
pleased with the Halcrow report because it digested all of the same kind of 
information and did the talking for us’ (Interview, 28.03.2008) 
 
The work that NAAG and the Bilston protest site performed on the campaign used 
environmental, sustainable transport and to a lesser extent, climate change frames to 
make their arguments.  They did not, however, show evidence of linking these 
frames to specific areas of EU legislation and in this regard do not show evidence of 




ii) The openness of the polity 
Of the avenues through which one may expect the anti-road campaign to have been 
able to access the institutional channels of influence at the EU l – through appealing 
directly to the European Commission for example – or through the brokering of other 
EMOs; there is no evidence that either was pursued.   
Of the two main grassroots protest groups, the protest camp at Bilston Glen was the 
least likely to desire to influence EU policy-making processes.  An activist said: 
‘I know that the EU has passed a lot of legislation on the environment, and 
talks a good talk about trying to prevent climate change, but they’re not really 
getting it.  The governments aren’t really getting it.  I don’t bother with them 
because I just don’t see them getting it.  We need to think about the world 
differently – we need people to take better care of the world in which they 
live, for wealth to be distributed fairer and for change to come from below.  
That’s where it’s going to come from’ (Interview, 12.06.2009).   
 
Although NAAG found the idea of EU legislation more legitimate ‘the EU needs to 
do more work in this area’ (Interview, 28.03.2008) they did not attempt to connect to 
decision-making power at that level of governance.  
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
NAAG and the protest camp were supported in their campaign by national and 
international EMOs.  The closest of their allies was Transform Scotland, a subsidiary 
of the UK-wide Campaign for Better Transport and a member of the European 
Federation for Transport and the Environment.  They also have links to ‘Transport 
Environment’ the main Brussels-based lobby group for sustainable transport issues 
with a pan-European membership.  As allies they were ideally placed to be able to 
connect to the EU, but as European Union legislation was not considered to be held 
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responsible for the road, or to have the ability to challenge it, then this aspect of their 
relationship was not explored. 
 
For the Bilston protest camp, although it was able to develop an extensive national 
network, and to attract members from other EU Member States, its allies were not 
formed as a direct result of the process of European integration (like the European 
Environmental Bureau for example).  In this final dimension of European political 
opportunity structures there is no evidence that the anti-road campaign was able, or 
indeed willing, to engage. 
 
To summarise, the campaign against the A701 shows no sign of connecting to 
European political opportunity structures.  The issue was considered to be a local one 
that was framed by national legislation and enacted by a regional council.  For 
NAAG it was not necessary to make the connection with the EU in the hope of 
blocking the proposals and for the protest camp the EU was not the most legitimate 
actor.   The effect of European political opportunity structures can therefore be said 
to have had no impact on the campaign. 
 
The UK anti-GMO Campaign 
 
In the mid 1990s GM crops rose to the top of the environmental activism agenda.   In 
the case of our Devon case study it was in 1998 when a plantation of GM maize was 
planted close to Riverford Organic Farm that the regional anti-GM movement began 
in earnest.  In the same vein as the faucheurs volontaires, locals organised a 
campaign and when some of them dug up the maize a well-publicised (but ultimately 
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fruitless) legal battle ensued.  Such was the anti-GM sentiment in Devon, both 
amongst the public and within local government, that in 2003 it declared itself the 
first GM-free County in England.  The anti-GM story here echoes other stories 
unfolding across the UK at that time. 
 
i) The strength of the polity 
The tight bind between the EU and the policy process for GM crops has meant that 
the anti-GMO campaign in Devon recognised the relationship between EU and 
national policy on GM crops.  They prepared flyers which included reference to EU 
legislation.  The main grassroots group Totnes Genetics Group (TOGG) also 
produced the quarterly newsletter ‘Genetix Update’ which provided a summary of 
press coverage of GM issues, legislation, trial sites and campaign in the UK and 
abroad.  Figure 4.2 below shows an extract from Genetix Update (Issue 21, Spring 
























Figure 4.2:  Genetix Update Spring 2002 
 
Because of their role in producing this national newsletter on behalf of the Genetics 
Engineering Network (GEN), TOGG was particularly well informed in matters of 
legislation.   
 
‘I remember when TOGG were producing the newsletter – everyone that was 
campaigning on GMOs that I knew used to get it and they had it in healthfood 
shops and places like that.  There was always good content and they seemed 
very well informed.  That’s where a lot of us got our information from...yes, 
they understood the EU too’ (Interview, 17.02.2010) 
 
In spite of this knowledge-base, TOGG regarded the issue as a national one, and 
looked to national government to challenge EU legislation, rather than challenge EU 
legislation itself.  Its awareness of the role of EU legislation in its local campaign did 




ii) The openness of the polity 
The groups involved in the campaign in Devon – primarily TOGG and local chapters 
of Friends of the Earth – only partially addressed their concerns to the level of the 
European Union.  Friends of the Earth Europe has its own ongoing anti-GMO 
campaign that it addresses in Brussels, organised by a dedicated ‘Food Campaigner’ 
(Friends of the Earth Europe) and it was considered by those in the local chapters 
that ‘those in Brussels are taking care of the EU, it’s our responsibility to take care of 
Devon’ (Interview, 19.12.2008).  In this way, although the national administration of 
Friends of the Earth may have acted as a broker for local chapters wishing to raise 
their concerns at the level of the European lobby, it was not felt appropriate to do so.  
For TOGG, although it wrote letters and petitions to the European Commission and 
participated in pan-European petition actions such as ‘Stop the Crop’ these were very 
conventional and symbolic forms of protest - its main concerns were still addressed 
to the national level.  In this regard it did not connect to the second dimension of 
European political opportunity structures. 
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
Although TOGG was too small an actor to have direct access to new allies at the 
level of the EU it had the opportunity to access those who did.  Along with the local 
chapters of Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Earth Europe was the main link for 
the Devon campaign to pan-European networks of actors.  Of the two main lobby 
groups operating at the level of the EU – Genet and The International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements EU Group (IFOAM EU) – membership was drawn 
from Friends of the Earth Europe, Genewatch, GM-free Cymru and the Soil 
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Association – all actors with a UK presence.  Despite this, and perhaps because 
‘those in Brussels are taking care of the EU’ (Interview, 19.12.2008), the opportunity 
to present localised Devon concerns to European-level allies was not realised.   
 
In summary, the anti-GMO campaign in Devon shows only one sign of connecting to 
European political opportunity structures through its awareness of EU legislation.  
The failure to act at a European level however, either through attempting to influence 
the legislative process, or to connect to those who do, means that the European 
political opportunity structures were not engaged with. 
 
Conclusion 
In both cases of protest in the UK there is a marked lack of the campaigns connecting 
to European political opportunity structures.  While in the case of the A701 the 
capacity of the EU to address the concerns of NAAG and the Bilston Glen protest 
camp was not under consideration, in the case of GMOs it was recognised and then 
ignored.  Clearly it should not be assumed that for local-level campaigns the ability 
to connect local decisions to EU legislation is desirable or expedient.   
 
 
4.3 Europeanised POS in Evidence 
In chapter three I outlined the set of three variables that constitute a europeanised 
political opportunity structure.  A social movement actor will therefore be 
europeanised to the extent that they are able to connect to these europeanised POS 




1) Address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy  
(the strength of the EU) 
2) Appeal to national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making  
(the openness of the EU) 
3) Engage with new allies at a national or pan-European level whose work is 
informed by, but does not necessarily directly address, EU policy  
(the availability of elite allies) 
 
In the following section I illustrate the extent to which the social movement actors in 





The French Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
 
In the previous chapter I posited that a green group can show evidence of 
europeanisation if they address the national mechanisms for implementing EU 
policy.  This is illustrated in the case of the campaign against the A65 in Aquitaine; 
for instance one of the chief criticisms in the ARLP/SEPANSO dossier regards the 
ability of local and national government to manage their responsibilities to 
implement EU environmental legislation, in particular in providing public 
consultation.  In this regard ARLP shows evidence of connecting to europeanised 
political opportunity structures.  They complain that the necessary public 
consultation did not take place: 
150 

There is a manifest violation of the terms in article L1.21-8-I of the 
Environmental Code because there has never been a public debate...This 
major oversight also violates the terms of the 1998 Aarhus Convention 
regarding information, public consultation and the right to jurisdiction in 




ARLP and SEPANSO also complained about the credibility of the individual chosen 
to head the enquiry into the road proposals, claiming that his membership of Béarn 
Adour Pyrénées (BAP) – a regional transport pressure group - which received 
22,800 from the pro-road Pyrénées Atlantiques Council, made his judgement 
partial: 
 
The chairman of the public enquiry into the A65...is also technical advisor to 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) of Pau, which is, in 
association with Béarn Ardour Pyrénées (BAP), the main lobby group for the 
A65.  He is therefore a long way from demonstrating the neutrality required 
to head up a public enquiry into works that have been publically welcomed 
by the structure to which he is attached.  It should also be noted that, in 2002 
at least, BAP benefitted from a grant from the fervently pro-road Pyrénées 
Atlantiques Council of 22, 800 euros (Article in the République des 




 Original text : il y a manifestement violation des dispositions de l’article L.121-8-I du Code de 
l’Environnement dans la mesure où il n’y a jamais eu pour ce projet de mise 
en oeuvre de la procédure du débat public...Cette carence majeure viole de plus les dispositions de la 
Convention d’Aarhus en date de 1998, relative à l’information, à la participation du public et à la 
saisine des juridictions en matière d’environnement – translation my own. 
38
 Original text - Le président de la commission d’enquête publique de l’A65…est en même temps 
conseiller technique de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie (CCI) de Pau, qui constitue avec 
l'association Béarn Adour Pyrénées (BAP) qui lui est liée, la principale structure de lobbying en 
faveur de l’autoroute A65. Il est donc bien loin de démontrer la neutralité nécessaire pour diriger une 
commission d’enquête impartiale sur un projet d’autoroute réclamé publiquement par une structure 
professionnelle à laquelle il est attaché.  A noter que cette même association Béarn Adour Pyrénées, a 
bénéficié, au moins en 2002, d’une subvention du conseil général des Pyrénées Atlantiques, fervent 
partisan de l’autoroute, d’un montant de 22 800 Euros (article de la République des Pyrénées du 29 
mars 2002) – translation my own.
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By addressing the competency of the decision-makers, on the grounds that they must 
implement EU environmental legislation at a local level, ARLP show clear signs of 
connecting to a Europeanised POS. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
The second variable of a europeanised political opportunity structure is the ability of 
the movement to appeal to national channels responsible for influencing EU 
decision-making.  Examples include access to political parties, to representatives on 
the Committee of Regions, to members of the European Parliament or simply by 
lobbying national government.  We discover in chapter six that although ARLP 
problematised the road at multiple levels of governance, including appealing to EU 
legislation, its primary focus was on decision-making powers at the local and 
national levels.  So although it showed evidence of appealing to the national 
implementation of EU legislation, it did not appeal to national mechanisms to 
influence that EU legislation.   
 
We saw the EU as more of a help than a hindrance; we were running out of 
ideas about how to change the minds of the Council and we thought that 
maybe by appealing to EU legislation with respect to Natura 2000 they would 
have to listen to us...we wanted the EU’s power to influence (Interview, 
17.11.2009). 
 
In fact, it used legislation at the EU level to circumvent national decision-making 
channels, because EU environmental legislation was favourable to its cause.  
Because the road was not conceived of as a ‘European project’ then it was not 
necessary for ARLP or its allies to appeal to the EU to overturn its decision in 
approving the A65’s construction.   
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iii) The availability of elite allies 
Finally, ARLP actively pursued a strategy designed to reach out to other similar 
campaigns across Europe and in so doing shows evidence of engaging with the third 
variable of political opportunity structures – engaging with new allies at a pan-
European level.  A member recalls: 
‘we were on Spanish TV as well as in the local and national press.  Our 
spokesman was in a studio debate on France 3 and that raised our profile a 
lot.  People came from Spain and Switzerland I think to see what we were 
doing and to encourage us with their own experiences’.  (Interview, 
06.11.2008) 
 
Although the anti-road campaigners in Switzerland and Spain were campaigning at a 
very local level themselves, their work was still being informed by EU policy either 
in the field of transport or environmental protection.  The alliances that formed with 
other activists were loose and informal, nor were they sustained beyond the lifetime 
of the campaign against the A65.  But their very presence at all points to a 
connection to europeanised political opportunity structures. 
 
In summary the campaign against the Autoroute Langon-Pau illustrates the way in 
which a grassroots campaign may show evidence of europeanisation when acting 
domestically.  The ARLP addressed its campaign to the national mechanisms for 
implementing EU policy by challenging the authority of those mechanisms 
themselves, in particular the validity of the public enquiry and its work on assessing 
the road’s environmental impact.  By choosing to combat the road on environmental 
grounds ARLP found opportunity to circumvent the national level and appealed to 
the EU to change national decision-making; it therefore did not evidence the second 
dimension of europeanised POS.  It did however begin to form informal alliances 
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with new allies at a pan-European level and to that extent we may conclude that the 
grassroots campaign against the A65 showed evidence of connecting to europeanised 
political opportunity structures.  
 
 




i) The strength of the EU 
 
One of the themes which emerged from the interviews conducted in this case was 
that the anti-GMO campaign squarely addressed, and supported the circumvention 
of, the national mechanisms for implementing EU GMO policy.  The grassroots 
fauchage and Vigilance Aquitaine 33 campaigns groups were populated not only by 
local farmers and families but also locally elected representatives.  The participation 
of more than one elected member in the campaign afforded them insights into local 
possibilities to circumvent national legislation.  One protester explains: 
 
The locally elected members didn’t take any decisions on GMOs, nor did the 
citizens, the Minister of Agriculture did.  So the region decided that it 
wouldn’t finance GMO businesses and it would favour organic enterprise 
(Interview, 10.11.2008) 
 
And another expands on this theme: 
We knew that there was nothing we could do really to change EU legislation 
on the free market in GMOs and all that kind of thing.  That was a campaign 
for bigger players than us.  But we did think we could do something on the 
ground – after all, we’re the people who get the regional government elected 
so we try to make demands known (Interview, 22.11.2009) 
 
It is not unique amongst these case studies of GM crops for grassroots campaigners 
to deploy their resources to influence the local implementation of national and EU 
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GMO legislation, but it does demonstrate evidence of grassroots actors connecting to 
europeanised domestic POS. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
A key observation with regard to the national channels responsible for EU decision-
making is that grassroots green groups were very attuned to the political context in 
which they were operating.  At times of electoral significance: the Presidential 
elections in 2007 for example (see Figure 6.2). 
 
‘we stepped up our campaigns outside supermarkets, on the radio we tried to 
get as much publicity as possible’ (Interview, 04.11.2008).   
 
The grassroots groups were similarly responsive during the review of GMO policy in 
2008. When Monsanto’s license in France came up for renewal in Spring 2008 the 
opportunity for protesters to push for its elimination became more promising.  
Indeed, at the end of the government’s environment conference, the Grenelle de 
l’environnement, in October 2007 the French Premier Nicolas Sarkozy announced 
that in accordance with the ‘precautionary principle’ no more GM maize trials would 
take place until an expert governmental  group had been established, had assessed 
them, and deemed them to be safe: 
 
 ‘I would like to revisit the issue of GMOs: the truth is that we have doubts 
about the current benefits of pest-resistant GMOs, and the truth is that 
we have doubts about the control of the release of GMOs, the truth is that we 
have doubts about the health and environmental benefits of GMOs.  I do not 
want to put myself at odds with the European Union.  But in respect of the 
precautionary principle, I hope that the commercial cultivation with GMO 
pesticides is suspended.  This decision is pending the outcome of evaluations 
by an expert panel which will be created before the end of the year. We will 
do this in close consultation with the European Commission.  We do will do 
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His decision came as part of his call for an ‘environmental revolution’ and was 
flanked by high profile environmental campaigns such as Greenpeace’s banner ‘Ban 
GMOs Now!’ unfurled over the Arc de Triomph, and in their report La Bombe OGM 
published in the same month (Greenpeace France, 2007).  Grassroots groups in 
Aquitaine followed suit:  
‘we took a much bigger interest in the EU to see if we could find a way of 
getting the government to stop, to see if anything was illegal.  We figured that 
if the government needed to think about it then the European Union would be 
behind it all and that’s what we needed to understand’  (Interview, 
06.11.2008). 
 
They were able to take advantage of the charged political space to increase the 
openness of the state to their demands.  By connecting the europeanised political 
opportunity structures, the grassroots green groups also show evidence of 
europeanisation. 
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
Finally, the anti-GMO campaign engaged only to a limited extent with new allies at a 
European level whose work was also informed by EU policy on GM crops.  The 
faucheurs volontaires capitalised on the high profile media presence of José Bové to 
connect to anti-GMO campaigns in other European countries.  Companion groups, 
 
39
 Original text - Je veux revenir sur le dossier des OGM : la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur 
l’intérêt actuel des OGM pesticides ; la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur le contrôle de la 
dissémination des OGM ; la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur les bénéfices sanitaires et 
environnementaux des OGM. Je ne veux pas me mettre en contradiction, José Emmanuel avec l’Union 
européenne. Mais, je dois faire des choix. Et bien, dans le respect du principe de précaution, je 
souhaite que la culture commerciale des OGM pesticides soit suspendue. Ceci en attendant les 
conclusions d’une expertise à conduire par une nouvelle instance créée avant la fin de l’année en 
concertation étroite avec vous, Grenelle de l’environnement, et avec la Commission européenne. Je 
prends mes responsabilités là-aussi. Nous respecterons nos engagements – translation my own. 
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with some overlapping membership with the main grassroots group Vigilance OGM 
33, included the Bordeaux branch of Greenpeace and the Landes branch of Amis de 
la Terre.  These higher profile allies were part of a pan-European network of actors 
and the grassroots groups had the opportunity to borrow indirectly from the raised 
profile that the involvement of these actors afforded.  They did not however show 
signs of taking advantage of this opportunity.  Again, these connections show 
evidence of the grassroots groups connecting to europeanised POS, although the 
participation of these grassroots actors in networks with more professionalised actors 
did not afford the access to allies across Europe that the literature might suggest. 
 
In summary, the campaign against genetically modified crops in France showed 
evidence of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures.  Although  it 
conceded  it had limited capacity to change EU legislation directly it did appeal to 
the national mechanisms for implementing the policy.  It also attempted to influence 
the national channels capable of influencing EU decision-making by exploiting 
changes in the political opportunity structure around the presidential election and the 
Grenelle de l’environnement,  Finally, in spite of its links to local chapters of EMOs 
and membership of national GMO and environmental networks the access to new 
allies at a pan-European basis was not evidenced.  The greatest benefit that Vigilance 
OGM 33 accrued through membership in these groups was through the additional 
public profile it gave to the issue in general.  The media-worthy action repertoire of 
the faucheurs afforded them great European publicity and opened small opportunities 
and highly individualised opportunities to engage with other actors involved in 
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similar campaigns, but overall in the third dimension of europeanised political 
opportunity structures it is difficult to prove evidence of europeanisation. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the grassroots campaigns in France show much clearer evidence of 
connecting to europeanised POS than European POS.  The anti-GMO campaign 
exploited the windows of political opportunity around the Grenelle de 
l’environnement to address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy, in 
the same way that ARLP held their national and local representatives accountable for 
implementing environmental legislation.  Secondly, both campaigns engaged with 
allies and pan European level whose work was informed by EU policy.  In so doing, 





The Italian Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
Although there is very limited evidence of the anti-road campaign connecting to 
European POS, it does show evidence of engaging with europeanised POS.  First of 
all, the groups involved address the national mechanisms for implementing EU 
policy – the campaign group makes direct reference to the woolly nature of the 
regional government’s framing of the road as a European Project.  In a dossier 
produced by an alliance of environmental actors opposed to the road they dedicate a 
chapter to discussing the road within the context of the TEN-T, concluding that ‘if 
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the Italian authorities are hoping to build a new road parallel to the SS Aurelia, and 
they are basing this decision on the TEN then they have misread it’ (Emilliani, Lenzi, 
Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004: 9)
 40
.  The campaigners engage with the ability 
of the state to enforce this kind of policy.  They note that ‘if a state receives money 
for developing their contribution to the TEN, they are completely free to choose the 
kind of road they wish to spend it on’ (2004: 9).
41
  This is certainly evidence of 
europeanisation within the green groups because they are recognising both the 
domestic adaptation to European legislation and the existence of bodies at the EU 
level tasked with coordinating and implementing this programme. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
In contrast to European POS, where the opportunities to connect to channels of 
influence at the EU were undeveloped, the grassroots campaign does engage with the 
national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making.  One of the chief 
complaints in the campaign materials regarded the decision-making and consultation 
process for the proposed works.  They refer to un processo decisionale 
scombiccherato – a misguided decision-making process (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, 
Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004: 11; Vittadini, 2004: 1).  This theme was echoed in the 
interviews: ‘they aren’t listening to us’ (Interview, 03.11.2009) and ‘we have 
attracted the attention of the locals and we’ve got a lot of support, but the 
government are too busy worrying about how they’re going to afford it to care what 
 
40
 Original text – se le autorità italiane, per promuovere la costruzione di una nuova autostrada 
parallela alla SS esistente, si fondano sugli orientamenti TEN, ne fanno una lettura errata – 
translation my own. 
41
 Original text – i cofinanziamenti comunitari desinati alla rete stradale TEN non sono in alcuno 
caso vincolati dalla necessità di realizzare un’infrastruttura autostradale a pedaggio: la scelta del 
tipo di intervento reste di totale responsabilità dello Stato membro – translation my own. 
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we think’ (Interview, 02.11.2009).  For the anti-road campaign then, there is 
evidence of connecting to the national conversation about EU transport policy and in 
so doing, showing evidence of connecting to europeanised POS.  
 
 iii) The availability of elite allies 
 
With regard to the groups’ allies, the institutionalised nature of some of the 
participating green groups was an advantage when accessing the decision-makers at a 
national level.  The local chapters of Friends of the Earth and Legambiente are 
afforded credibility by virtue of their larger institutional umbrella.  The main dossier 
of objection prepared in 2004 was signed by Italia Nostra, Legambiente, the WWF, 
Comitato per la Bellezza, Movimento Ecologista and Soccorso Ambientale la 
Maremma (SAM) (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004).  With the 
exception of this last group all of these signatories are national or international 
environmental organisations or local collectives of the same.  The membership of the 
grassroots elements of the protest, for example SOS Maremma, overlapped with 
these organisations and, as in the French example, would have theoretically afforded 
the grassroots groups the opportunity to connect to other groups across Europe 
campaigning on similar issues.  There is no evidence from the literature of the 
campaigns or from the interviews I conducted that these avenues were exploited, and 
therefore the groups did not connect to europeanised POS in this regard.   
 
To summarise the anti-road campaign in Tuscany shows signs of connecting to 
europeanised political opportunity structures.  Interestingly is demonstrates a kind of 
anti-europeanisation by choosing to engage with, and reject, the idea of the road as a 
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European project.  In a similar vein, it engages with the domestic channels 
responsible for EU decision-making by actively dissuading them of their obligations 
to adhere to the TEN-T framework.  Finally, with regard to the third dimension of 
political opportunity structure, there is no evidence that the wide variety of 
professionalised and institutionalised bodies involved in the campaign afforded the 
grassroots elements any additional capacity to access allies at a national or pan-
European level.  The anti-road campaign may therefore be said to be partially 
europeanised. 
 
The Italian Anti-GMO campaign  
 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
As with their colleagues in the anti-road campaign, the work of the anti-GMO 
protesters is characterised by the close involvement of EMOs and political parties.  
In this instance, however, the particular interest that the regional government had in 
EU GMO legislation gave the movement greater scope to address the national 
mechanisms for implementing those policies.  This argument is illustrated in the 
special privilege the Tuscan Regional Government gave to ‘heritage’ or 
‘conservation’ seeds under the terms of Council Directive 98/95/EC.  They 
transposed this into Regional Law 64/2004 ‘Protection and promotion of the heritage 
of local breeds and plant varieties of agricultural, zootechnical and forestry interest’.  
Regional government then used this law to protect the alimentary patrimony of the 
region and to add further armoury against the cultivation of GM crops on its territory.  




we knew this was coming so we were able to anticipate Italy's application of 
the Directive through the regional laws. In a sense, you could say that it's 
been the regions driving the national legislative process in Italy, not the other 
way around (GRAIN, 2005). 
 
Awareness of, and engagement with, EU legislation has created new policies to 
which the local social movement groups can connect and provides evidence of 
europeanisation.   
 
Furthermore, the anti-GMO campaign in Tuscany has undoubtedly been hugely 
influenced in other ways by its relationship to the regional government.  The political 
output structures in Italy are such that the green movement in Tuscany does not need 
to drive the GMO policy agenda forward to the same extent as in the other case study 
countries.  This is because not only is the agenda already being pursued by the 
regional government, but they also have the autonomy to implement local anti-GM 
laws.  One organic farmer interviewed said: 
 
We would react if we needed to, but at the moment we are happy just to work 
together to make sure the next generation understands what’s at stake 
(Interview, 22.20.2008).   
 
The opportunities for these grassroots green groups to illustrate europeanisation 
through europeanised POS are limited by the political space taken up by local 
government and institutionalised movement actors such as Friends of the Earth and 
WWF.  Much of the requirement for them to appeal to the national channels 
responsible for implementing EU decision-making is taken away.  Nonetheless, they 
do still address their concerns to national mechanisms, and in so doing show 
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evidence of connecting to the first dimension of europeanised political opportunity 
structures. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
In addition, the political input structures for the anti-GMO groups are very 
favourable and very open.  As Kitschelt notes ‘openness increases with the capacity 
of legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the executive’ (1986: 
63).  This is very clearly the case in Tuscany which is able to generate its own policy 
with regard to banning GM crops. Because of the local consultation that Tuscany is 
able to provide, the political opportunity structure that is able to grant to the anti-
GMO campaign is an open one.  Regional government is able to represent the 
concerns of the local anti-GMO campaign at the national and European levels and 
the campaign in turn, appeals to that national level.  An organic activist said: 
 ‘We have a great relationship with the regional government.  We feel like 
they are listening when we say we don’t want this seed or that seed 
jeopardising our livelihoods’ (Interview, 03.11.2009). 
 
 
The high levels of institutionalisation in the movement here may further improve 
these actors’ chances of consultation, although further research in this area would be 
required in order to prove this relationship.   
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
The greatest opportunity for the grassroots face of the movement to connect to 
europeanised POS is through the engagement of new European allies, although only 
through opportunities to work in tandem with larger EMOs.  The most important 
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national environmental organisation Legambiente has a base in their Girasole 
(Sunflower) office in Rispecia, Tuscany.  Here they organise the annual national 
environmental festival ‘festAmbiente’.  The festival website has a scrolling box 











                                          Figure 4.3: The Festambiente Website 
 
With their high degree of institutionalisation and commercial sponsorship 
Legambiente are well-placed to connect the localised anti-GMO campaign with other 
environmental organisations or interested parties.  The low presence of authentically 
‘grassroots’ actors in Tuscany, squeezed out by the dominance of local government 
and their EMO allies means that this brokering role is unfulfilled.  In the third 




 The companies mentioned on the website include Latte Fresco la Maremma (Maremma Fresh 
Milk), Demerter (Organic Standard providers), Parmiggiano Reggiano (the Council of parmesan 
cheese producers) , e-on (energy company), Copaim (local food producer), Coop (Italian cooperative 
supermarket chain), sun system (solar panel producers), Novamont (biodegradable chemical 
manufacturer) and Azzeroco2 (an emissions reduction consultancy) represent the spread of 
commercial partners across environmental, alimentary and agricultural interests. 
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To recap the Tuscan campaign against GMOs, much of the movement’s 
opportunities are closely defined by their proximity to the Regional Government who 
dominates the local legislative and awareness-raising arenas.  There are much higher 
numbers here of institutionalised EMOs acting than in the two other case study 
countries, and the ad-hoc coalitions of farmers who develop their own localised 
support networks and awareness-raising actions are in the minority.  While one might 
expect to find evidence of europeanisation at the EMO level of the campaign, the 
distance between the levels of actor (from regional government, to EMO, to farmers) 
means that the opportunity to connect to new allies at a national or pan-European 
level is restricted.  Only in their ability to address the implementation and 




In summary, the Italian case studies do show some evidence of grassroots groups 
showing signs of europeanisation through connecting to the national mechanisms for 
implementing EU policy, and the channels responsible for decision-making.  In both 
cases however, their engagement with allies at a national or pan-European level 
whose work is also informed by EU legislation was not in evidence.  In both cases, 
more formal and organised interests – either local government or EMOs defined the 












iii) The UK 
 
 
The UK Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
i) The strength of the EU:  
The anti-road campaign showed clear signs of addressing the implementation of 
policy, but this policy was not related to the level of the EU – the focus was on 
national and regional legislation.  In a press release during the formulation of the 
road proposal by Midlothian Council NAAG said: 
The proposed road and associated developments slice through miles of Green 
Belt, protected by law. Other Government commitments and legislation it 
breaks include ones on Out of Town Developments, transport, environmental 
protection, health, international treaties on Global Warming, and Midlothian's 
own Environment Strategy (NAAG, 1999) 
 
They illustrate an understanding of the wider legislative framework within which the 
development sits, but beyond referring to ‘international treaties’ they do not address 
EU legislation explicitly.  This approach is echoed by the activists at Bilston protest 
camp who engaged only with the most local level of policy-making.   
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
The national political opportunity structure for the anti-road campaign was relatively 
closed. There was limited public consultation by Midlothian Council during the 
development of the proposal to realign the A701 and once the final proposal was 
presented to the Scottish Parliament it was approved without public consultation.  
Despite continued efforts to push for a public enquiry, including calling for a motion 
to be passed in parliament to note their objections (Motion S1M-00643) and the 
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threat of legal action, the government did not rescind.  It was not until the Halcrow 
Report, funded by the Holyrood and commissioned by Midlothian Council that 
comprehensive independent assessment of the proposal took place.  An activist said: 
 
‘We couldn’t believe the fact that we didn’t even get a say in it!  There was 
no democracy involved at all, they just didn’t want to know what we had to 
say.  In the very beginning we held a meeting with all of the different 
political parties there and the Labour Councillor didn’t even turn up.  If you 
ask me was this proposal fair or democratic I would have to say no’ 
(Interview, 20.02.2010). 
  
The opportunities for the Bilston protest camp to appeal to the national channels for 
EU decision-making were even more restricted, but they were also to an extent self-
imposed.  Because they defined themselves so consciously as challenging the 
dominant forms of power then the institutional avenues that may have been available, 
and that we observe in the other case studies, were not a legitimate option for the 
protest camp.  While they were happy to act at a local level – to deliver a petition to 
Midlothian Council offices for example – they did not want to develop this into an 
opportunity to shape supranational decision-making.  An activist explains ‘there is 
only so far you can get with the law-makers before you have to give up and take 
matters into your own hands and just actually stop the bulldozers at the gates’ 
(Interview, 03.03.2009).  Whilst unsurprising, the reluctance of this most grassroots 
of all of the case study groups to participate in EU-generated political opportunities 
highlights one of the differences within the same campaign between those who don’t 
and those who won’t.  In this domain of europeanised political opportunity the 




iii) The availability of elite allies 
The anti-road campaign and the work of NAAG in particular gained popular 
legitimacy from their association with mainstream EMOs such as TRANSform 
Scotland, the Campaign for Better Transport, Friends of the Earth and in particular 
the Green Party MSP at the time Robin Harper, who participated in NAAG events.  
Furthermore, as a member of the Transport and Environment Committee in the 
Scottish Parliament, he was able to raise their concerns at an institutional level and 
indeed did so (Scottish Parliament, 2002). Although these connections helped to raise 
the public profile of the campaign there is no evidence that NAAG were able to, or 
sought to, exploit these links to engage with new allies either nationally or from other 
Member States.   
 
The protest camp at Bilston Glen, however, shows much greater signs of 
europeanisation in this regard.  The activists here were able to use the resources of 
the national activist community as a means of increasing their support.   The network 
of allies was at its peak in the first five years of the campaign when the proposal was 
at its most probable.  The protest camp was mentioned in the radical ecological 
journal ‘Do or Die!’ popular amongst the  national activist community, which also 
had links to international protest campaigns (Do or Die!, 2003).  It also enjoyed a 
strong online presence through its own website (Bilston Glen Anti-Bypass Site) or 
frequent mentions on social movement activist website Indymedia where it would 
publish appeals for people to come and join their events.  The network of anti-road 
protests that established themselves across the UK in the 1990s left a legacy of 
experienced, mobile protesters and organisational bodies like Road Alert! and Road 
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Block (both recently dismembered) who were willing to ally themselves with the 
Bilston camp.  Although this network in itself is not evidence of europeanisation, its 
international reach does indicate that possibility.  Activists arrived at the Bilston 
camp from various European countries including Spain, France and Greece where 
they had been involved in other environmental or social justice campaigns.  They 
brought with them experience of campaigning against local and national 
governments who are bound by EU regulation.  Although these grassroots protesters 
chose not to address their concerns at the level of this regulation, they were still 
responding with pan-European alliances to a europeanised policy area.  The degree 
of their connection to this third dimension of europeanised political opportunity 
structures should not be overstated, but it does highlight an interesting difference 
between the differential impact on groups of varying degrees of professionalisation. 
 
In summary, the campaign against the A701 evidenced extremely limited signs of 
connecting to a europeanised political opportunity structure.  The preference that 
NAAG and the Bilston camp showed for maintaining the local dimension of the 
proposal meant that EU policy was not considered either in terms of addressing the 
way in which it was implemented nationally, or in terms of influencing the 
construction of the legislation at the level of the EU.  Interestingly, there were greater 
signs of europeanisation through access to allies amongst the Bilston protest camp 









The UK Anti-GMO Campaign 
 
 
i) The strength of the EU 
In the previous section we acknowledged that the anti-GMO campaign in Devon had 
a good awareness of EU legislation and the role it played at a national level.  While it 
seems it chose not to address the construction of the policy at the EU, did it attempt 
to address the way it was implemented domestically?  Here the answer is yes – but 
only at the at the most local level. 
 
The degree of centralisation of the UK’s environmental policy provides a contrast 
with Italy, where it is possible for regional GM bans to sit alongside national 
approval.  The most local and radical elements of the movement are therefore able to 
exploit anti-GM agendas at the regional level which they can be sure are not being 
addressed by central government.  In Britain only local Councils are able to ban GM 
crops from being cultivated on land administrated by them, and this is a symbolic 
stance rather than one that has legislative approval.  There is therefore a territorial 
dimension brought out by the British POS that is not seen in the other campaigns. 
 
ii) The openness of the EU 
The targets of the Devon anti-GMO campaign were domestic.  To the extent that it 
held national government responsible for challenging EU legislation on GM crops, 
the movement showed signs of trying to influence European decision-making, indeed 
they showed good legislative understanding.  However, although the ultimate 
intention may have been to change EU policy, its strategy primarily involved 
targeting local and national actors such as individual farmers considering GM trials 
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or supermarkets whose ability to influence EU policy was, at best, limited at worst, 
non-existent: 
 
We wrote hundreds and hundreds of letters to the local supermarkets over the 
years campaigning for better labelling and non-GM goods like milk for 
example’ (Interview, 17.02.2010) 
 
In this regard, neither TOGG nor the local chapters of EMOs involved in the anti-
GMO campaign showed sufficient engagement with using national channels to 
change EU decision-making to evidence europeanised political opportunity 
structures. 
 
iii) The availability of elite allies 
TOGG were especially well connected amongst the anti-GMO groups in Devon by 
virtue of their central role in the Genetic Engineering Network and their production 
of the newsletter Genetix Update.  This network was firmly grounded in the UK, so 
although they were keenly aware of similar protests occurring across Europe, they 
did not find the possibility of making contact with these protesters to be strategically 
useful.  Interviews underscored the idea that although they conceived of GMOs as 
cross-border problem, it was not their role to create cross-border alliances.  
Furthermore, the alliances that they built nationally with other anti-GMO groups 
were united in preventing specific field trials rather than by a common concern for 
GM policy more generally.  In this regard their alliances were only very tangentially 




Overall, the UK anti-GMO campaign does not show any evidence of connecting to 
europeanised political opportunity structures.  The preferred arena of action is most 
certainly local – the ‘decision-maker’  targeted by their campaign was most often 
national government or local Councils who had the power to symbolically ban 
GMOs from Council land.   Often, the target of their campaign held no-decision-
making responsibilities.  Furthermore, although TOGG held a privileged position in 
the UK anti-GMO network, the concerns that it shared with other UK groups were 
more often for specific trial sites than wider environmental issues contextualised by 
European legislation.  
 
Conclusion 
In the arena of europeanised political opportunity structures the UK campaigns have 
shown remarkably little evidence of europeanisation.  The pan-European networks 
created by the Bilston protest site are the only concession amongst the case studies.  
The opportunity to address those who could influence EU decision-making at a 
national level was eschewed for both ideological and strategic reasons.  For those in 
the protest camp the EU is not a legitimate actor, so addressing it even through 
national channels was not deemed appropriate.  For NAAG, influencing 
environmental or transport policy at the level of the EU was not strategically useful, 
although this may be because the road-building programme did not advance as far as 
it did in the French and Italian examples.  The anti-GMO campaign too found it more 
strategically useful to concentrate their efforts on highly localised issues.  In both 






This chapter has examined the way in which the six case study campaigns have been 
able to connect to the political opportunity structures around them.  I analysed the 
capacity for these groups to respond to European POS and europeanised POS, 
arguing that they would be europeanised to the extent that they were able to connect 
to either of these.  A number of findings come to the fore. 
 
The most striking finding is that these social movement groups were largely 
disengaged from European political opportunity structures.  There was little sign that 
these groups recognised the role of EU legislation in a domestic context, gained 
direct access to institutional channels of influence at the level of the EU, or accessed 
allies at that level.  Signs of engagement with europeanised POS were more 
prevalent, but should not be overstated.  A number of further distinctions between the 
cases studied suggest reasons for this difference which may be understood in terms 
of strategic advantage and ideological conviction. 
 
The first distinction is between policy areas.  In the case of road-protest the role of 
EU legislation in either causing, or helping to remediate, the road was addressed 
differently.  In France, although the road was recognised as a national project ARLP 
and SEPASO saw an opportunity to appeal to EU environmental legislation to try to 
block the proposal.  In Italy the opposite level of engagement was true and the 
campaign sought to distance itself from any suggestion that the road might be 
connected in any way to EU legislation – a kind of ‘anti-europeanisation’.  In the UK 
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the role of the EU in shaping the legislative framework within which road proposals 
are considered was not addressed at all.  The degree of europeanisation within road 
protest therefore varied widely.  In the area of anti-GMO campaigns the situation 
was more uniform.  There was greater recognition that EU legislation was important 
at a national level across all of the cases studied, although this did not change the 
way in which the groups chose to mobilise at a local level. 
 
A second distinction emerges from this chapter between those groups who 
considered the EU to hold a legitimate role in their campaign and those who did not.  
In other words, the way in which ideological conviction shaped the political 
opportunity structures addressed by the campaigns.  Two groups clearly rejected the 
legitimacy of the EU, although for different reasons.  They were within the anti-road 
campaigns in Italy and the UK.  In Italy the actors in SOS Maremma and their 
colleagues saw the Tuscan Regional Government’s framing of the road as a 
European project as a strategy to give it unfounded legitimacy.  By actively rejecting 
the role of the EU in sanctioning the road or being able to mitigate it they were de-
legitimising the project.  In the UK on the other hand, the Bilston protest camp saw 
the EU as an illegitimate actor in the campaign for ideological reasons.  Its 
commitment to challenging the dominant discourse of power meant that its decision 
to act locally stemmed from ideology rather than strategy.  These two campaigns 
raise some interesting questions about the extent to which European political 
opportunity structures are seen as desirable by social movements – we return to this 




Finally, the idea of EMOs as brokers between local actors and European-level actors 
or networks was a recurrent one in this chapter.  Where the literature on the 
europeanisation of social movements finds evidence of europeanisation within 
NGOs, this chapter highlights the disconnect between the NGO and their local 
constituencies.  It is not proven possible here for a local chapter to connect to 
European or europeanised political opportunity structures simply by hanging on the 
coat tails of these larger europeanised actors.  Nor, importantly, is it seen as 
necessary.  It is striking that even though the opportunity to access pan-European and 
influential networks might be recognised, the actors in all campaigns apart from that 
against the A65 in France eschewed this opportunity.  There was a strong preference 
for establishing a local or national network and to let those based in Brussels take 
charge of influencing the European Union.  The implication in the literature that 
overlapping membership between grassroots and institutionalised groups on the same 
campaign might create a kind of ‘europeanisation by proxy’ has not been confirmed 
by these case studies.  Rather, grassroots groups have remained largely disconnected 
from their professionalised colleagues and declined any perceived strategic 
advantages that such a relationship might bring.  We undertake now a similar 
examination of these campaigns in the context of the frames they adopted.  The 
analysis that follows offers further insight into these distinctions, and teases out in 




5 Frames: Context and Cases 
 
‘Social movements exist in a larger societal context.  They draw on the cultural stock 
for images of what is an injustice, for what is a violation of what ought to be’.  
 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996: 266-267) 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I illustrated how the domain of political opportunity 
structures can capture europeanisation in social movements.  This chapter 
concentrates on another such domain – frames.  I construct a framework in order to 
answer the question ‘what is the impact of europeanisation on social movement 
frames?’  In answering this question I have two aims.  The first is to explore the role 
that both national and supranational frames have on social movement behaviour.   
Frames are part of the fabric of social movement identity and social movement 
strategy.  They determine the way in which the issue is conceived, the way support is 
recruited and the way in which action is taken.  Furthermore, because frames are a 
product of collective negotiation, they are the embodiment of the diffusion of social 
movement ideas.  In this way, they are particularly well suited to capturing 
transnationalism, and in this case europeanisation, within social movements. 
 
The second aim is to capture the nuanced impact of europeanisation on social 
movements; in doing this I distinguish between two kinds of frame: European frames 
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where the problematision of the issue, the proposal of action, the mobilisation and 
rationalisation are a direct result of the policies or activities of the EU and 
europeanised frames where the framing is contextualised by the process of European 
integration but does not address it directly.  This distinction, as in the case of 
European and europeanised POS, highlights the reflexive nature of europeanisation 
because it accounts for both the ability of the EU to dictate the mobilisation frame 
chosen by the movement and for the movements to negotiate a common frame 
between themselves which is then exported to other member states.  This distinction 
also teases out the ability of frames to diffuse outside of formal structural 
mechanisms through the negotiation of frames across movements – nationally and 
specifically, across Europe.  In so doing, they may evidence passive europeanisation 
processes. 
 
The chapter is structured into two parts: the first part offers a definition for ‘framing’ 
and outlines the utility of the concept within social movement studies; the second 
section describes the parameters of European and europeanised  frames, then 
concludes with an outline of the national environmental frames in each of the case 
study countries.   
 
 
5.2 Frames and Social Movement Activity 
 
 
Frames are an important aspect of social movement activity because they provide a 
rationale for the group’s activity, they represent a sympathetic way for movements to 
present issues to the general public, and they create a shared understanding of issues 
which helps to facilitate networking within and between social movement groups.  I 
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define frames as action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities of a social movement group43.  Scholars have attributed 
various different characteristics to frames but the overarching principle remains: it is 
the collective negotiation of meaning, rather than the sum total of individual 
meanings that creates a frame.  In this way it is not a static or fixed understanding but 
one which can adapt and be constantly redefined according to the membership of the 
group, the changing nature of the problem and the parties involved in managing it.  
This definition suggests that frames are well-suited to accommodate the dynamic 
nature of the process of europeanisation. 
 
The vehicles through which an issue is framed may be textural (constructed through 
the language used in flyers, posters, websites), visual (logos, pictures in printed 
communications) or aural (speeches, radio or television appearances).  Doerr et al. 
recognise this diversity: ‘the world view of social movements is not only enshrined 
in manifestoes and email lists, but it is also visible in the design of posters and t-
shirts, in the use of visual symbols and in photos that are used for campaigning’ 
(2008: 161).    In this chapter I draw data from all three sources, analysing the text 
and images of campaign materials as well as the language of interviews and 
television appearances to identify evidence of europeanisation where it exists.  




 This definition is based closely on the definition offered by Robert Benford who applies these 
qualities to social movement organisations (R. D. Benford, 2000: 614).   I believe this definition 




The focus on frames allows me to operationalise the broader issue of beliefs in 
grassroots green groups.   Mueller and Judd note that ‘belief consensus has long been 
regarded as one of the defining characteristics of social movements’ (Mueller & 
Judd, 1981: 183).  Frame analysis captures this consensus.  Frames embody the 
subjective interpretation of a problem and the identification of appropriate solutions.  
This problematisation reflects, and helps to construct, the beliefs of the group.  ‘In 
the cognitive process of interpreting reality, the actors in a conflict construct and 
exploit frames of references that “allow individuals to find, conceive, identify and 
label the events which occur in their lives and more generally in the world at large” 
thus giving sense to their actions’(D.  Snow, Rochford, K., & Benford, 1986: 464).  
In short, framing is the process of negotiating and re-negotiating a common 
understanding of an issue, while frames are the articulation of those understandings. 
 
Frames, Ideologies and Beliefs 
It should be noted however, that while the terms ‘frames’ and ‘ideologies’ both 
imply the idea of ‘belief’ and both terms address the meaning that is attached to 
objects and actions, they are not synonymous concepts.  In the early development of 
the concept of framing, ‘ideology’, ‘culture’, ‘belief’ and ‘meaning’ were conflated.  
Klandermans argued that a successful social movement needs to be able to garner 
support for its beliefs, and then to motivate people to act upon them: he labelled 
these processes ‘consensus mobilisation’ and ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 
1984).  It took several years before what was variously referred to as ‘ideological 
factors – values, beliefs, meanings’ (D. Snow, 1988) or ‘belief systems’ (Gerhards & 
Rucht, 1992) became disaggregated into distinct concepts.  In distinguishing between 
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ideas of meaning in this way we are better able to understand how people present 
their concerns publically.  It is possible for example to have two very different 
ideologies within the same masterframe.  Oliver and Johnston illustrate this idea in 
the debate about abortion in 1970s America: ‘both sides...adopted the civil rights 
masterframe.  The pro-life movement stresses the right of the fetus to life, while the 
pro-choice movement stresses the right of the woman to control a fundamental aspect 
of her life.’ (2005: 187).  For the green movement this means that debates about the 
ideology of ‘ecologism’ may be kept distinct from social movement actors using 
ecological or environmental frames in their campaigns.  In other words, a movement 
using an ecological frame does not give them an ecologist ideology, the former is 
designed to be immediately powerful and the latter requires a longer process of 
contemplation.  ‘Ideologies cannot just be “resonated with” they have to be 
learned...Ideologies are complex systems of thought that cannot be communicated 
accurately in stock phrases or sound bites’ (Oliver & Johnston, 2005: 196). 
 
Framing Tasks 
When frames are applied in practice they may be broken down into a series of sub-
functions.  Snow and Benford call these ‘framing tasks’ (1988: 199):  
 
1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in 
need of alteration;  
2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to 
be done; 
3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.  
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The first two of these tasks map onto the idea of ‘consensus mobilisation’ while the 
latter maps onto ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 1984).  The more 
interconnected these tasks – also called tools or properties (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 
1998) – the more successful the movement’s frame will be.  Let us examine each of 
these three tasks in turn. 
 
The diagnostic element of a frame is composed of two parts: firstly to convert a 
particular event or phenomenon into a social problem and secondly to apportion 
blame.  Inevitably the identification of these problems and responsibility is a very 
selective task – other potential sources of protest are neglected in choosing just one.  
della Porta and Diani argue that because actors must choose from various sources of 
frustration, those causes against which they should direct their energy, the process is 
a reduction in social complexity.  Once these frames have been established it 
becomes difficult for other conflicts to penetrate.  In this way the diagnosis of frames 
is a process that can lead to asymmetry of power with some concerns being squeezed 
out of the dominant frame (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 76). 
 
The prognostic element of the frame moves beyond identifying the problem to 
seeking solutions, creating new consensus and devising new ways of doing things.  It 
is also responsible for devising tactics and identifying targets.  This is the element of 
the frame with a utopian dimension – the rejection of global capitalism for example.  
It is also the area of framing that has the greatest potential for conflicting approaches 
within the same movement.  While a movement may agree that global capitalism is a 
social problem those on the left may underline the exploitative practices of 
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capitalism and call for it to be overthrown, while nationalists may highlight the threat 
to national sovereignty and call for greater regulation (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 
77).  It is the process of negotiating a common frame and devising an appropriate 
solution that gives a movement its sense of shared beliefs that keep the movement 
together. 
 
The final task of a frame is to motivate citizens into action.   They must be convinced 
that there is cause to act, opportunity to act and legitimacy to act.  In order to 
construct a frame that will do this the collective experience must be able to connect 
at an individual level.  Social movement actors need to demonstrate that a particular 
problem is common to other groups of actors and that it is relevant to their life 
experience.  Benford identifies the four ‘vocabularies of motive’ which are employed 
in mobilising actors in this way: vocabularies of severity (the immensity of the 
danger), urgency (the urgent necessity to fix the problem), efficacy (your power to 
change things) and propriety (your awareness is needed).  These vocabularies 
provide good reasons for identifying with a cause and for acting on its behalf (R. D. 
Benford, 1993).  We see these vocabularies of motive illustrated in the case studies 
in the following chapter. 
 
Masterframes and Frame Alignment 
To be successful, social movements need not only to link multiple groups of actors 
together, but also to link their multiple frames together.  Snow and Benford refer to 
this linkage as a “master frame” – ‘the diffusion of movement activity across 
different population and organisational sectors of society’ (1992: 26).  The range of 
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problems that can be accommodated by a masterframe gives leverage to the variety 
of actors within it focussing on one or more of these problems.  It helps the 
movement to develop an interpretation of reality which resonates with the greatest 
number of actors.  della Porta and Diani emphasis the temporal and cultural context 
of a masterframe noting that ‘the discourse of a single movement (or the organisation 
of a movement) must be placed in relation to the general orientations of a given 
period’ (2006: 80).  Fisher calls this ‘narrative fidelity’ because the masterframe 
rings true with existing cultural narratives (1994).   
 
The notion of a masterframe may be linked to another aspect of framing commonly 
referred to as ‘frame alignment’.  Developed by Snow et al. the terms refers to ‘the 
linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of 
individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are 
congruent and complementary’ (1986: 464).  In order to achieve frame alignment 
they identify four processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, 
and frame transformation.  The premise here is that actors’ beliefs may be taken as a 
given – the movement must simply effectively market their ideas in such a way as to 
make them attractive to those actors. 
 
The concepts of masterframes and frame alignment are developed in this thesis in the 
notion of ‘national frames’.  I define these national (master) frames as a way of 
interpreting and problematising a phenomenon – in this case ‘the environment’ – in a 
way which resonates with the majority of the population in a particular place and 
time.  In this way, I argue, we will expect to find a peculiarly ‘French’ understanding 
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of the environment, or a specifically Italian environmental frame.  della Porta and 
Diani underscore the relationship between frame alignment and national context:  
‘frame alignment broadly relies on a dynamic relationship between the development 
of a movement and the cultural heritage of both the country in which it operates and 
its institutions’ (2006: 83).   Where a social movement is able to connect their own 
frame to that of the masterframe or national frame, then those ideas have greater 
resonance and salience with a greater number of national actors.   In this way, the 
ability of the movement to connect their own frames to the national frame would be 
expected to increase their chance of success.  I expand on these national frames 
further in section 5.4 when I examine the national environmental frames in each of 
the case study countries. 
 
 
5.3 The Diffusion of Frames 
 
In light of our focus on europeanisation it is another important feature of frames that 
they can be diffused and transferred amongst different actors: ‘frames are not fixed to 
the context in which they emerge.  They are also transferable to other contexts may 
they be geographically distant or differ in cultural terms.’ (Doerr, Teune, & Garavini, 
2008: 162).  Indeed, the idea of frames as vehicles for the transfer of ideas from one 
place to another is not a new one: 
‘Protest makers do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each 
conflict...they often find inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and 
practiced by other activists. In short, they play the role of adopters in the cross-




This means that frames are a good conduit for the transnational diffusion of 
understanding, which in turn shapes movement behaviour.  If frames are a product of 
their environment, then we might expect the diffusion of social movement frames 
within the European Union to be influenced by this context, and in turn the 
understanding and the mobilisation around an issue will reflect this.  In short, 
because frames are informed by their political and cultural context, and they may be 
diffused to like-minded actors, we may expect to find evidence of europeanisation in 
social movement frames. 
 
I use the definition offered by Katz and McAdam and Rucht of diffusion as: 
 
the acceptance of some specific item, over time, by adopting units – 
individuals, groups, communities – that are linked both to external channels 
of communication and to each other by means of both a structure of social 
relations and a system of values, or culture (1993: 59). 
 
I argue that this process of diffusion, of common acceptance of ideas, is important to 
the study of europeanised social movements in two ways.  Firstly, the process of 
diffusion helps to forge social movement identity by forging networks.  Social 
movements exist to the extent that individual actors are persuaded to act collectively 
and provided with the opportunity to do so.  Indeed, the very act of networking is 
central to the definition of a social movement – social movements are better 
conceived of as networks that alter as new groups form, as activists from other 
groups become part of the movement and others ...drop out’ (Doherty, 2002: 13).  
The diffusion of frames through the forging of networks is therefore central to social 
movement identity and social movement behaviour.  Moreover, the two concepts of 
frame diffusion and networking are complimentary concepts because framing tasks 
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share many similar characteristics with network functions.  Passy identifies (Passy, 
2003: 23): 
o Socialisation – creating the will to participate 
o Structural-connection – the ability to match prospective members with 
opportunities for action 
o Decision-shaping – the idea of group cooperation and the influence of 
the collective over the individual 
 
These functions echo the themes of Snow and Benford’s prognostic, diagnostic and 
mobilisation tasks (1988: 199).  In this way, by examining the possibilities for 
europeanisation within the diffusion of frames we are able to examine 
europeanisation at the heart of the movement itself. 
 
Secondly, in examining the diffusion of frames amongst grassroots or local groups 
we can develop new insights into the relationship between europeanisation and the 
mechanisms of the state.  At a formal level many of the EMOs rely on state or 
European funding to advance their agenda and to expand their network.  For groups 
at a more local level this is not an option and networks are constructed more through 
interpersonal than inter-institutional linkages (Doherty, 2002: 13).  Furthermore, 
where the frames being diffused do not intentionally address the impact of European 
Union activities then we illustrate the process of passive europeanisation.  Without 
the state resources afforded to institutionalised interests, how will frames be diffused 
through networks at a grassroots level?  We know that a given institutional 
framework will be more favourable to some EMO frames than others (Bomberg, 
2012) – by investigating the diffusion of frames we are able to trace europeanisation 
to those areas outside the an institutional framework (formal political actors, political 
fora) in the process of europeanisation.   
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Scholars have suggested a number of reasons why social movement campaigns find 
success, or not, at the European level (Bomberg, 2012; della Porta & Caini, 2009; 
Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001).  One of the reasons commonly cited why some frames 
diffuse better than others across the EU is the movement’s attitude to the European 
Union itself: 
the attitudes of various national actors on Europe confirm widespread support 
for European integration, but also extremely different conceptions of Europe.  
Europe emerges as an ‘imagined community’ that means very different things 
to collective actors.  Support or opposition to Europe are positions usually 
pertaining to territorial identity, pitting nationalists against Europeanists – or 
intergovernmentalists against federalists.  However, at various points in time 
and on various policies national actors have symbolically intertwined their 
positions on Europe with those held on other issues, some using their veto 
powers, other fashioning themselves as Europe’s entrepreneurs (della Porta & 
Caini, 2009: 115). 
 
This ‘imagined community’ therefore implies that the ability of a movement to 
connect to other countries within the community will dictate their success at an EU 
level.  But what does their attitude towards the EU say about their success 
domestically?  If grassroots actors against a road or a field of GM crops do not 
require change at a European level, will they be more or less predisposed to 
importing or exporting the frames from other EU member states?   Tarrow explains: 
No domestic claim is inherently interesting outside a country’s borders unless 
it is framed to appeal to a broader audience.  This does not necessarily require 
outright “frame transformation”: often the symbols and issues that appeal to a 
domestic audience can be extended without much frame transformation to an 
international one.  But many campaigners for domestic support reframe 
domestic claims to get international recognition (Tarrow, 2006: 147). 
 
In the analysis which follows in chapter six we examine these ideas further.  We 
focus on how the movements framed the issues in their campaign, the level of 
governance to which they attributed the problem, and any attempts that they made to 
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either transmit or to receive the frames from similar campaigns across Europe.  But 
first, in the following section I explain how the social movement frames of European 
Union policies may be European, or europeanised. 
 
 




Why look for evidence of europeanisation within social movement frames and how 
should we measure it?  The answer to both of these questions lies in revisiting the 
existing literature.  If we consider the qualities of frames we see just how integral 
they are to the foundations and manifestations of social movement behaviour.  Snow 
and Benford call these properties ‘framing tasks’ (1988: 199):  
 
1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in 
need of alteration;  
2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to 
be done; 
3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action. 
 
For the purposes of investigation in chapter six I have distilled these three diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational elements down into two kinds of frame: mobilisation 
frames and problematisation frames.  Mobilisation frames refer to the way in which 
the issue is being presented in order to mobilise support – what is at stake?  Why is it 
important?  Problematisation frames refer to the attribution of blame – who is 
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responsible?  At which level of governance?  In our consideration of europeanised 
frames I also investigate the diffusion of frames in order to account for the ability of 
a frame, informed by the context of European integration, to be constructed 
domestically and then exported to another EU member state. 
 
We can see that the way in which a particular issue is being framed dictates much 
about the way a social movement group works.  In the negotiation of the frame some 
actors will be drawn in, finding the frame appealing, while others will find that the 
frame does not resonate with them.  The frame therefore dictates not only the three 
tasks above, but it also has a bearing on the actors involved.  It follows therefore that 
if there is to be evidence of europeanisation within any aspect of a social 
movement’s behaviour, it may be observed to a greater or lesser degree in the way in 
which it frames a given issue. 
 
Frames have also, in one way or another, long been considered part of the process of 
europeanisation.  Radaelli for example refers to the ‘“soft” “framing” mechanisms of 
Europeanization’ (2000: 18) or ‘Europe as logic and frame’ (2004: 10) while Knill 
and Lehmkuhl discuss ‘framing integration’ (1999).  If frames are integral to social 
movement behaviour, and part of the process of europeanisation, then it is a logical 
step to examine them alongside one another. 
 
In spite of this, the framing considered in this chapter is distinct from much of the 
other literature on framing in three significant and connected ways.  First of all, 
much of the literature concerning European protest or frames on a European scale 
189 

does so with ‘framing Europe’ in mind (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 
2001; McCauley, 2011).  It addresses the popularity of the EU itself where this 
research is also concerned with the construction of domestic frames within and 
across the European Union. 
 
Secondly, this research defines ‘europeanised frame’ differently from many other 
works of its kind.  Scholars such as Koopmans  refer to europeanised frames as those 
which ‘make reference to European identities, interests, norms and legal 
frameworks’ (Koopmans, 2007: 196). This kind of understanding does not 
distinguish between those frames which explicitly ‘reference Europe’ and those 
which are (directly or indirectly) shaped by the product of European integration.   I 
classify this distinction as European or Europeanised frames. 
 
Thirdly, the concepts of European and europeanised frames draw out nuances in the 
distinction between direct and indirect europeanisation.  As I explain in more detail 
below, European frames refer to the direct agency of the European Union, while 
europeanised frames refer to the influence exercised indirectly through the context of 
europeanisation.   In broader europeanisation literature direct europeanisation most 
commonly refers to a mechanism of negotiation between a member state (actor or 
institution) and the European Union, while indirect europeanisation accounts for the 
adaptation of non-member states to European Union policy without formal 
negotiations with the EU (Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004: 354-5).  My own idea 
of European and europeanised frames explores the ability of indirect europeanisation 
to occur within European member states.  This idea develops further our 
190 

understanding of the limits of europeanisation, and contributes to the less well-
developed literature on indirect europeanisation. 
 
i) European Frames 
 
European frames are centred directly on the agency of the European Union.  They are 
frames which explicitly address the actors and institutions of the EU as the main 
protagonists in a particular issue.  They evidence a direct process of europeanisation.  
A ‘European frame’ should therefore meet the following criteria
44
: 
1) articulate a response to a European Union policy  
 
In order to isolate the impact of the EU over other process such as globalisation, it is 
necessary that a European frame is formed in response to European Union legislation 
or EU policy guidelines. 
 
2) problematise the issue as the responsibility of the European Union  
 
The European Union must be identified as an actor who is able to influence the 
outcome desired by the movement.   
 
3) require that action is taken at the EU level 
 
The social movement must address their concerns to the European Union (either 
exclusively, or alongside other policy actors) and require that the EU act on them. 
 
 
For example, if the environmental movement was to decide that car emissions were 
too high and causing pollution it may identify a range of ways to combat this: for car 
manufacturers to introduce cleaner technology, for the EU to make the European 
Union Emission Standards higher and  for the general public to use public transport 
more often.   If the movement was to take action against the EU in order to address 
 
44
 I refer to the ‘European Union’ as a shorthand for its composite institutions and individual 
representatives.  A European frame would equally apply to a social movement that specifically 
addressed its complaint to the European Commission for example. 
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this pollution then it would be evidencing a European frame.  Actors at multiple 
levels of governance have the competency for making these changes – national 
governments for example have a role to play in facilitating public transport through 
their domestic transport policy but if they choose to problematise emissions as an 
‘EU problem’ for which it must take responsibility then they are fulfilling the second 
criteria of a social movement frame.  If they then go on to require that the EU act on 
this responsibility by changing its Emissions Standards then they will show evidence 
of the third dimension of a European frame.  Were they to mobilise against national 
governments however – forcing them to compensate for low emissions standards 
with stricter domestic standards – then they would not be evidencing a European 
frame.  Instead they would be saying that ‘the EU has caused this problem, but the 
national government must fix it’.  In summary, in order for a European frame to be 
present then there must be EU policy in debate, the EU must be identified as 
responsible for the issue, and demands for a solution must be targeted at the EU. 
 
To refer European frames back to the three tasks of social movement frames 
identified by Snow and Benford, a social movement is europeanised by European 
frames to the extent that the problematision of the issue, the proposal of action, the 
mobilisation and rationalisation are a direct result of the policies or activities of the 
EU.  The movement must respond to EU policy, it must problematise the issue as 
‘European’ and it must require action at a European level.  This kind of ‘direct’ 
europeanisation where there is a linear relationship between the social movement and 
the EU is not however the only route to europeanisation available, demonstrated 
below by the concept of europeanised frames. 
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ii) Europeanised Frames 
 
 
Europeanised frames differ from those above because they do not need to address the 
EU explicitly, they may be constructed and diffused at a more local territorial level.   
In this way, a europeanised frame may be identified by the following criteria: 
 
1) articulate a response to European Union activity 
 
As with our definition of European frames, in order to isolate the impact of the EU 
over other process such as globalisation, it is necessary that a europeanised frame is 
formed in response to European Union legislation, policy guidelines or similar 
activity. 
 
2) problematise the issue as the responsibility of regional or national actors 
 
National or regional government, or indeed multinational business interests, must be 
identified as the actor who is able to influence the outcome desired by the movement.   
 
3) does not require that action is taken at the EU level 
 
The movement will require action be taken by the actor they hold responsible, rather 
than go ‘over their heads’ to demand action from the EU.  
 
4) is constructed domestically and then diffused or replicated in other 
European Union member states 
 
The frame will be constructed within one nation state and then exported to another.  
A movement may also show evidence of europeanised frames if they import a frame 
from another member state.  This process of diffusing these frames and building 
relationships across borders is necessary for the presence of passive europeanisation 
processes. 
 
An example of this kind of europeanised frame, drawn from outside the green 
movement, would be protests against the proposed closure of the French Renault 
plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium.  Belgian factory workers framed the problem as a case 
of French ‘aid shopping’ from the European Union and persuaded the Spanish 
government to withdraw its plans to subsidise an expanded Renault plant at 
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Vallodolid, Spain, because Renault were planning to use structural funds to fulfil 
their plans.  The workers also managed to stage a number of protests at the site of the 
plant and mobilised the European Metal Workers Union to take action in Brussels.
45
  
In this case the involvement of the EU was tangential as the problem arose from their 
structural funds.  Responsibility was said to lie nationally with the French 
Government and with Renault and action was demanded there, but the frame was 
europeanised because it was able to unite and mobilise a number of different actors 
around Europe. 
 
This understanding of a europeanised frame may be best thought of as lateral, in that 
the framing is contextualised by the process of European integration but does not 
address it directly.  By contrast a European frame indicates a more vertical 
relationship between social movement and the EU with the movement identifying the 
EU as the main protagonist in the issue.  In the next chapter we examine these two 
dimensions of framing in the case study countries, asking what evidence there is for 
europeanisation.  First, in order to better understand the way in which 
europeanisation can be manifested in either European or europeanised frames, it is 












 For an excellent account of these protests see Imig and Tarrow (2000: 73-76). 
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To capture the impact of European or europeanised frames, we need first to outline 
the national frames with which these frames interact.   In this section I outline the 
different ways in which the three case study countries frame ‘the environment’ – the 
national environment masterframe – and therefore how threats to the environment 
take on distinctly national characteristics.  By including an examination of national 
environmental masterframes alongside European or europeanised frames I offer a 
point of difference from other works on the europeanisation of movements because I 
do not consider the way the EU itself is framed by a movement (della Porta & Caini, 
2009; Rootes, 2002a).  Rather, I am interested in how a particular issue (the 
environment) is framed by a movement in the context of European integration.  This 
approach affords us insights into how the EU may affect movement frames even if 
the EU itself is not under question. 
 
Indeed, the majority of social movement literature that addresses the europeanisation 
of frames addresses the idea of a movement being for or against Europe.  della Porta 
observes that ‘Europeanization proceeds through the work of norms entrepreneurs 
that adopt and adapt European frames’ (2006a: 80).  Similarly McCauley notes from 
his investigations ‘[i]t is also striking how each actor has developed an ideological 
‘frame’ vis-à-vis the EU in their mobilization’(McCauley, 2011: 15).  The work I 
present here does not consider the extent to which a movement is pro-European 




In the same vein, the breadth of issues and understandings covered by ‘the 
environment’ is bewildering, but that breadth does not imply that there is therefore a 
common international understanding.  Liberatore opines ‘environmental problems 
are not given per se but are socially constructed, and the way in which this 
construction process develops is influenced by the prevailing cultural, economic and 
political conditions in different social contexts’ (1995: 59 in Szarka, 2002: 4).  In 
examining these prevailing conditions in the context of European integration I hope 
to shed light onto the way in which issues are framed by social movements within 
and across EU member states.  
 
The notion of national interpretation may therefore be recognised as an important 
one: ‘[a] central theme in the discourse of local oppositions to large-scale public 
works regards the territorial scale of the conflict’ (della Porta, 2006b: 59) where the 
territory may be either local or national.  In chapter six I will expand on the way in 
which issues are problematised at these different levels of governance, but in the 
following section I concentrate on the national masterframe.  The advantage of a 
territorial understanding of frames, and of extracting general national frames, is that 
we are able to draw cross-national comparisons, which in turn affords insights into 
the cross-national diffusion of frames and the processes of europeanisation across 







i) Frames in France 
 
 
The national environmental frame in France is similar, but distinct, to that of Italy.  
Here, the alimentary patrimony of the country is also important, but the environment 
is predominantly framed in terms of terroir and farming.  The idea of terroir is more 
than ‘terrain’ – it encompasses both a sense of the agricultural specificity of a place, 
but also the cultural identity that a terroir imbues.  Barham confirms ‘terroir refers to 
an area or terrain, usually rather small, whose soil and microclimate impart 
distinctive qualities to food products... [while] figuratively, terroir can also designate 
a rural or provincial region that is considered to have a marked influence on its 
inhabitants’ (Barham, 2003: 131).  This strong connection between ‘the rural’ and 
‘the environment’ is a product of France’s socio-political history.  Until the end of 
the Second World War France was a country characterised by its predominantly rural 
population and although ‘the major rural exodus thereafter profoundly altered French 
society...family connections with the countryside often remained strong, rural 
traditions have retained their place and agriculture is still accorded great political 
priority’ (Szarka, 2002: 10).   The framing of the environment as part of France’s 
rural history is illustrated in this quote from Jacques Chirac, former Minister for 
Agriculture and French President: 
At a time when concerns over the environment and quality of life are 
prioritised, who can deny the irreplaceable role played by agriculture in 
conserving our surroundings?  The enhancement of the countryside, the 
protection of our landscapes, our flora and fauna, are likewise the result of the 
labour of our farmers who put ecology into practice on a daily basis, in 
perhaps too discrete a manner.  The wine grower, the stock breeder, the 
forester, the market gardener do not only produce goods: they are the 
guardians of the values intimately bound up with a rural locality and 
constitute a civilisation, in the strong sense of the term’ (Alphandery et al. 




We can observe here that not only is the framing of the environment as a question of 
rural patrimony, but that this is a highly politicised frame.  It reflects a conscious 
shaping of the environmental frame by interested parties who use their valuation of 
the past to assert a new vision for the future of the countryside (Barham, 2003: 132). 
Therefore, in the same way that the Italian political system supports the privileged 
role for the region, so the French policy system favours agricultural issues.  Hervieu 
et al. call agricultural policy the ‘most public of all policies.  The protagonists, the 
decisions, the processes and the effects of agricultural policy are more explicit...than 
those of other areas of State intervention’ (1991: 6).  The environmental masterframe 
then is one which although firmly rooted in France history has been consciously and 
knowingly reinterpreted into France’s policy-making structures. The anti-
globalisation angle is a linked, but more recent extension of this environmental 
frame.  It is possible then to reconcile these two ideas into one French masterframe: 
the environment as valuable territorial heritage – see Figure 5.1. 
 
Fig 5.1:  The Counter-Globalisation Frame in France 
 
One of the most prominent frames in French public discourse is that of 
counter-globalisation.  The frame has a particular resonance in France that 
has made social movement actors, policy-makers and economic interests 
alike frame their arguments in these terms. 
 
The global justice or counter-globalisation frame has steadily risen in popularity over 
the course of the previous two decades so that it has now taken on the role of 
something of a master narrative for the ‘new’ social movement sector amongst 
others, binding diverse struggles over cultural, environmental and social identities’ 
(Hayes, 2006: 821).  Although the rise of the counter-globalisation movement has 
been manifest in all Western democracies, the frame has taken on particular 
salience.    That anti-globalisation politics are particularly strong in France should 
come as no surprise as, notes Birchfield (2005),  France has always been sceptical 
of the virtues of unregulated capitalism, has a deeply rooted protest culture and a 
strong tradition of venerating their cultural and culinary heritage which is perceived 
as being emasculated by increasing globalisation .   Waters explains ‘in a country 
with a vibrant culture of social protest, where an extensive and deeply cherished 
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public sphere exists, protest against economic globalisation has been particularly 
passionate and intense’ (Waters, 2004: 855).  At a time when the politics of the left 
has been declining, the rise of the counter-globalisation frame has breathed new life 
into political debate and has helped to invigorate French social movements.  Indeed, 
for activists across the world, France is often held up as a reference point, a ‘model 
to follow’ in the organisation of anti-globalisation protest.  Anti-GMO activists have 
been helped considerably by individual personalities like José Bové who has 
become a posterchild for the counter-globalisation movement and a household 
name.  The enduring appeal of the counter-globalisation frame in France means that 
these debates have transferred across policy areas: for example in agriculture Heller 
notes ‘[t]he French debate about GMOs now has shifted to one about the 
commodification of life, the fate of the small farmer, and the global homogenization 
of culture by multinational capitalism’ (2008: 27).  This frame, above others, is the 
frame which has found the greatest salience in France across the greatest spectrum 




ii) Frames in Italy 
 
Central to Italy’s understanding of the environment is its relatively recent history of 
statehood.  With the risorigimento of 1861 came the amalgamation of numerous 
independent states in the Italian peninsula into the Kingdom of Italy and a loss of 
regional autonomy.  Nonetheless, a strong sense of this regional identity has 
persevered, and ‘the region’ continues to be of symbolic importance today.  The 
legacy of Italy’s unification is a stronger sense of regional identity than in the other 
case study countries.  A consequence of this privileged role for the region is that the 
environment too is understood in terms of its local cultural, political and historical 
significance.  Anything which is perceived as a threat to the local environment 
therefore becomes imbued with these regional values. 
 
Defence of the territory through defence of the environment has been observed 
across a number of studies of environmental projects in Italy.  In their study of 
proposed eco-parks Carrus et al. noted ‘the positive role of regional identity in 
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predicting support for specific parks. This effect emerges for that dimension of 
regional identity regarding people’s pride for their own regional traditions, history, 
and culture’ (2005: 251). Similarly, of campaigns to build a TAV line (Treno Alta 
Velocità – High Speed Train) in Val di Susa and a bridge on the Messina Straits della 
Porta and Piazza observe that ‘those who contest large-scale public works frequently 
underline a communitarian defence of a territory that is suffering from external 
aggression’ (2006b: 59). In this way environmental protection is framed in terms of 
territorial protection.   
 
Italy’s political arrangements have arguably supported this ‘progressive extension of 
the territorial and symbolic dimension of mobilisation’ (della Porta, 2006b: 13).   
Decentralisation is key here; Italy is the most highly decentralised of all of the case 
study countries with regions holding competence for a lot of environmental policy.  
Decentralisation is also highly prized, with any incremental moves towards 
centralisation resulting in the proliferation of regional political parties as an 
expression of resistance to this idea.  Nanetti observes ‘the decentralisation of the 
institutional structure has...stressed the differences and the specificity of each 
regional context’ (Nanetti 1988: 9 inWoods, 1992: 58).  In Italy therefore, the way in 
which the environment is framed in regional terms is supported by the underlying 
political structure which encourages the development of regional specificity. 
 
So how does the link between the environment and the local territory manifest itself 
within a national frame?  In short, the environment is framed as a source of regional 
pride – as a backdrop to the cultural, political and particularly the alimentary 
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patrimony of the area.  To illustrate, when Greenpeace launched a campaign in 2007 
against GM milk being used to make parmesan cheese they wrote ‘Si tratta di una 
richezza sia agroalimentare che culturale che deve essere protetta’ – ‘it is about its 
riches, both in terms of agriculture and culture that must be protected’ (Greenpeace, 
2007: 7) – see Figure 5.2.  The idea that the local environment is intrinsic to local 
identity is supported by the research of Diani and Forno who found that between 
1988-1997 over half of all nationally reported environmental protests in Italy were 
local in the level of mobilisation – higher than the statistics for either France or 
Britain (2007: 141).  In Italy therefore, we conclude that the environment is framed 
in terms of regional patrimony, or heritage. 
 
Fig 5.2 The Italian Agri-regional Frame in Action 
 
 
The ideas of regional specificity, territorial identify and agriculture heritage 
are all exemplified in the battle to keep parmesan cheese GM-free.  
Interestingly, although environmentalists framed the suspected presence of 
GMOs in the cheese as ‘contamination’, their frame was countered by 
attempts on behalf of the local council to re-frame the issue as one of cultural 
patrimony. 
 
Parmesan cheese is one of Italy’s best-known exports, produced in the Northern city 
of Parma in Emilio-Romagna and the surrounding areas of Bologna and Modena.  
The symbolism of the cheese and the Italian heritage that it embodies transformed it 
into a symbol of GM resistance.  In a report by Greenpeace Italy of June 2007 ‘il 
caso Parmigiano-Reggiano’ it frames the issue in terms of food security:  ‘in virtù dei 
seri dubbi sulla sicurezza degli Ogm per il consume umano e animale, invocando il 
principio di precauzione, gli Ogm non dovrebbero essere utilizzati per la produzione 
di alimenti o mangimi’ – ‘because of serious doubts about the safety of GM 
food for human or animal consumption, invoking the precautionary principle, GM 
should not be used for the production of food or feed.’  That GM milk was suspected 
of being used to make the cheese became synonymous with the language of 
contamination.  A national campaign was launched to persuade the Council of 
Parmigiano-Reggiano (charged with overseeing the authenticity and labelling of the 
product) to forbid the use of GM milk in the cheese’s production.  The Council 
denied the existence of GMOs in the cheese and attempted to reframe the debate 
as a battle to safeguard the nationality (rather than purity) of parmesan cheese.  At 
the time of Greenpeace’s campaign the Council was locked into a legal battle with 
German producers who were flooding the market with non-specific hard grating 
cheese.  The Council took the case to the European Courts of Justice, who 
eventually ruled in their favour that only cheese produced around the city of Parma 
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could be called Parmesan cheese.  The Council used the context of the legal battle 
to diffuse the GM campaign and to garner support for its own.  Furthermore, it was 
able to connect its own struggle to parmesan cheese with the national frame of 
regional specificity.  The way the issue has been framed, and the counter-frame 
established by the Council of Parmigiano-Reggiano underscores the idea that 
territorial and alimentary history play a key role in the framing of debate. 
 
 
iii) Frames in the UK 
 
 
The UK framing of the environment is set apart from the other two case study 
countries by its rather more anthropocentric characteristics.  Nonetheless, although 
environmental protest in Britain is now more comparable to that of its European 
neighbours, this ‘environmental consciousness’ has taken a different direction. 
 
The first of these differences is that the concept of regional identity or terroir has not 
translated into the UK’s framing of the environment.  The relationship between the 
citizen and the landscape is not interactive in this way, rather the environment is a 
self-contained environment which may be ‘visited’ but is not inherent in the cultural 
patrimony of the people.  Doherty and Hayes explain: 
‘the idea of terroir is most certainly weaker in Great Britain, where 
agriculture is regarded as more of an economic activity than one which is 
concerned with social integration and where there is a far weaker relationship 
between food and agriculture (processed foods are more widely consumed 




We can observe that the environment is not participatory as in France or Italy; rather 
it is a backdrop for pastoral leisure activities and the production of food is something 
to be secured rather than celebrated – see Figure 5.3.   
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 Original text : ‘la notion de terroir est assurément faible voire inexistante en Grande-Bretagne où 
l’agriculture est majoritairement perçue comme une activité économique plus que comme une activité 
qui génère de l’intégration sociale, et où les liens entre alimentation et agriculture sont davantage 
indirects (la nourriture préparée y est plus consommée qu’en France)’ – translation my own. 
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Fig 5.3: The Food Security Frame in the UK 
 
 
One of the most interesting frames to emerge in the UK over the past ten 
years is that of food security.  The UK has suffered a number of issues with 
viruses entering the food chain in cases of BSE and Foot  Mouth Disease as 
well as a deep suspicion of GMOs. The UK public is, as a consequence, 
particularly sensitive to food risks and subsequently both scientific experts 
and activists are likely to frame their arguments in terms of food security. 
The arrival of the food security frame may be traced to the mid 1990s and the anti-
GMO campaign.  Marris et al. observe that in 1996 tomato paste made from GM 
tomatoes was on sale (clearly labelled) in two major British supermarkets and was 
selling well.  Although Greenpeace was acting to stop the GM soya that was being 
imported from the US, the public remained largely unaware.  Any debate which was 
happening was confined to key interest groups such as food supermarkets, nature 
conservation agencies like English Nature or specialised NGOs (2001: 41).  In 1998 
two events turned the tide: a documentary was broadcast about the dangers of GM 
crops, and the first act of GM crop destruction occurred when activists attacked a 
field of sugarbeet in Norwich.  By mid June many other crop sites had been reported 
as damaged.  Momentum gathered behind the anti-GMO campaign as public figures 
such as Prince Charles became involved.  GMOs were considered unsafe 
‘frankenfoods’ and Marris et al. note how public responses to GMOs were shaped 
by underlying factors which blurred the boundaries between 'science' and 'politics', 
and also between 'risk' and 'ethics' (2001: 7).   Concerns about food safety were 
compounded by the government’s revelations in 1996 that it had covered up 
evidence linking BSE and CJD.  The public outcry, at home and across Europe led 
to British beef exports being banned and, despite of incidences occurring in 
Germany, Belgium and Portugal, it was British food safety that was vilified in the 
European  media, setting the UK against the rest of the continent in ‘The Cattle of 
Britain’ (The Sun. 22.05.96).  The rolling issues of GMOs and BSE were joined in 
2001 by an outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease that saw over seven million sheep 
and cattle culled across the UK causing an agrarian recession.  The government’s 
ability to deliver food to its citizens was being undermined in the national press and 
they were forced to establish the Food Standards Agency as a response to public 
concerns over food safety (Wales, Harvey, & Ward, 2006).   Certainly, although 
agricultural issues were also evident on mainland Europe, the UK was by far the 
worst affected by the crises of foot and mouth and BSE.  These concerns became 
closely intertwined with ‘anxieties about food and the methods of food production, 
e.g. chemical additives, microbiological safety and BSE’ (Shaw, 1999: 13.1).   
 
 
The idea that the frame of the environment is deeply entwined with human 
cultivation of the natural world is supported by the kinds of environmental 
organisations that have taken root in the UK: from the Commons, Open Spaces and 
Footpaths Preservation Society in 1865 to the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB) in 1889 and the National Trust (NT) in 1895.  These forefathers to the 
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current spectrum of environmental organisations had at their core the protection of  
land access (Rootes, 2003a: 21) rather than the farming trade unions that we have 
seen in the other case study countries.  
 
‘Where in France the countryside is seen as a populated and cultivated 
resource, in Britain it is mainly regarded as unpopulated, like “a landscape 






The framing of the environment as a recreational resource, and the legacy of the 
early EMOs is also manifest in data on environmental protest in Britain.  Although 
Britain has historically been characterised by its low levels of protest, Seel et al. 
unpick this idea further to illustrate that it has experienced low levels of 
environmental protest, rather than protest more generally, and that this low level of 
environmentalism has gradually reversed thanks in part to a growth of environmental 
consciousness during the 1980s (2000: 15-17).  Elsewhere, Rootes identifies the four 
main sets of environmental issues that have prompted mobilisation: transport, animal 
welfare, nature conservation and pollution/industrial issues (2003a: 29-31).  Of these 
four issues, the questions of transport and nature conservation in particular 
underscore the idea of human dominance of the landscape, rather than the reciprocal 
relationships between citizen and environment that we see in the other case study 
countries. 
 
In summary, I have outlined three distinctly national environmental frames: the 
environment as regional identity in Italy, the environment as territorial and 
 
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 Original text : Tandis qu’en France, la campagne est  vue comme une ressource peuplée et cultivée 
elle est majoritairement considérée en Grande Bretagne comme ‘non-peuplée’ comme une ‘paysage 
sans silhouettes’ et un refuge pour la flore et la faune’ – translation my own. 
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agricultural heritage in France and the environment as a pastoral resource in the UK.  
In spite of these robust national frames, the relationship between the national 
environmental frames described here and the European or europeanised frames 
outlined above is a complementary one.  National frames by no means avoid the 
possibility for a europeanised or European frame – the national frame does not need 
to be subordinated, only amended.  In this way, europeanisation may be observed to 
the extent that europeanised or European frames play out against the backdrop of 






To conclude, this chapter has illustrated the utility of frames in understanding the 
beliefs driving social movement behaviour.  We have noted that frames are able to 
bridge ideologies by focussing on specific issues outside of a particular world-view. 
They are tools of social movement activity in that they help to make sense of the 
problem in hand, to identify a response, to mobilise and to justify the course of action 
taken.  They are, however, also part of the repertoire of action itself because ‘they are 
not static ideas belonging to individuals so much as a product of collective action’ 
(Doherty, 2002: 89).  Because of the pervasive role of frames in social movement 
activity, they are well-suited to observing changes in behaviour as a result of 
europeanisation.   At the same time, the concept of europeanisation itself helps us 
identify and examine ‘soft mechanisms’ of europeanisation or the idea that Europe 
itself is a frame.  For this reason, looking for europeanisation in the domain of social 
movement frames is a useful endeavour. 
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By distinguishing between European and europeanised frames in this thesis I offer a 
more nuanced understanding of europeanised frame beyond a catch-all term for the 
way in which social movements frame the European Union – i.e. does a social 
movement ‘like’ the EU.  The distinction I draw disaggregates those movement 
frames which explicitly reference Europe and those movement frames which are 
shaped by the process of European integration itself.  This permits me to unpack the 
concept of europeanisation into direct and indirect europeanisation – helping to draw 
out the europeanisation that takes place within and across member states.  Equally, 
where we observe the diffusion of frames that do not intentionally address EU 
activity at an EU, or at a national level, but may be contextualised by it, then we are 
able to recognise a passive europeanisation process at work.   
 
 
Finally, in this chapter I also observe three distinctly national conceptions of ‘the 
environment’ – from terroir in France, to regional heritage in Italy, to a recreational 
space in the UK.   How might these national frames map onto the European territory? 
In the following chapter I examine each of the case studies to illustrate how national 








6 Frames: European and Europeanised 
 
 
‘When and how movements add to or change the cultural stock are an important 
dimension for understanding social change in general.  The cultural stock becomes 
the backdrop for social movement development and political choice in the next round 
of collective mobilisation and choice.  Thus, a comparative focus on outcomes 
contributes to locating social movements in a historical process’ 
 




6.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we identified the four main properties of frames: to 
problematise the issue, to identify the target and strategy, to mobilise and to 
rationalise that action (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998).  Other writers similarly refer 
to these as the ‘tools’ or  ‘tasks’ of frames: to motivate actors, to devise a strategy to 
address the problem, and to attribute causality to the problem (R. D. Benford, 2000).  
I synthesised these properties and tasks into two areas of framing: 
 
1) Mobilisation Frames (What is concerning?  Why is it important?) 
2) Problematisation frames (Who is responsible?  At which level of governance?) 
 
I also presented they way in which these properties map onto the concepts of 
European and europeanised frames:  frames that respond explicitly to the European 
Union, and frames that are informed by the context of European integration but that 
do not directly address the EU.  I then examined how each of my case study 
countries frames the environment in a nationally distinctive way.  The aim of this 
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chapter is to apply our understandings of national, European and europeanised 
frames to both anti-road and anti-GMO protest in France, Italy and the UK.  I use 
these studies to answer the overarching question: what is the impact of 
europeanisation on social movement frames?   
 
The chapter is divided into three sections:  the first of these examines the case for 
European frames and the second for europeanised frames.  In France I examine the 
anti-road protest against the construction of the A65 between Langon and Pau in the 
Aquitaine region of Southern France.  Also in Aquitaine, I study the ongoing 
campaign against GM crops.  In Italy, I evaluate the campaign against the Corridoio 
Tirrenico road running along the Tuscan coast and the anti-GMO campaign in that 
same region.  Finally, in the UK I investigate the campaign against the re-routing of 
the A71 at Bilston outside Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in 
Devon.  In the subsequent section we then examine how frames are diffused cross-
nationally and what implication this diffusion has for social movement 
europeanisation.  I argue that despite some evidence for a cross-national diffusion of 
frames, the tenacity of national frames impedes the creation of a highly-developed 
‘europeanised’ frame because, exemplified in the case of France, they are not 
sufficiently adaptable to the individual contexts of localised protest.    
 
 
6.2 European Frames in Evidence 
 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined the properties and tasks frames, synthesising them 
into two areas of investigation: 
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1) Mobilisation Frames (What is concerning?  Why is it important?) 
2) Problematisation frames (Who is responsible? At which level of governance?) 
 
These areas of investigation in turn help to guide us in our definition of European 
and europeanised frames.  We established that a European frame should meet the 
following criteria: 
 
o articulate a response to a European Union activity  
o problematise the issue as the responsibility of the European Union  
o require that action is taken at the EU level 
 
The mobilising frames used by a social movement group may allow it to 
problematise the issue as European.  Or, the frames might be very national in nature 
and resistant to the influence of European frames.  In the following sections we apply 






The French Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
i) Mobilising Frames 
 
In its official documentation and on its website ARLP created three main 
mobilisation frames.  First it conceived of the road as economic folly – the project 
was going to cost too much money to build, the toll charge would not cover costs and 
would adversely affect those who lived close to the A65 who would have no other 
choice of road.  At a press-conference on 29 June 2008, Julian Milanesi – the 
spokesperson for ARLP explained some of its economic concerns: 
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The most important factor is the surge in the price of oil, which makes this 
highway completely "useless". "The barrel is now at 143 dollars. The 
project was designed with a barrel at 30 dollars. Bitumen is a petroleum 
derivative.  It increased by 30% in 2007, even more in 2008.  Given the price 
of petrol, it is obvious that this highway, which will cost 18 euros for 





The economic theme crops up again in ARLP’s own briefing paper where it claims: 
ce projet n’est pas financièrement acceptable et, par conséquent, ne correspond pas 
à la notion d’utilité publique  this project is not financially acceptable and 
consequently does not qualify as a ‘public good’’.  Anger emerged over the proposal 
that local taxes would be used to pay for a road that could not ever be profitable, and 
would cost the residents money to use. 
 
Secondly, the road was presented as ill-thought through.  They ARLP and 
SEPANSO argued it could not be justified by the degree of traffic congestion it 
claimed to alleviate: 
The weakness of traffic warrants, according to the Regional Directorate of 
Public Works, the allocation of public money to compensate for the road’s 
lack of profitability.  The road project Langon-Pau cannot be based on current 
traffic or on the effects of traffic congestion on the existing road 
network. Traffic is light and smooth on the road between Langon and Pau 




Nor had the proposals undergone sufficient public consultation: 
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 Original text : ‘l’élément le plus déterminant est la flambée du baril de pétrole, qui selon lui, rend 
cette autoroute totalement “inutile”.  Le baril est aujourd’hui à 143 dollars. Le projet a été pensé 
avec un baril à 30 dollars. Le bitume est un dérivé pétrolier. Il a augmenté de 30% en 2007, encore 
plus en 2008. Compte tenu du prix de l’essence, il est évident que cette autoroute, qui coûtera 18 




















It is worth noting one major flaw in particular, namely the lack of public 






In this way the frame was one of injustice – that a flawed proposal had been 
developed, and that it had been developed without sufficient consultation. 
But the most dominant of the frames in their literature was the ecological protection 
frame.   
 
This was made apparent in their official dossier of complaint, but was also the most 
obvious frame in their campaign materials and website.  The work of the planteurs 
volontaires illustrates the idea that the road’s threat to biodiversity was central in 
mobilising local residents.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the kind of language used to 













 Original text : Un vice de forme majeur est à noter, à savoir l’absence de débat public préalable à 
l’enquête publique en date du 27 février 2006 – translation my own 
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  The poster reads: 





>Rare species are disappearing 
1000 times faster than they 
would ‘naturally’ 
>The planet is heating up 
>Does your local politician not 
understand? 
  >Make a statement with a tree! 
SUNDAY 30 MARCH 15,00 
COMMUNE D’ESCAUDES 
BRING A SAPLING AND 
SOME WATER   
 
 
 Figure 6.1: Les planteurs volontaires poster 
 
Above all else, the road was seen as a threat to Natura 2000 protected wildlife, to the 
Landes National Park, and to the local ecosystem in general.  One activist expressed 
their wider concerns:  
It was so amazing to see all the planteurs volontaires turn up to plant trees.  
People just came down for a bit and planted their tree and stood around and 
talked about what a shame it would be to lose this place.  There’s already less 
wildlife here than when we were young, and now they might be none at all.  
We all agree it would be tragic (Interview, 06.11.2008). 
 
This concern about the local ecosystem is a different way of understanding the 
environment from that of the French national environmental frame – the idea of the 
environment as ‘terroir’. Nonetheless, this terroir frame too ran, to a lesser degree, 
through the campaign materials but became more apparent during the course of the 
 
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 The planteurs volontaires use a play on words in their slogan – where taken literally it means ‘they 
plant, we replant’ but figuratively ‘to plant’ can also mean ‘to mislead’. 
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interviews.  In their joint dossier, ARLP and SEPANSO touched upon the idea of 
terroir through their concerns about the destruction of forest habitat.  They wrote: 
This road project will create a corridor that will lead inevitably to changes in 
the local climate.  Farms and forestry will be carved up, which in turn will 
alter the landscape and make their work more difficult.   The projections for 
how this development will work do not take into account the cost of decades 
of work on specific projects (irrigation, creation of water supply, 




Similarly, a poster for a day of action at the beauty spot ‘9 Fontaines’ near Bostens 



















                               Figure 6.2: L’Appel des 9 Fontaines Poster 
 
 
The importance of this spot as a part of local history was a theme that was mentioned 
in more than one interview.  One activist said:  
 
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 Original text : Ce projet d’autoroute va créer un couloir qui provoquera inévitablement des 
changements climatiques locaux.  Les exploitations agricoles et sylvicoles seront cloisonnées, ce qui 
modifiera le paysage et rendra le travail plus difficile. Les remembrements projetés ne rendront pas 
aux exploitants les espaces qu’ils ont aménagés parfois au prix du travail de plusieurs décennies en 




It’s only a place of about 500 inhabitants, Bostens, but there’s a plot there 
that everyone knows called 9 Fontaines.  It’s the spring where women used to 
go to wash their clothes, and it’s where I played as child.  It’s ecologically so 
rich, it’s a Natura 2000 site too.  The local people can’t believe that the road 
might destroy something so important to us (Interview, 11.11.2008). 
 
 
Frames were effectively employed to motivate people to take part, by empathising 
with the idea of a threat to a landscape to which they felt connected.  This connection 
to the agricultural lifestyles of the past was echoed in ARLP’s early briefing paper: 
 
In the Landes area of the Gascogne...heritage is a reference point for our 
changing society.  The identity of the Grand Landais is tied to the period of 
agro-forestry-grazing where farmers roamed the moors on their stilts and the 
men who harvested the resin from pines? What grandfather has not told his 
children and grandchildren of his memories of pignadar and the hard life he 
led in a smallholding of wood and mud?  Which of our grandmothers does 
not remember the long walks to the mill to grind the grain that gave 





In summary then there were three main frames which were used to mobilise support 
for the campaign: economic folly, indignance at a poor proposal with poor 
consultation and finally the threat to the local ecosystem.   Also present was a fourth 
frame which was an undercurrent to all of these – the national theme of terroir.  
These were the concerns that resonated with the activists and that were used to 
garner support.  The possibility of EU involvement was linked to only one of these 
frames – the ecological frame, although the call for action at an EU level was clearly 
articulated and robustly developed.   
 
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 Original text : Dans les Landes de Gascogne…le patrimoine est une référence pour toutes les 
couches de notre société en pleine mutation. L’identité de Grand-Landais fait fortement référence à la 
période de l’agro-sylvo-pastoralisme où les pasteurs parcouraient la lande sur leurs échasses et les 
résiniers sur leurs pitey gemmaient les pins a coup de hapchots. Quel grand-père n’a pas raconté à 
ses enfants et petits enfants ses souvenirs du pignadar et de la rude vie qu’il menait dans les métairies 
de bois et de torchis? Laquelle de nos grand-mères n’a pas souvenir des longues marches vers le 
moulin pour y faire moudre ce précieux grain qui faisait vivre tant de bouches? – translation my own.
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ii) Problematising Frames 
 
The construction of the A65 was not officially at any point a ‘European Road’ – the 
impetus was national and the financing was not through a TEN-T programme but 
rather in public-private partnership.  In spite of this, the idea of creating a regional 
transport corridor to reduce the journey time between France and Spain and to better 
connect the industry across the hubs in the South of France is one that sits well 
within the TEN philosophy (Aliénor, 2007).  It was also a suspicion of ARLP that the 
construction of the A65 was a Trojan horse for the construction of further roads 
across the Pyrenees which would eventually connect Bordeaux to Valencia:  
As the public inquiry continues the challenge is to prove that development of 
the A65 as a ‘public good’ is in fact masking the true goal of the road: its 




As such, one might expect the anti-road campaign to legitimately address EU 
transport policy, although this angle did not materialise.  Instead, as we noted above, 
ARLP framed the road as an ecological threat, and used this environmental frame to 
address EU environmental policy, as well as the obligations of environmental 
protection the EU sets out under the TEN framework.   ARLP, SEPANSO and Amis 
de la Terre Landes lodged an official complaint with the European Commission on 
the grounds that the road would adversely impact the environment.  They identified 
eight Natura 2000 sites which would either be touched by the road or impacted by its 
presence: 
Finally, it is important to remember that the A65 is set to impact 8 Natura 
2000 sites, all of them designated sites of public interest ....Therefore, the 
impact assessment of  Natura 2000 could not justifiably conclude that 
 
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 Original text : Telle que l’enquête publique est présentée, il existe une tentative pour prouver que la 
réalisation de l’A65 est d’utilité publique en masquant sa réelle finalité, c’est-à-dire son devenir 
européen – translation my own. 
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no significant harm will be done, on the contrary, it must conclude that the 




In connecting the road to EU environmental policy the groups showed clear evidence 
of problematising the issue as a European one, and clear evidence of European 
frames. Although the EU was identified as a body that could help with their 
campaign, the French national and local government was explicitly identified as 
ultimately responsible for the road.  A failure to stop the project, argued the 
campaign, would be hypocritical: 
 
While the preparatory work for the A65, which will connect Langon to 
Pau has begun, associations of environmental 
protection (ARLP,SEPANSO, L’Alliance pour la Planète, Les Amis de la 
Terre, France Nature Environnement, FNAUT, Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour 
la Nature et l’Homme, Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat France, WWF, 
CGT-UIT and CFDT) question the government on the commitments 
made during the Grenelle Environment Forum.  The fact that the proposal for 
the A65 is in advanced levels of development is used as the main argument 
against revaluation.  However, it is not too late to reconsider this project that 
contradicts the official statements made during the Grenelle.  Nicolas 
Sarkozy's speech was clear:  "Clearly, a project whose environmental cost is 
too heavy will be refused. (...) It will be for un-ecological projects to prove it 





 Original text : Enfin, il est faut rappeler que l’autoroute A65 devrait impacter 8 sites Natura 2000, 
qui sont tous des projets ou des sites d’intérêt communautaire…. Par conséquent, l’étude d’incidence 
Natura 2000 ne pouvait légalement conclure à l’absence d’impact significatif et aurait du, au 
contraire, conclure à l’impact significatif du projet A65 sur les sites Natura 2000 – translation my 
own 
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 Original text : Alors que les travaux préparatoires de l’A65, qui doit relier Langon à Pau, ont 
commencé, les associations de protection de l’environnement (ARLP, SEPANSO, L’Alliance pour la 
Planète, Les Amis de la Terre, France Nature Environnement, FNAUT, Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour 
la Nature et l’Homme, Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat France, WWF, CGT-UIT et CFDT 
Aquitaire) interrogent le gouvernement sur le respect des engagements pris pendant le Grenelle de 
l’Environnement.  Le niveau d’avancée du projet d’A65 est aujourd’hui le principal argument utilisé 
à l’encontre de sa réévaluation. Il n’est pourtant pas trop tard pour revenir sur ce projet d’autoroute 
qui cumule les contradictions avec les déclarations officielles faites lors du Grenelle. Le discours de 
Nicolas Sarkozy était alors sans équivoque : « Très clairement, un projet dont le coût 
environnemental est trop lourd sera refusé. (...) Ce sera aux projets non écologiques de prouver qu’il 




ARLP was also responsible for some of the more creative acts of protest that were 
designed to shame local politicians and the Minister of the Environment for their role 
in the construction of the A65.  In March 2007 ARLP held a wheelbarrow race in the 
town square of Mont de Marsan.  In each wheelbarrow sat someone dressed up as 
one of the four local politicians who were responsible for facilitating the road. They 
raced the caricatures to find out who was the biggest bétonneur or ‘concrete layer’ of 
them all.  Other activity targeted Jean-Louis Borloo the Minister for the 
Environment.  A float was taken by the ARLP to the Climate Parade in Paris in April 
2008.  Someone dressed as the Minister rode on top of the float while ‘DJ Borloo’ 
played ‘tractomix A65’ a rap especially written for the occasion.   
  
Overall, the most notable finding in the case of the anti-road protest in Aquitaine is 
the environmental frame that was used to mobilise support.  The French national 
frame was present, and activists were clearly motivated by the threat the road posed 
to their local environment, but it was subsidiary to another environmental frame – 
that of ecological damage.  By framing the road as a threat to endangered wildlife, 
ARLP and les planteurs volontaires were able to address their concerns directly to 
the European Commission. They connected to EU Environmental Policy and to the 
environmental obligations of the TEN-T.  The road was problematised as hypocrisy 
by national and local government, which became the targets of protest; but the road 
was also connected to EU policy and to EU channels of influence through the frame 
of ecological threat.  In this way, a partial European frame emerges through 










The anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine had one very dominant masterframe – that of 
food quality.  The issue is framed in two slightly different ways, but each of them is a 
permutation of this one idea of la qualité alimentaire – food quality. 
 
The first frame which encouraged mobilisation amongst activists and members of the 
public is intrinsically linked to the national frame of terroir.  One campaigner said:  
I grew up on a farm, and although I live in the city now the countryside never 
leaves you.  You can’t underestimate what the countryside means, and how 
important not polluting it is.  There are people working hard out there to 
make good food and good wine – just like my family used to do.  We must 
honour that, and GMOs are the opposite of the good work that they are trying 
to do (Interview, 04.11.2008).  
 
The economic and cultural importance of Bordeaux’s wine producing region, 
together with the strong maize-growing heritage of Aquitaine means that GM crops 
were framed as a threat specific to the region.  By underlining how invaluable the 
agricultural traditions are, the anti-GMO campaign managed to incite a sense of 
urgency because the stakes for the region were so high. 
 
Running parallel to the idea of GMOs as a local threat to food quality was the idea 
that GMOs were also a global threat to food quality.  In a pamphlet from local 
chapters of Amis de la Terre and Attac the GM maize is shown as a ticking time 












 Figure 6.3: Amis de la Terre/Attac GMO flyer 17/04/08 
 
In the interviews it emerged that these two issues were woven together in order to 
mobilise local residents: ‘we don’t want GMOs here, but we don’t want them 
anywhere else either.  We can’t campaign everywhere though so we make our mark 
here, and we make it locally’ (Interview, 14.11.2008).  GMOs were thought to be 
unpredictable – once they had been released in one place, or even country, there 
would be no guarantee that the rest of the world’s agriculture could be isolated from 
them. 
 
A third frame was linked to the threat to the small farmer by multi-national 
corporations such as Monsanto.  This frame also taps into broader concerns about 
global capitalism versus localised food production.  One of the strategies employed 
by the anti-GMO activists from local chapters of EMOs, Vigilance OGM 33 and 
faucheurs volontaires to highlight the role of muiltinational biotech companies is to 




I was involved a few years ago when we all performed a citizen inspection on 
Monsanto.  They were distributing GM maize to local farms and we wanted 
to draw attention to it.  They’re so big, and so powerful, and the government 
are in their pocket; but that still doesn’t stop us from making our point known 
(Interview, 18.11.2009).   
 
While another argued: 
 
I have so many farmers among my friends and family and their situation is 
going downhill fast.  Companies like Monsanto need to take their fair share 
of the blame for that.  They’ll get rich selling their dangerous technology to 
rich farmers, and they’ll get rich selling dangerous foods cheaply – is it any 
wonder that we’re worried?! (Interview, 18.11.2008)  
 
The idea of protecting the farmer sits well within the national frame of terroir.  It 
also permits the GM protests to connect to the large and influential community of 
farming interests in the region and the country as a whole. 
 
In summary, there were three frames used by the anti-GMO campaign to mobilise 
support: as a threat to terroir, as a threat to securing GMOs globally and the threat of 
multinational biotech firms to local food production – all of them united by the 
overarching concern about food quality.  The mobilisation activities that these frames 




The legislative role of both the French government and the EU was recognised by 
protesters.  The nature of the issue is, however, highly localised and as a result the 
local and national levels of governance are a much clearer target of protest.  
Campaigners recognised the over-arching importance of EU policy, but for the 
localised networks of actors, local decision-makers were much more accessible 
targets.  As such, GMOs tended to be framed as a ‘French’ problem rather than a 
European one.  An activist commented: 
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The French government is so beholden to the biotech companies, but it needs 
to put its foot down.  We need the government to keep telling the EU that it 
won’t be forced to accept GM crops it doesn’t want.  And we want them to 
tell Monsanto to clear off.  At a local level we need more green 
representatives who will be willing to stick up for us in Aquitaine (Interview, 
18.11.2009).  
 
During the French Presidential elections of 2007 the faucheurs volontaires and local 
chapter of Attac Landes inserted GMOs into the political debate by handing out 
flyers around Bordeaux – see Figure 6.4: 
 
        The flyer reads: 
 
All of the candidates     
apart from  
Sarkozy oppose GMOs 
 
I think I’m too small, I 















According to those interviewed, they did not use similar tactics during, for example, 
European Parliamentary elections.  This illustrates that although the legislative 
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ability of the EU over GMOs was recognised, the activists called for action at a 
national level rather than directly at the European level. 
 
 
In summary, the issue was problematised as a multi-level concern although the 
national government was held most accountable.  The mobilisation frames did not 
facilitate attributing blame to a European level of governance because there were in 
part, specific to the region.  This points to only partial evidence for a European frame 











In Tuscany, the anti-road campaigners linked the construction of the road to 
important local resources: as a potential threat to local organic farms (the produce of 
which was of national importance) and to local sites of historical interest.  Here, the 
national frame of the environment representing regional identity is very much in 
evidence.  In its briefing paper on the road the Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito 
writes: 
The territory covered by the project includes the two important  
archaeological sites of Tarquinia and Vulci, many other protected landscapes, 
historical and archaeological sites (remains of Etruscan 
settlements, Roman villas and farms and castles and medieval 
religious complexes), the natural thermal spa (and archaeological) area of the 
OAS.  It also interferes with 9 parks and protected areas (the coastal tract also 
touches the Maremma Regional Park) and 12 sites of Community 
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An activist confirms: 
 
There are so many different reasons to dispute the road, but they all come 
down to one thing: respect for the place we live in (Interview, 21.10.2008). 
 
 
The second of the mobilisation frames is close to the French idea terroir.  The 
campaign connected the road to the agricultural patrimony of the area, in particular 
the wine-making areas for which Tuscany is famous.  In their leaflet ‘No 
all’Autostrada’ Legambiente frames the road as a threat to alimentary identity – 
something which is valuable both culturally but also economically: 
 
The road would cut through the vineyards of Morellino Scansano (DOC red) 
of Biano of Pitigliano (DOC), but also of Ansonica Costa dell’Argentario 
(DOC white) of Tarquinia (white and red DOC).  This is a territory that over 
the past decades has shown itself to one of the fastest expanding areas for 
quality wine production, growth of vineyards, entrepreneurial ability in the 
wine industry, helping local traditions to blossom but also showing itself to be 
at the forefront of innovation with thousands of acres of crops and rapidly 
expanding.  It is tradition that grows alongside the rapid growth in wine 
tourism, but the Wine Routes like the Strada del Vino colli di Maremma will 
effectively be cut in two by the road.  This is a place that tells its story 
through its culture, the human history of the Etruscans and perhaps 
earlier, until the modern age, where the contemporary draws inspiration from 
authentic ancient traditions and practices.  Where nature shows off its best side:  
its colours, its climate, its scents and the hills are reflected in the sea.  
Where the woods are wild but know that countryside and man can live side by 
side.  This is the countryside, its agriculture, so important to the area’s 
 
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 Original text: Il territorio interessato dall’intervento comprende le due importanti aree 
archeologiche di Tarquinia e Vulci , numerosi altri luoghi tutelati da vincoli paesistici, storici e 
archeologici (resti di insediamenti etruschi anche di tipo urbano, di ville e fattorie romane e di 
castelli e complessi religiosi medievali), l’area termale (e archeologica) dell’Osa, e interferisce con 9 
parchi ed aree protette (il tracciato costiero coinvolge anche il Parco Regionale della Maremma) e 




economy.  To mention agriculture in these places is to remember the good 





Both of these frames draw on an affiliation with the ecological, historical and 
cultural resources of the region, although they were not utilised in the campaign’s 
protest activities.  The strategy was drawn from a very traditional action  repertoire:  
a number of marches have been organised at various points along the proposed road, 
as well as public meetings and petitions.  Fig. 6.5 shows a flyer for a protest bike ride 
organised by the Comitato Stop Autostrada Tirrenca, typical of the action repertoire 












 Original text: L’autostrada taglierebbe le terre dei vigneti delMorellino di Scansano (rosso DOC), 
del biano di Pitigliano (DOC) ma anche dell’Ansonica Costa dell’Argentario (bianco DOC), del 
Tarquinia (biano e rosso DOC).  Un territorio che negliultimi decenni ha evidenziato una delle pi‘ù 
notevole cresite in Italia per qualità, espansione dei vigneti, capacità imprenditoriale in campo 
enologico, riportando alla fioritura dele tradizioni locali, ma anche a prosposte innovative che 
l’hanno poste all’avanguardia, con migliaia di ettari oggi in espansione.  Una tradizione che cresce 
con turisimo enogastronomici in rapido aumento, con strade del Vino segnalate che verebbero di fatto 
taglite in due dall’Autostrada, come la ‘Strada del Vino colli di Maremma’.  Questo è un posto che 
racconta attraverso la sua cultura, la storia dell’uomo degli etruschi e forse anche prima, fino ai 
nostri tempi, ove il moderno ha preso spunto dalle tradizioni antiche e dagli usi più genuini.  Dove la 
natura esprime il meglio di se con i suoi colori, il suo clima, i suoi profumi e le colline quasi si 
specchiano nel mare.  Dove i boschi sanno di selatico mentre la campagna si allea con l’uomo.  Ecco 
la campagna, l’agricoltura, un caposaldo dell’economia della zona.  Dire agricoltura in questi posti e 




      
        The poster reads: 
BIKE RIDE TO STOP THE 
MOTORWAY... 
     
...SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER 
’09, 10.00  
 
       TO ASK FOR 
 
>Maximum citizen involvement 
– open public consultations 
 
>The completion of the tract 
Grossetto – Civitavecchia, 
section ‘0’ at Livorno and the 
sliproad at Piombino 
 
>Improve and make secure the 
existing Aurelia 
 
       >Develop rail and sea travel 
 
AGAINST the damage from 
transforming the Aurelia into a 
motorway: 
        
Figure 6.5 >The tollbooth – not only to pay 
for the 
Flyer for Comitato Stop Autostrada’s    construction but to make S.A.T. 
rich off 
bike ride to stop the motorway 17/11/08  the backs of the citizens 
 
>More traffic, more cement 
 







The Corridoio Tirrenico was framed by local government as part of a European 
project although this argument was challenged by the protesters.  In this sense the 
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campaign explicitly addressed the fact that the road was not a European policy.  In 
their leaflet ‘Parte l’Autostrada Tirrenica’ the Regional Government says: 
‘In the link between Europe and the South of Italy there’s a hole.  And we 




With the implication being that the road will form part of a TEN-T, the campaign 
against the road refute this.  In their dossier it writes: 
At the meeting in Alberese on 11 October 2001 for ‘il corridoio tirrenico: the 
Tuscan proposal’ which was sponsored by the Tuscan Regional government, it 
was stated that there is no longer any ‘European motivation’ for the project – 
neither in the statement, nor in the technical reports.  But even though this has 
been so firmly emphasised it would be useful, for all of the citizens, once and 
for all, to say quite clearly that this project had no formal or material basis in 
the European Union.  Indeed, the construction of the road - over coast or hills - 
is rather at odds with European guidelines' (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, 






Because the campaign saw the road as an Italian project without a European 
connection, the target of protest was very much the local government rather than the 
EU.  There was no requirement for action at a European level, and the campaign did 





 Original text: Nei collegamenti tra l’Europea e il sud Italia c’è un buco nero. Che vogliamo 
colmare.  Con tanto verde – translation my own. 
60
 Original text: Anche se nell’incontro di Alberese dell’ 11 ottobre 2001 “il corridoio tirrenico: la 
proposta della Toscana” promosso dalla Regione Toscana la motivazione europea non compare più, 
né nelle dischiarazioni di guinta, né nelle relazioni techniche, questa motivazione è stata a lunco 
drasticamente affermata e insistita dinanzi ai cittadini che sembra utile, una volta per tutte, dire con 
tutta chiarezza che essa non aveva sin dalla sua origine alcun fondamento né dal punto di vista 
formale, né nel punto di vista sostanziale, anzi, da questo ultimo pointo di vita, la soluzione 
autostradale – di costa o collinare – appare piuttosto in contrasto con gli orientamenti europei – 




In summary there were two frames used to help mobilise the campaign against the 
road.  The first was the threat to historical and natural landmarks of great regional 
and national importance.  The second was to highlight the threat to the agro-
alimentary areas of the region.  Both of these frames connect with the national 
masterframe of the environment as regional heritage.  The problematisation of the 
road echoed this local theme and regional government was the targets of their 
protests – they actively eschewed any role for the EU in the development of the road 
project.  As such, the case of the Corridoio Tirrenico shows no evidence of European 
frames. 
 





The dominant mobilisation frame in the anti-GMO campaign was similar to that used 
by the anti-road campaign – the threat to the regional organic farming industry and 
the cultural value of the goods that it produced.  Again, the national frame of the 
environment being closely linked to regional identity is very much in evidence.   
 
As one might expect, given the anti-GMO stance of the Regional government, the 
frames of the government are similar to those of the campaigners.  At a recent press 
conference the Tuscan Councillor for Agriculture stated:  
 
Tuscany cannot be in any way a place where GMOs are produced or 
researched.  It cannot be allowed.  If rumour spread that there was even the 
slightest possibility that Tuscany could be contaminated by GMOs there 
would be an incalculable loss of competitiveness on the part of our agri-
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The grassroots face of the movement is all but squeezed out of the anti-GMO agenda 
in Tuscany, but member of local chapters of environmental organisations are in 
agreement.  There is something exceptional about the threat of GMOs to Tuscany 
because of the agricultural importance of the region.  The poster in Fig. 6.6 illustrates 













The issue was problematised by the anti-GMO campaign as a multi-level one that 
needed to be addressed at a regional, national and European level.  The weight which 
was afforded to each of these levels depended on the nature of the anti-GMO group 
involved.  The larger NGOs and EMOs benefitted from a place on the EEB or from 
 
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 Original text: La Toscana  non può in alcun modo essere una terra dove si produce o dove si fa 
ricerca in materia di Ogm. Non ce lo possiamo permettere. Se si spargesse la voce che in Toscana ci 
potesse essere anche il minimo rischio di contaminazione da Ogm ci sarebbe un’incalcolabile perdita 




Brussels-based European Offices.  These organisations also worked in tandem with 
political parties such as i Verdi and with the Regional Government; all of whom 
attributed a role for the EU in addressing the GMO situation in Tuscany and who 
evidenced a European frame.   
And since the government seems to be going in the opposite direction, we 
will make ourselves the head of a new movement against GMOs...We won’t 





But the smaller groups and the ad hoc coalitions of farmers addressed their 
campaigns to a more local level of governance.   
We go into schools and talk to the children about the produce, and why we 
want to grow organically, they’ll go home and tell their parents – it’s all about 
just keeping it at the back of their minds.  Those are the people that the Tuscan 
Regional government represent’ (Interview, 22.20.2008) 
 
In conclusion the anti-GMO campaign was characterised by a wide variety of 
environmental actors, many of whom were highly institutionalised and who worked 
with the Tuscan Regional Government.  The Regional Government itself framed the 
issue of GM crops as a threat to the region’s agri-alimentary traditions, so there was 
considerable frame alignment between the actors involved.  The issue was 
problematised differently, however, amongst the actors with the least 
institutionalised members concentrating on holding the regional government 
accountable for the implementation of policy, and EMO actors recognising a role for 
action in Brussels.  Their activities point to a partial European frame in the 




 Original text: E poiché il Governo sembra andare in direzione opposta  noi ci metteremo alla testa 
di un nuovo movimento anti Ogm.. “Non ce la terremo per noi ma la notificheremo a Bruxelles – 





iii) The UK 
 
 




There were a number of frames present in the campaign against the A701, some of 
them were privileged more than others according to the nature of the groups 
involved.  For example, the actors who represented an interest in sustainable 
transport framed the road both as a project that would worsen the social and 
environmental effects of car travel whilst wasting Council resources: 
[the proposal] would massively expand road capacity in  
the Edinburgh to Penicuik corridor, encourage long-distance car commuting  
along the corridor, and place potential for modal shift towards public  
transport at a further disadvantage.  We consider that the proposals would  
be a grave misuse of Midlothian Council funds (Transform Scotland, 1999). 
 
The No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) also shared this duel transport/economic 
frame.  It was aligned with the sustainable transport interest groups (for example its 
website was hosted by Spokes, a cycling advocacy group) and they articulated the 










 The full text accompanying each of these bullet points has been abbreviated in order to insert it into 





NAAG - No Alignment Action Group 
Midlothian Council wants to waste £20 million on a new dual 
carriageway. 
Haven't they got anything better to do?! 
The "A701 realignment" would:- 
• triple the road capacity on this part of the Edinburgh to Penicuik 
corridor 
• generate car traffic along the road corridor.  
• damage or destroy sites of local, regional and national wildlife 
importance 
• shift the balance between public and private transport yet further 
in favour of private car use.  
• be a Trojan Horse for out-of-town greenfield developments to 
sprawl across Midlothian.  
• land Midlothian council taxpayers with huge bills.  
• mean all Midlothian taxpayers will contribute to the road, whether 
they use it-or not.  
•   The A701 realignment, in short is a disaster waiting to happen.  
 
 
Fig. 6.7: NAAG Website  
 
The frame used by the protest camp at Bilston Glen was different: it emphasised the 
ecological threat to the woodland and its ecosystem, and the threat of creating a car 
culture through facilitating multinational development (see Figure 6.8).  They make 
reference to ‘a beautiful wildlife corridor, special site of scientific interest...the 
development in Midlothian, the hundreds of new houses, expansion of biotech and 
retail parks which are promoting a culture dependant on car use, creating an 











































    Fig. 6.8: Bilston Glen Protest Site Flyer 
 
 
The relationship between NAAG and the protest site was a cooperative one, and so 
by combining these assorted, but overlapping frames, the campaign as a whole was 
able to connect to a broader spectrum of concerns.  The national UK frame of the 
environment as a recreational resource is evident in both NAAG and the protest site’s 
frames – by tapping into the ideas of ‘a beautiful wildlife corridor’ and ‘future 
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greenfield development’ the area is being framed as a beautiful landscape of intrinsic 




Because there was no European Union involvement in the development of the 
proposal to realign the A701, the opportunity for protesters to connect to a European 
frame meant that they would have to appeal to the EU tangentially through other 
policy areas such as transport of environmental policies.  There is no evidence 
however that the issue was problematised at this level.  The mobilisation tactics of 
the protest groups point to a local and national frames:  occupying the site, of the 
bypass, or writing to local Councillors and committees at the Scottish Executive.  An 
activist explained: 
 
‘We couldn’t believe that the Scottish Executive approved the plans without a 
public enquiry – we have marched down to Holyrood to let them know that 
they can’t do that – too many people have a vested interest in what happens 
there’  (Interview, 03.03.2009). 
 
And another says ‘some of us from the site delivered petitions to Midlothian Council, 
they need to know that the people don’t want this road.  They’re the ones who want 
this, not the people’ (Interview, 20.06.2008).  Responsibility was clearly allocated to 
the local and national levels of government to stop the realignment, and the idea of 
action at an EU was not appropriate. 
 
Overall, the most notable finding in the case of the A701 is that the road was framed 
in overlapping, but distinct ways by the two main protest groups involved:  first as 
financial irresponsibility by the Council and a threat of further unsustainable 
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development in the areaand secondly as a site of ecological value and the continued 
expansion of multinational companies and out of town retail parks.  The target of 
these protests was very clearly localised and there was no visible attempt to connect 
these issues to broader policy debates at the level of the EU.  A European frame was 
not in evidence to any degree. 
 
  





The mobilisation frames used in the Devon campaign against GM crops were three-
fold: as a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the proliferation 
of multinationals at the expense of localised food production.  Figure 6.9 from the 
website of the Totnes Genetic Group illustrates these ideas: 
Our aims are, therefore, to: 
promote organic farming methods as the most viable, healthy and truly sustainable system of 
agriculture. 
promote farmers' markets and other local food distribution systems.  
oppose the introduction of uncontrollable, invasive and unnecessary products of biotechnology into the 
food chain. 
ensure that the content and source of all ingredients in processed food be clearly labelled, including all 
additives and derivatives which have been genetically modified.  
Figure 6.9: TOGG Website: ‘Who We Are’ 
 
Because the main activist group TOGG grew from a mobilisation to protect a 
specific local organic farm, it is unsurprising that the protection of small-scale 
organic farming was the frame which resonated best with activists and the general 
public in the beginning.  As one of its members explains however ‘it started with the 
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farms and ended with the supermarkets’ and the issue of food security became more 
important: 
 
We stared with the marches down the high street and then some protesters tore 
up the crops the following week.  I’d never been involved in any kind of 
environmental issue before, but I couldn’t believe that an organic farm 
wouldn’t be allowed to stay that way.  It was disgusting.  The within about six 
weeks of our campaign it spread around the country and everyone was talking 
about ‘frankenfoods’.  There were a number of people in TOGG that helped to 
campaign around the country, going to supermarkets or other trial sites and the 
like (Interview, 27.02.2009). 
 
This frame resonates with the way in which the issue was being framed nationally 
(Shaw, 1999) and also with the national frame of the environment.  The UK’s 
framing of the environment as a resource for the population to enjoy, rather than the 
French and Italian ideas about identity and agri-alimentary heritage, means that in the 
relationship between farm and fork, the fork is more important.  This awareness-
raising campaign has continued with a weekly stall outside the market in Totnes 
town centre as well as writing letters of protest to supermarkets reminding them to 





Although the group recognised the role of the EU in legislating on GM crops, and 
distributed information which included some of this information, it problematised 
GM crops at a local and national level.  While letters and petitions were sent to 
DEFRA, The National Farmer’s Association and to Downing Street, the issue was 
considered to be a local one.  Members from TOGG addressed questions to Devon 
County Council during its Executive Committee meetings (Devon County Council, 
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2003) in the run-up to Devon declaring itself a GM-free zone and put pressure on 
local supermarkets.  Their consideration of the role of the EU, however, was not an 
integral part of their activities: 
I was aware of the work that José Bové was doing in France and at a European 
level, he was magnificent.  I didn’t have anything to do with that sort of thing 
myself though, not many did.  We were more concerned with what we could do 
here .   
 
To the extent that TOGG and local EMO chapters recognised the role of European 




In summary, in the case of anti-GM protest in Devon three frames were used to 
mobilise support: as a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the 
proliferation of multinationals at the expense of localised food production.  What 
started as a campaign to protect a specific farm developed into a broader frame of 
public safety and food security.  This resonated well with the national frame, and was 
problematised at a national level.  There was no real evidence of a European frame at 




My investigation of European frames has highlighted two interesting properties of 
social movement frames.  The first is the endurance of the national frame.  In all but 
the cases of GM crops in Italy and road-building in France where the issues were 
problematised as multi-level, I note the dominance of problematising issues at a 
national or regional level.  The second theme that emerges is the role of mobilising 
frames shaping this problematisation.  By adopting an environmental frame the 
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French road protesters were able to problematise the issue in some measure as 
European.  Conversely, by deliberately mobilising on issues of regional specificity 
rather than, for example, transport policy, the Italian anti-road campaign deliberately 
problematised the issue as a regional one and focussed their mobilisation strategy on 
the Regional Government. The extent to which these campaigns show evidence of 
europeanised frames as well as, or instead of European frames is addressed in the 
next section. 
 
6.3 Europeanised Frames in Evidence 
 
According to the framework that I developed in chapter three, I established that a 
frame is europeanised to the extent that it meets the following criteria: 
 
o articulate a response to European Union activity 
o problematise the issue as the responsibility of regional or national 
actors 
o does not require that action is taken at the EU level 
o is constructed domestically and then diffused or replicated in other 




The europeanised frame looks different from a European frame in three main ways.  
First of all it problematises the issue as the responsibility of national or regional 
government.  It may recognise that the EU could play a role in developing the 
situation, but the issue is not framed as a ‘European’ one.    Therefore, the second 
point of difference is that a europeanised frame does not require that action is taken 
at the EU level.  Finally, a europeanised frame is constructed domestically and then 
exported to other member states.  This is unlike a European frame which, by virtue of 
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The French Anti-Road Campaign 
 
 
i) Mobilisation and Problematisation 
 
In the previous section I noted the mobilisation frames used by the anti-road 
campaign: economic folly, ill-thought through and, the most dominant frame – 
ecological destruction.  It was through this ecological frame that ARLP, SEPANSO 
and Amis de la Terre Landes were able to address their concerns directly to the 
European Commission and EU environmental policy.  In recognising the role that 
EU legislation could play in the construction of the road, and demanding action at an 
EU level, the anti-road campaign problematised the issue, in some degree, as 
European. 
 
Overall, however, the anti-road campaign was problematised at multiple levels of 
governance, not just the European level.  I noted in the previous section that its 
action repertoire appealed to regional and national government through letter-
writing, flyer-dropping and a number of innovative events such as racing caricatures 
of local politicians in tracto-brouette (tractor-wheelbarrows) around the town square 
of Mont-de-Marsan.  These local mobilisations were the most prolific, and the 
problematisation locally and nationally was the most dominant frame.  Therefore, we 
can conclude that although the campaign exhibited some evidence of European 
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mobilisation and problematisation frames, the dominance of national-level activity 
lays the preconditions for europeanised frames. 
 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
The second key determinant of europeanised frames is the exportation of frames that 
were constructed nationally to other EU member states.  This was a strategy pursued 
by the anti-road movement, who were keen to reach out to other road campaigns 
across Europe.  An activist remembers:  
We were on Spanish TV as well as in the local and national press.  People 
came from Spain and Switzerland I think to see what we were doing and to 
encourage us with their own experiences.  We talked about why we were 
doing what we were doing and I think we had a lot to learn from one another.  
Some of them are going to look at their environmental impact assessments 
again like we did (Interview 4/11/2009).   
 
Because the French protesters were reaching out to campaigns similarly guided by 
EU legislation, and because they were able to export their ecological frame and their 
experiences about how instrumental it had been, they therefore showed clear 
evidence of europeanised frame diffusion.  
 
In summary, the way in which the road campaign chose an ecological mobilisation 
frame for the road permitted them to problematise the issue at regional, national and 
European levels.  Despite this limited evidence of European frames, the issue was 
mainly problematised at a national level and therefore suggests europeanised frames.  
The exportation of those frames to other campaigns in Europe further confirms the 






The French Anti-GMO Campaign 
 
i) Mobilisation and Problematisation 
 
In the previous section we illustrated the three mobilisation frames used in the anti-
GMO campaign in Aquitaine: concern for local food quality, global food quality, and 
the localisation of food production.  Although these frames fitted well with the 
national terroir frame of France, the fact that they focussed on the distinctiveness of 
the Aquitaine region made it difficult for them to problematise the issue at a 
European level.  Their activities were locally based, from the crop destruction of the 
faucheurs volontaires to the petitions and supermarket flyer-drops of the local 
chapters of Friends of the Earth and other NGOs.  In holding the national and 
regional governments accountable for GMOs on their territories and not demanding 
action at a European level the campaign shows evidence of europeanised rather than 
European frames. 
 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
Interestingly in the case of France, the most famous export of the GMO campaign 
was the action repertoire.  The distinctively French faucheurs volontaires became 
household names across Europe in the late 1990s and soon the idea of targeting GM 
trial sites and destroying them in a theatrical fashion had caught on to other anti-
GMO campaigns in other countries.  Although the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine 
also adopted and reinforced this action repertoire it cannot be said that this was 




In terms of the frames that the campaign adopted or exported, there is evidence of a 
europeanisation of frames.  There is evidence that the idea of regional agri-
alimentary specificity – or terroir – is a frame that has successfully been used in 
other European countries.  The campaign was composed of a variety of different 
actors, many of whom were members of either international networks such as GMO-
Free Europe, or were affiliated to international NGOs such as Greenpeace.  The most 
grassroots actor Vigilance Aquitaine 33 was connected to the Maison de la Nature et 
de l’Environnement which made them part of a regional network or environmental 
associations.  Through the involvement of these more institutionalised actors in the 
campaign the idea of GMOs as a threat to regional agricultural goods and heritage 
became as mutually constructed and europeanised frame.  One of the activists 
observed: 
 
I think José Bové’s work in Aquitaine has really made our work here world 
famous.  Other people around Europe and the world look at what we’ve done 
and how we got so much attention.  Those higher up get invited to do press 
interviews and we tell the world what we  know (Interview, 22.11.2009). 
 
We return to the idea of this frame in our discussion of the Italian case. 
 
 
In conclusion, the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine did recognise the role of the EU 
in generating the GMO policy which was to be implemented by the French 
government, but the problematisation of the issue was distinctly national and 
evidenced europeanised frames rather than European frames.  These europeanised 
frames were reinforced by the mobilisation frame of terroir which was successfully 







The Italian Anti-Road Campaign 
 
i) Mobilisation and  Problematisation 
 
We saw in our earlier discussion of the campaign against the Corridoio Tirrenico 
that the protesters very consciously problematised the issue as a national issue and 
did not require action at an EU level in order to address it.  In this regard, the 
movement was precluded from having a European problematisation frame.  In terms 
of the mobilisation frames, the road was positioned as a threat to both the dominant 
national frame of regional identity (through the destruction of important sites of 
archaeological and cultural interest) but also as a threat to the important wine and 
olive-growing resources of the area.  This made the idea that Tuscany was 
exceptional their dominant frame and the extent to which they showed europeanised 
frames is dependent on the extent to which this frame was imported or exported to 
other European member states. 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
In this case the breadth of actors involved in campaigning against the road – from 
political parties to NGOs and coalitions of local residents suggests that there would 
be improved opportunity for the campaign to engage with other similar campaigns 
across Europe.  What sets the Italian example apart from the French and UK road 
protests is the very limited involvement that it had with the wider social movement 
community.  One protester said: 
 
‘I suppose there are these sorts of campaigns happening all the time.  But this is 
really a long and complicated issue for us in Italy and it would be hard for 
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In the case of the Corridoio Tirrenico there is no evidence of europeanised frames 
because although there was no requirement for Europe to act, the grassroots groups 
involved were not sufficiently receptive to the way in which other European anti-
road campaigns were being framed to evidence europeanised frames themselves. 
 
To conclude, the campaign against the Corridoio Tirrenico actively isolated the road 
from European policy and problematised it as a purely national issue.   In spite of the 
breadth of actors, and the opportunities that this afforded them to connect to other 
campaigns the mobilisation frames they adopted were also highly localised and 
insular.  There was consequently no evidence of europeanised frames. 
 
The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign 
 
i) Mobilisation and Problematisation 
 
The dominance of the Tuscan Regional Government in dictating the anti-GMO 
agenda in Tuscany left little room for the involvement of social movement groups.  
The actors tended to be those local chapters of larger national or international NGOs 
who were sufficiently institutionalised to work in tandem with the regional 
government on their continued awareness-raising campaign.  The grassroots face of 
the movement represented almost exclusively by local farmers problematised the 
issue as a local one and concentrated its pressure on the regional government to 
develop favourable agricultural policies.  The NGO chapters, however, were more 
disposed towards problematising the issue as multi-level and demanded policy-
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change at the EU level.  This all goes to provide some precipitous conditions for 
europeanised frames. 
 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
One of the most interesting characteristics of the Tuscan mobilisation frame (GMOs 
as threat to the agri-alimentary traditions of the region) is that it has so much in 
common with the French frame of terroir.  It is quite distinct, however, from that of 
the UK anti-GMO movement, so it suggests that there was some cross-fertilisation of 
frames between France and Italy and, in particular, evidence of europeanised frames 
in the Italian anti-GMO campaign. 
 
In summary, the anti-GMO campaign had a strong European frame on the part of the 
Tuscan regional government and those more formal environmental groups that 
worked with it, but the less institutionalised actors problematised the issue as a multi-
level one.  The clearest evidence of europeanised frames is the diffusion of the 
mobilisation frame: notions of terroir.  In the case of GMOs, there is evidence of 






The UK Anti-Road Campaign 
 
i) Mobilisation and  Problematisation 
 
The campaign against the realignment of the A701 involved a variety of different 
mobilisation frames, but all of them problematised at a national and regional level.  
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For NAAG the road was framed as worsening the social and environmental effects of 
car travel whilst wasting Council resources and for the protest site at Bilston Glen the 
road threatened the ecology of the area while facilitating the development of 
multinationals.  By demanding action from Midlothian Council and the Scottish 
Executive the protest excluded the possibility of displaying European frames. 
 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
What marks the anti-road protest at Bilston apart from the other cases in this thesis is 
the mobility of the actors on the protest site.  A protester explains: 
 
People have come and gone over the years, but they come and go from all over.  
Some of us have got experience on other protest sites and that’s how we 
learned how to build the houses and walkways and what to do.  Some of us 
have been doing this for years....  We get people from other countries too who 
just come for a few weeks or months.  They tell us about what’s going on back 
home with them – it’s a cool place to be (Interview, 03.03.2009). 
 
This diversity of experience and background is expressed in the frames that the 
protest camp used – appealing to ideas of ecological destruction and multinational 
business are more universally accessible and attractive frames than emphasising what 
is so different about a particular place.  Although this in itself does not evidence a 
europeanisation of frames, it does suggest cross-fertilisation of ideas amongst activist 
communities; especially the more mobile communities of protest camps. 
 
 
Overall, the spectrum of mobilisation frames used in the campaign represented the 
diversity of actors involved.  All of these frames problematised the road as a matter 
of national or regional interest and adopted appropriate action strategies accordingly.  
The preconditions of europeanised rather than European frames are in evidence here.  
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The diffusion of these mobilisation frames is similarly more inclined towards 
europeanised frames, although unlike in other case studies here this was manifest in 
the most grassroots level of the campaign. 
  
 
The UK Anti-GMO Campaign 
 
i) Problematisation and Mobilisation 
 
Earlier in this chapter I noted that there were three mobilisation frames used by the 
anti-GMO campaign in Devon, with the weight shifting between them over time:  as 
a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the proliferation of 
multinationals at the expense of localised food production.  However; all of these 
frames were problematised primarily as national and local issues. 
 
ii) Frame Diffusion 
 
The original mobilisation frame for the Devon campaign – the protection of small 
organic farms – quickly aligned itself with the emerging national frame of food 
security.  They took part in national days of action – for example in 2004 on a 
national day of action against Sainsbury’s a collection of farmers parked three 
tractors outside the store in Barnstaple and demanded that they cease using GM feed 
in their milk production.  In this way the campaign’s frame showed itself to be 
relatively porous.  Although the frames showed evidence of diffusing within the UK, 
they did not evidence diffusion to other EU member states, and so cannot be classed 
as europeanised frames. 
 
 
In sum, in the UK example the campaign against GM crops shows no evidence of 
European frames because they problematised the issue as a national one.  But nor do 
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they show convincing evidence of europeanised frames because the frames they used 
in order to mobilise support were not exported or imported or mutually negotiated 






In conclusion, the examination of frames in my case study areas and case study 
countries has highlighted some interesting findings about the variables which 
account for how europeanised a movement’s frames will be – and in what that 
europeanisation will look like. 
 
The first of these is that despite identifying three distinct national frames there are no 
clear cross-national differences in evidence. The road campaign in France shows 
evidence of both European and europeanised frames, and can therefore be said to be 
highly europeanised.  The same is not true of the anti-GMO campaign in the same 
region.  So the country in which the protest occurs cannot be said to be wholly 
responsible for the degree to which a campaign’s frames are europeanised – clearly 
there are other important variables at work within the case study countries. 
 
The most significant of these variables, and an important finding, is the importance 
of the relationship of ‘goodness of fit’ between the protest frames and the national 
masterframes.  Where they fit well together there is an increased likelihood of a 
europeanisation of frames. We see that where europeanisation of frames occurred 
(e.g. the French road protest) the protest frame did not sit well within the national 
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frame.  The road was framed primarily as an ecological threat, while the national 
masterframe of terroir would have privileged the threat to farmsteads and the 
agricultural traditions of the countryside).  Where the opposite is true, and the protest 
frame nested within the national masterframe (in the case of Italian roads threatening 
regional heritage for example) then the national frame becomes reinforced.  This 
would make it more difficult for the protest to accept incoming europeanised frames, 
and indeed the French road campaign was open to sharing its experience of using the 
ecological frame with other European road protests, while the Italian example was 
firmly national in scope. 
 
Furthermore, these case studies underscore the dominance of national frames.  Even 
in those areas where EU policy could be directly, or indirectly applied – such as 
legislation on environmental protection and where there were similar campaigns 
happening in three different EU member states simultaneously the grassroots level of 
protest remained firmly embedded in the national environmental frames.  This 
finding supports the work of other scholars who have noted that ‘in many cases 
domestic politics and the domestic polity serve as forces of inertia and explain the 
resilient or “sticky” responses to europeanisation’ (S. Bulmer, 2007: 48).  Work on 
parties (Bomberg, 2002) and policies (Jordan & Liefferink, 2007) has underscored 
the tenacity of national styles of ‘doing things’.  The findings in this chapter 
therefore hint at similarity in the patterns of europeanisation found between social 
movements and other political actors. 
Finally, in this chapter we should note the evidence of a commonly constructed and 
diffused frame for GM crops in France and Italy:  the idea of a threat to regional 
249 

terroir or agri-alimentary specificity.  The membership of their campaigns looked 
rather different, with the French protesters being drawn from a more evenly spread 
spectrum of environmental interest groups rather than the largely institutionalised 
EMO actors in Italy, but they shared membership of some pan-national organisations 
and attracted good international media attention.  This observation is significant 
because our analysis of POS showed that overlapping membership of grassroots and 
more professionalised or institutionalised groups within the same campaign did not 
result in political alliances. Grassroots groups were reluctant to reach ‘up’ to more 
institutionalised or professionalised groups.  The overlapping membership between 
grassroots and professionalised groups in France and Italy does, however, appear to 
have resulted in the diffusion of frames.  It seems that networking between social 
movement groups is more central to the europeanisation of frames than to the 
europeanisation of political opportunity structures.  These findings are teased out 









7 Comparisons and Conclusions 
‘A qui profite l’Europe? La question, dans sa formulation abrupt, sous-tend les 
arguments du débat politique sur l’intégration européenne, tant pour ses promoteurs 
que pour ses opposants’ 
 (Balme & Chabanet, 2002: 21) 
‘Who benefits from Europe? This blunt question underpins the political debate on 






This thesis has sought to explain what europeanisation means for the mobilisation 
strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement in Europe.  I have 
identified three types of europeanisation process: direct europeanisation (where an 
actor connects directly to the EU), indirect europeanisation (where an actor connects 
to a europeanised member state) and passive europeanisation (where actors 
europeanise unintentionally outside of state mechanisms).  All three of these 
processes have been observed across two domains of social movement activity: 
political opportunity structures (POS) and frames.  The empirical evidence supports 
my central argument that europeanisation exists in places where the literature does 
not currently expect or look to find it.  It may be found in the opportunities available 
through member states or the EU itself, but equally there is evidence that 
europeanisation occurs in the process of networking across social movement groups.  
In short, europeanisation need not always be mediated by the state. 
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It is evident in these case studies that a lack of physical protest in Brussels or the 
absence of petitions to the European Commission does not mean that europeanisation 
is not taking place within and across states.  On the contrary, this thesis demonstrates 
incidences of europeanisation at both a European and domestic level.  It should be 
noted however that variation in the degree of europeanisation across the case studies 
is striking.  I have demonstrated that campaigns against roads are constrained by 
different political opportunity structures and different frames to campaigns against 
GMOs.  In the same way, member states have distinctly different national political 
opportunity structures and frames to one another.  The conditions for social 
movement activity and the extent to which they show evidence of europeanisation 
are both determined by the intersection of these variables. 
 
The degree of europeanisation identified by this thesis should not be overstated – in 
some cases it is not in evidence at all, and in other cases there are only partial 
indications of europeanisation.  The incidence of European or europeanised political 
opportunity structures and frames, across each of the case studies and within each of 








Figure 7.1: European and Europeanised Political Opportunity Structures 
Figure 7.2: European and Europeanised Frames 
 
  EUROPEAN POS EUROPEANISED POS 
DIMENSIONS OF 
POS: 
STRENGTH OPENNESS ALLIES STRENGTH OPENNESS ALLIES 
FRENCH ROADS x x  - x  - x 
FRENCH GMOS x  -  - x x  -  
           
ITALIAN ROADS  -  -  - x x  - 
ITALIAN GMOS x  -  - x x  - 
           
UK ROADS  -  -  -  -  - x 
UK GMOS x  -   -  - -  -  







FRENCH ROADS  - x x x 
FRENCH GMOS  - x x x 
       
ITALIAN ROADS  - - - - 
ITALIAN GMOS  - x x x 
       
UK ROADS  - - x x 
UK GMOS  - - - - 
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These tables offer a broad overview of the incidences of europeanisation within the 
movement groups but they should be read carefully.  Where there is any evidence of 
europeanisation at all it has been recorded with an ‘x’ – so the table does not reflect 
the limited degree of evidence in some of the case studies.  Furthermore, it does not 
indicate differential evidence of europeanisation within different actors in the same 
movement – for example between the Bilston Glen protest camp and the No 
Alignment Action Group (NAAG).  These tables therefore provide only a snapshot 
of the evidence for europeanisation  
 
Nonetheless, these findings do signpost something important – that europeanisation 
does not rely on the ability of a social movement to connect to the state in order to 
become europeanised.  They also highlight some of the variables that determine the 
extent of europeanisation including member state, protest issue, political opportunity 
structures, frames and the kinds of local social movement actors involved.  This 
chapter provides an overview of the comparative conclusions from the thesis, 
analysing our findings across policy areas, then across countries, across domains and 
finally examining our findings across the different kinds of actors involved. 
 
 
7.2 Comparison by Domain  
 
I have identified two intervening variables or ‘domains’ that determine the shape of 
europeanisation experienced by social movement actors at a local level: political 
opportunity structures and frames. Within each of these domains I have illustrated 
that a movement may connect to that domain directly at the level of the European 
255 

Union, or indirectly at a domestic level, or the process of europeanisation may occur 
passively and unintentionally outside of institutional channels.   
 
Distinguishing between these two domains allows us to compare the importance of 
structural factors (POS) with more fluid ones (frames) in the process of 
europeanisation. This comparison in turn raises some important questions: is 
europeanisation channelled more obviously through political structures such as 
configurations of allies than through the creation and diffusion of shared beliefs? To 
what extent does a social movement need to be institutionalised to have access to the 
opportunities in either of these domains?  The focus on passive europeanisation in 
addition to direct and indirect europeanisation means that I am able to move beyond 
the focus on those social movements who have the resources to mobilise in Brussels 
and therefore experience europeanisation (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001; Imig & Tarrow, 
2000, 2001). 
 
There are two main observations that are distilled from a comparison of domains of 
protest.  The first of these is that there is greater europeanisation of political 
opportunity structures than frames.  Scholarship that privileges europeanisation as a 
process that transmits more easily through concrete structures such as policies and 
polities, than through the more fluid dissemination of norms and beliefs between 
citizens is reinforced (Börzel, 1999, 2003; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Ladrech, 2001; 
Vink & Graziano, 2007a).  In short, the degree of movement europeanisation is 
explained more by the political opportunity structures in which they act than by the 
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frames they construct and diffuse.  Figures. 7.1 and 7.2 illustrates how the degree of 
europeanisation between these domains breaks down, and here we can observe a 
point of similarity between the two domains – in both cases there is greater evidence 
for connecting to europeanised rather than European domains.  This observation 
points to the resilience of social movements’ mobilisation against policy 
implementation rather than policy formulation, and to the enduring preference for a 
domestic arena of action. 
 
A second observation is that frames may be used to orientate movements towards 
particular europeanised opportunity structures.  This means that social movement 
actors are able strategically to select their protest strategies in ways that will facilitate 
or close down opportunities for direct and indirect europeanisation.  In short, they are 
able to use frames to select the most advantageous POS for their campaign.  By 
framing an issue as a very local concern, rooted in local heritage then the activists are 
able to channel the campaign into addressing local or national POS.  This may be 
helpful because policy in that area is decentralised or devolved or because local 
political elites are favourable to their concerns.  Equally, an issue may be framed as a 
European policy problem in order to situate the campaign within European political 
opportunity structures.  This may be advantageous because it circumvents 
unfavourable national or local opportunity structures or because it offers access to 





Direct and indirect europeanisation 
The case of anti-road protest in Aquitaine illustrated the strategic value of frames.  
We saw how movement actors intentionally created a frame that would exploit 
European political opportunity structures.  Although the construction of the A65 was 
originally contested by ARLP and SEPANSO as a question of transport policy, the 
fact that it was a national rather than a European road project meant that they were 
constrained by national political opportunity structures to challenge transport 
decision-makers.  However, by framing the road as an environmental issue they were 
able problematise the issue at multiple layers of governance.  They thus ‘created’ a 
European level of POS and exploited it by submitting a complaint directly to the 
European Commission.   This was advantageous to them because local elected 
officials were favourable to the road, because they felt disenfranchised from the 
decision-making process and because it offered the opportunity to raise the profile of 
the campaign.  Frames were therefore used to access the most strategically useful 
political opportunity structures.   
 
In the discussion of direct and indirect europeanisation a second important 
observation is that across all of the case studies there is more evidence of movement 
actors connecting to europeanised rather than European domains.  Where there is 
evidence of European POS or frames it is few and far between.  The lack of 
European frames or POS of can be explained by two factors.  In the first part we can 
see the importance of the local nature of the protest – groups who mobilise in 
Brussels require expertise or resources that their less institutionalised colleagues do 
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not have.  Although it is not the sole deciding factor, the degree of 
professionalisation and institutionalisation is therefore still an important factor in 
determining the arena of action.  The degree of europeanisation is also, in turn, 
determined by the level of European legislation against which a movement is 
mobilising (see section 7.3).  If the implementation of the offending legislation is 
determined at a local level, then this is more likely to be the locus of the protest.  
This finding supports those who have argued that ‘however much policy and 
regulation is made at the EU level, it is at the national and local level that policy is 
implemented and it is the implementation of policy rather than its formulation that 
leads to most protest’ (Rootes, 2003b: 251).  In short, domestic mobilisation –  and 
the indirect europeanisation that accompanies it – remains dominant.  
 
But access to resources and expertise to address EU political opportunity structures, 
or to engineer a European frame, does not explain all of our findings.  ARLP had 
access to SEPANSO’s European Officer who helped them to mount a challenge at 
the European Commission.  Why did other case study campaigns not seek out similar 
expertise?  We have already noted that it may not have been considered strategically 
beneficial to address European POS, but a third point to note is that the EU may not 
be considered a legitimate arena of action.  Two of the grassroots groups involved in 
anti-road campaigns purposefully distanced themselves from the EU but for different 
reasons.  In the case of the Corridoio Tirrenico the local grassroots groups acted 
strategically to keep the road and their campaign as far as possible from ‘European 
questions’.  They sought to delegitimise the road, which was being framed as part of 
a European network by the Regional government, by asserting that it was a distinctly 
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local project.  They therefore chose not to mobilise at a European level nor to seek 
the assistance of those who might help them to do so.  The Bilston Glen protest camp 
also eschewed the EU in its campaign, but in this instance it was because it 
questioned the legitimacy of the European Union itself and the social and political 
system that it represented.  It chose not to act at a European level, not because it 
would legitimise the road but because it would legitimise the EU.  In comparing 
direct and indirect europeanisation processes we are able to explain the dominance of 
europeanised POS and frames in the context of how strategically useful or legitimate 
any intent to connect to the EU may be. 
 
Passive europeanisation 
The comparison of domains has also drawn attention to the third ‘passive’ process of 
europeanisation.  The case studies capture an interesting contrast between the degree 
of passive europeanisation in frames (higher) and political opportunity structures 
(lower).  This is because in the process of constructing a network through which 
passive europeanisation processes can take place, europeanised political opportunity 
structures require elite allies, while europeanised frames may be diffused between 
other grassroots groups.  It is harder for grassroots groups to connect to elite allies 
who may not consider them sufficiently legitimate, experienced or resourced.  As we 
have also noted, elite allies with access to European influence were equally not 
considered legitimate partners by some of the case study groups.  For this reason, 
although there is the opportunity for passive europeanisation across both domains of 
europeanisation it is more likely to occur within and between grassroots actors 
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themselves rather than through networks of grassroots and elite allies facilitated by 
europeanised political opportunity structures. 
 
As we saw in the case of the UK anti-road protest a rejection of consciously 
connecting to the EU, whether at an EU or national level, did not preclude the 
passive europeanisation of the campaign.  The Bilston Glen protest camp evidenced 
the process of passive europeanisation through the national and pan-European 
networks that it created which it used to recruit other European activists to the camp 
and to help construct a protest frame that addressed both the road but also issues of 
wider ecological and social concern that lie within the gift of  EU policy-making.  In 
France, ARLP did not actively reject the opportunity to connect to the European 
Union, but it still evidenced passive europeanisation through the network it created 
of actors in similar campaigns across Europe. 
 
7.3 Comparison by Protest Issue
 
The second variable that has proven significant in determining the degree of 
movement europeanisation is the issue around which the actors are campaigning.  
This is important because it determines the political opportunity structures within 
which the movement operates, but it is also strategically useful because a movement 
can frame an issue in such a way that manipulates the opportunities available.  In 
short, the protest issue dictates the mobilisation strategy of a movement. 
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In the case studies considered here I examined two protest areas: road-building and 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  In France we examined anti-GMO protest 
in Aquitaine, as well as the campaign against the construction of the A65 motorway 
between Bordeaux and Pau.  In Italy we investigated anti-GMO protest in Tuscany, 
and mobilisation against the proposed Corridoio Tirrenico road running along the 
Tuscan coastline.  Finally, in the UK we examined anti-GMO protest in Devon and 
the campaign against the proposed bypass at Bilston Glen in Scotland.  These two 
areas of protest were selected because although they are both subject to European 
Union legislation (which allows us to better isolate the process of europeanisation 
rather than other processes such as globalisation) they offer some important 
contrasts.  The first distinction concerns the degree of European regulation – 
genetically modified crops are subject to much more binding and comprehensive 
regulation than road-building projects.  Making this distinction between the protest 
areas affords insights into the relationship between europeanisation of legislation and 
europeanisation of protest.  In other words, does social movement protest become 
more europeanised when addressing more europeanised policies?  Our case studies 
show that yes, the policy issue is important – but in different ways.  Where the EU 
holds clear competence for a policy area (such as GMOs) European political 
opportunities and frames are more likely.  Where the EU policy is interpreted and 
implemented with national discretion (such as road-building) then europeanised 
political opportunity structures and frames are more likely. 
 
The second distinction is in the way in which these two policy areas manifest 
themselves on the ground.  While road-building proposals are concentrated on a 
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specific project and a physical site around which protest can mobilise, GMO 
campaigns are more likely to revolve around awareness-raising.  Road-protest issues 
are more likely to be seen as a local issue, while GMO issues may be more 
generalised and express concern about food security or globalisation for example.  
These two issues require very different action repertoires, which will be delineated 
by different frames.  Are social movements more europeanised when they frame an 
issue in more general terms than localised ones?  The case studies tell us that both 
the frame, and the kinds of actors involved are dictated by the protest issue and both 
of these variables affect the degree of europeanisation within a movement.   
 
The overall conclusion we may draw from the comparison of protest issues is that 
although the protest issue does not directly dictate the degree of europeanisation it 
facilitates particular political opportunity structures or frames that do.  We can 
observe variation across all three kinds of europeanisation processes: direct, indirect 
and passive according to the protest issue against which the groups were mobilising.  
In particular we note that European POS (evidence of direct europeanisation) was 
stronger in the case of anti-road protest, europeanised POS (evidence of indirect 
europeanisation) was stronger in the case of anti-GMO protest, and the conditions for 
passive europeanisation are more evident amongst anti-GMO protesters than their 






Direct and indirect europeanisation 
Across our case studies we observed that there was a difference between the protest 
area and the movement’s ability to connect to European or europeanised political 
opportunity structures.  If we revisit figures 6.1 and 6.2 the first point to note is that 
there is a greater likelihood of anti-GMO protest showing evidence of connecting to 
European frames than do anti-road protests.  GMO cases thus showed more evidence 
of direct europeanisation. 
 
This finding may be explained by two factors: the degree of regional governmental 
autonomy over the policy area, and the kind of actors involved in the campaign.  
GMOs are much more tightly bound by European legislation than road-building 
policy.  The GMO campaigns in our case studies all recognised the enhanced role of 
the EU in legislating at even a local level.   The social movement literature would 
suggest that recognising the role of EU legislation in GMO policy would lead these 
actors to connect to European political opportunity structures, to require that action is 
taken at the level of the EU and to problematise the issue as the responsibility of the 
EU.  
 
This relationship should not be overstated however.  The case studies’ connection to 
European political opportunity structures in the area of GMO protest was marginal.  
UK groups recognised the role of the EU although chose not to address it, French 
groups at a local level relied on more institutionalised partners at a national or 
European level and in Italy the proximity of anti-GMO groups to the Tuscan 
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Regional Government European networks did not translate into a europeanisation ‘by 
proxy’.  Furthermore, there is minimal evidence of European frames evidencing 
direct europeanisation in either protest area.  In sum, even in those protest areas 
where there is a high degree of EU legislation, direct europeanisation is not a 
foregone conclusion.   
 
A second observation that can be made is the greater evidence of connecting to 
europeanised POS and frames in anti-road campaigns than in anti-GMO campaigns.   
The process of europeanisation has been mediated through the nation state in these 
cases and anti-road groups are more likely to address their campaign to this national 
level, thereby evidencing indirect europeanisation.  The strategy of these anti-GMO 
campaigns shows that in protest issues that target specific projects the 
europeanisation of social movements is brought about by mobilisation at a national 
level rather than at a European one.   
 
Passive europeanisation 
The presence of passive europeanisation also appears to vary according to the protest 
issue because the kinds of local social movement groups active in these areas 
represent different manifestations of the social movement spectrum. Different kinds 
of social movement actor will have different abilities to construct medium to long-
term networks of allies across Europe.  The greater the depth and breadth of the 
network of actors created, the stronger the opportunity for passive europeanisation to 
occur.   
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Anti-road campaigns tend to be a one-off event, precipitated by a decision to build a 
specific road in a particular place.  We noted in the case studies that the membership 
of the anti-road campaign is largely localised to the site of the road; campaigners 
may invoke ‘NIMBYism’ and focus on preventing the construction of the road.  In 
all of the case studies the campaigns linked their arguments to wider discourses about 
climate change, environmental degradation, capitalism – but once the road has been 
built or overturned they did not continue to campaign on these issues.  An exception 
is the Bilston Glen protest camp where activists continue to occupy the site although 
the road proposal has been suspended. The members continue to participate in other 
local campaigns such as Occupy Edinburgh or the Camp for Climate Action.   
 
Because of the ‘flashpoint’ nature of anti-road protest the actors involved are often 
new to protest, they lack material resources and experience.  These are the actors 
who, although they may understand the role of EU legislation and EU opportunities 
in their campaign, will lack the ability to connect to them directly.  The limited 
experience and resources of these actors may present an obstacle for connecting to 
European or europeanised political opportunity structures or frames and experiencing 
direct or indirect europeanisation.  However, the brief duration of the campaign 
makes it more difficult for them to experience passive europeanisation.  Network 
building takes time.  It is in the process of constructing networks of allies on a 
national and pan-European scale that passive europeanisation occurs.  When protest 
issues revolve around specific short-term events such as a road, social movement 
groups are unlikely to have enough time to develop this network. 
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Conversely, anti-GMO campaigns tend to be much longer-term.  Although the arrival 
of a particular group might be precipitated by a specific GM trial site (the case of 
TOGG in Devon for example), once the immediate threat of the site is over the 
groups studied continued their campaign in an awareness-raising capacity over a 
period of years.  The activities of the movement have become more routine and 
require the kind of permanent presence that it is easier for local chapters of EMOs to 
provide than transient ad-hoc coalitions of actors.  This means that the kind of actors 
involved in anti-GMO protest are likely to be better-networked, more experienced 
and more professionalised (although not professional) and therefore more able to 
connect to the opportunities and issues at a European level.  This networking was 
evident in Tuscany where the domination of the Tuscan Regional Government meant 
that local EMO chapters were more involved than grassroots groups in the campaign.  
These tenacious networks were also evident in France where the overlapping 
membership between the faucheurs volontaires, Vigilance OGM 33, Amis de la Terre 
and other groups meant that there was a well established network of actors.  In this 
way, in the case of anti-GMO protest the networks of groups suggest that social 
movements are more able to experience passive europeanisation when they are 
campaigning on a long-term issue. 
 
7.4 Comparison by Country 
 
The third variable that has proven significant in determining what europeanisation 
means for grassroots and local movement groups is the country in which the 
campaign takes place.  Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate that there is a very clear 
267 

difference in the overall tally for europeanisation across the different case study 
countries.  The UK shows the least evidence of either European or europeanised POS 
and frames, followed by Italy with France showing the greatest evidence of 
europeanisation.  How might we explain that, and does this headline capture the full 
spectrum of europeanisation processes at work?  All of the case studies investigated 
in this thesis underscore the importance of national context: the distinctive political 
opportunity structures in each country together with the dominance of national 
frames. But what do very different national contexts mean for the prospects of social 
movement europeanisation? 
 
The comparison of case studies by country draws out two important themes.  The 
first is that the better the fit between the protest frame and the masterframe, the less 
likely there is to be any kind of europeanisation – direct, indirect or passive.  This is 
because europeanised frames are an alternative to dominant national frames, they 
problematise the issue in a way that the national frame does not, and so 
europeanisation is borne out of this friction.  The second point of interest is that the 
more entrenched the national protest tradition, the more likely passive 
europeanisation becomes.  This is because it increases the availability of ready-made 
networks through which passive europeanisation can diffuse.  Both of these findings 






Direct and indirect europeanisation 
The most striking finding in the area of direct europeanisation is evident when we 
examine the frames used by the movements studied.  Here we discover an important 
relationship between the national frame and the protest frame.  The more comfortably 
the protest frames sit within the national master frames, the less likely 
europeanisation is to occur.  This is best illustrated by the case of the A65 in France 
when the protest frame did not sit well within the national frame.  The road was 
framed primarily as an ecological threat by ARLP and SEPANSO, while the national 
masterframe of terroir would have privileged the threat to farmsteads and the 
agricultural traditions of the countryside.  The ability of their campaign to 
problematise the road as a European issue meant that they could legitimately address 
their concern to the European Commission and in so doing showed evidence of direct 
europeanisation.     Interestingly, the opposite was true in the case of the corridoio 
tirrenico, and the protest frame of regional heritage nested well within the national 
masterframe of the environment as an expression of regional distinctiveness.  Indeed, 
the campaign actively rejected any suggestion that the road was a European project.  
As a result there is little evidence of either direct or indirect europeanisation – 
instead we would expect the national frame to become reinforced and more 
entrenched.  We can conclude therefore that direct europeanisation processes are 
more likely to occur in countries where the protest frame is from  the national 
masterframe.  This finding echoes the idea of ‘goodness of fit’ but forward by Green 
Cowles et al. (2001).  According to this conceptualisation of europeanisation 
adaptational pressure is applied by the EU to the rules and policies of national 
institutions in order to get them to align or ‘fit’ with the European way of doing 
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things.  The degree of this pressure determines the degree of europeanisation.  
Echoing this idea a kind of ‘inverse goodness of fit’ principle applies to the 
relationship between the protest frame and the national master frame.  
Europeanisation of frames may only occur where there is a poor fit between the 
frames used by the protesters and the national frame.  
 
Passive europeanisation 
The incidence of passive europeanisation also varied by country, but was strongest in 
France and the UK where both GMO and anti-road protesters developed a pan-
European network.  There are two reasons for this that set these cases apart from the 
Italian protest: the established history of national protesters in those two areas, and 
the ability of the movement to frame the issue as a general rather than regional 
concern. 
 
The history of anti-road protest in the UK afforded the campaigners, particularly 
those in the Bilston protest camp, with a well-established network of allies 
immediately that the campaign began.  The involvement of Transform Scotland (part 
of Campaign for Better Transport, formerly Roadblock UK) was particularly 
advantageous.  The mobility, particularly international mobility, of some of the 
activists at the Bilston Glen site meant that activists with experience on the road 
protest sites of the 1990s in the UK were also able to lend their skills to the campaign 
in Scotland.  Similarly, the anti-GMO group TOGG played a pivotal role in the 
development of the UK’s anti-GMO movement which afforded it the opportunity to 
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gather allies across the country.  In France, although there was not such a strong 
history of anti-road protest as in the UK, those activists involved in the campaign 
against the A65 did actively seek to reach out to other similar European campaigns in 
the hope of sharing ideas and experiences.  In the case of anti-GMO protests, for 
which France has gained international notoriety, the movement groups involved were 
also able to draw on a pre-existing network of sympathetic allies with whom to work. 
These relationships were national, but also to some degree international, as the 
faucheurs volontaires’ action repertoire gained notoriety and was exported to other 
protests across Europe.  Notably, in Italy where there was not the same established 
history of either anti-GMO or anti-road protest, the relationships built by the various 
groups on each campaign were weak or non-existent.  It is this history of protests, 
and the ready access to networks of allies that made it easier for these local groups to 
gain experience, share ideas and to communicate their work with other groups.   
Secondly, the decision of the UK and French anti-road protesters to frame their 
campaigns in terms that resonated not just locally, but also nationally and 
internationally facilitated passive europeanisation.  They used ‘climate change’ or 
‘capitalism’ to connect to a wider audience whilst also diffusing their environmental 
frame to other anti-road campaigns in Europe.  This gave their frames an appeal or 
‘universality’ beyond their national borders.  The UK example shows that even when 
there is little evidence of direct or indirect europeanisation taking place, passive 
europeanisation may still be occurring within those two domains.  The ability to 
disconnect from the national masterframe therefore facilitated passive 
europeanisation.  Where national frames are more entrenched it is harder for social 
movement actors diffuse their frames across borders and thereby participate in the 
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process of europeanisation.  Strict cross-national differences in frames are an 
obstacle to social movement actors being able to evidence europeanised frames.  For 
grassroots social movements the results of this study indicate that in order to become 
europeanised the issue must be framed in a way that transcends national borders – 
either by problematising the issue as European, or by appealing to universal rather 
than national frames.   
 
7.5 Comparison by Actor 
 
 
A final observation should be made about the degree of institutionalisation with the 
local social movement spectrum, and what this means for the process of 
europeanisation.  One particular finding that has been distilled from the investigation 
presented here is that grassroots’ alliances with local chapters of europeanised EMOs 
does not result automatically in europeanisation ‘rubbing off’ on the group (or what I 
have called ‘europeanisation by proxy’).  In those policy areas which are most tightly 
bound by European legislation, and which encourage the participation of long-term, 
experienced social movement actors, one is more likely to find evidence of those 
actors connecting to European political opportunities and frames.  Where the inverse 
is true and an environmental decision is less well defined by European legislation 
and the actors involved are more likely to be mobilising on a one-off basis, they are 
more likely to connect to europeanisation through europeanised political 




A second observation to make is that the greater the level of European legislation in a 
given policy area, the more likely social movement groups are to engage in direct 
europeanisation by circumventing the nation state and taking action directly in 
Brussels.  It is striking that across the case studies so many the local and grassroots 
groups were remarkably reluctant to engage with any opportunities thought to lie 
with the national and international professionalised EMOs, even within chapters of 
those same EMOs.  In other words, the disconnect between an EMO and its local 
chapters was far greater than anticipated and led to much lower levels of 
europeanisation than expected.  This was most evident in the case of the corridoio 
tirrenico when in spite of their access to numerous other professionalised groups 
with bases in Brussels and Rome, SOS Maremma chose not to reach out to those 
partners and to eschew the very idea that the EU was a legitimate arena for their 
concerns. 
 
These  arguments are reinforced by the work of Fairbrass and Jordan whose 
examination of institutionalised EMOs and ‘interest groups’ reinforces the 
possibilities for social movements to connect directly with the European Union rather 
than have their access mediated by national institutions.  Indeed, the Commission 
actively seeks such links: 
The Commission was particularly assiduous in its efforts to expand the EU’s 
competence in [biodiversity policy]…National and international 
environmental groups have served as the Commission’s ‘eyes and ears’ at the 
national level, by identifying implementation failures...Thus, environmental 
groups have been able to circumvent national barriers by exploiting the 






We saw in the case of anti-GMO protest in Tuscany that GMOs gave an important 
dimension to the political opportunity structures available: the decentralisation of 
environmental policy.  This decentralisation allowed the Tuscan Regional 
Government to find a way of circumventing the pro-GMO position of national 
government by creating Regional Law 64/2004 ‘Protection and promotion of the 
heritage of local breeds and plant varieties of agricultural, zootechnical and forestry 
interest’.  In so doing it was able to ring-fence Tuscany as a GMO-free region and to 
create a local political opportunity structure that favoured the participation of larger 
anti-GMO organisations and EMOs.  This political opportunity structure favoured 
those groups who were the most professionalised and therefore the most likely, 
according to the literature, to be institutionalised and to experience europeanisation 
(della Porta & Caini, 2009; Rootes, 2002b). 
 
These same decentralised political opportunity structures had the opposite effect in 
the case of anti-road protest where the Regional Government was squarely held 
responsible for the development of the road by grassroots and local level groups.  
This is in spite of the Tuscan Regional Government framing the development as a 
European project to which one might have expected professionalised EMOs and 
political parties to respond with their European-level resources.  Instead, the 
grassroots actors responded to the decentralised political opportunity structure, 
problematised the corridoio tirrenico as a regional issue and mobilised in a very 
local way.   Here, the POS favoured the involvement of multiple smaller, local and 
grassroots groups which showed the least evidence of europeanisation.  The two 
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protest areas of GMOs and roads in Tuscany were subject to the same national and 
regional political opportunity structures, but facilitated different kinds of actors who 





In this chapter we have found comparative evidence that allows us to answer the first 
of the research questions posed by this thesis: where does the europeanisation of 
social movement predominantly occur – at the domestic or European level?  We have 
found that for grassroots and local groups europeanisation through the state occurs 
primarily at a domestic level.  National political opportunity structures and frames 
are enduring and powerful.  My findings support the theory that local environmental 
protest targets the implementation rather than the formulation of EU policy (Rootes, 
2002a, 2003b).  However, we have also observed europeanisation taking place 
unconsciously at a pan-European level, through the construction and diffusion of 
norms across protests (in the cases of the A65 and A701) and through the 
construction of national and pan-European networks in response to issues arising 
from European legislation.  In this way we have demonstrated that europeanisation 
does not need to be channelled through the state in order to occur. 
 
We are also able to answer the second question in this thesis’ research design:  what 
extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of 
movement europeanisation?  We have seen that the degree of institutionalisation 
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within a social movement campaign is varied.  We have noted coalitions between ad-
hoc grassroots groups and local chapters of NGOs or EMOs who have more in 
common than the local and national branches of the same EMO.  Grassroots social 
movements therefore are a more nuanced structure than the social movement 
literature implies.  This disconnect between the local chapters and the national or 
European-level of the same EMO has important consequences for the process of 
europeanisation at a local level.  The europeanisation of EMOs has already been 
established in the literature (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001) 
but this thesis shows that this does not result in a kind of europeanisation ‘by proxy’ 
for the local chapters of the organisations.  There are other factors that determine the 
degree of europeanisation amongst local chapters, such as protest issue or political 
opportunity structure, that dictate the degree of europeanisation more strongly than 
their affiliation to more institutionalised brethren.  Therefore, although the alliance of 
grassroots groups and local chapters is helpful to the campaign, it does not 
automatically afford them access the same europeanised political opportunity 
structures or frames as their larger colleagues. 
 
Nested within these conclusions lie a number of other important comparative 
findings.  In section 7.2 I explained how although there is greater evidence of 
europeanisation in the domain of POS than frames, movement groups are using 
frames to situate their campaign within the political opportunity structures that offer 
them the best strategic advantage. The arenas of europeanisation are therefore 
interconnected and the process of europeanisation should be considered a diffuse 
one.  In section 7.3 we noted that although there is variation across protest areas this 
is not because of the protest issue itself, but rather because of the kinds of POS and 
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frames that are facilitated by the degree of EU legislation in a particular protest area.  
We have also demonstrated that although the national distinctiveness of political 
opportunity structures and frames is enduring, and important in shaping social 
movement activity, it is the ‘goodness of fit’ between national frames and protest 
frames that dictates the degree of europeanisation.  The better the fit, the less likely 
europeanisation is to occur because the protest frame serves to reinforce rather than 
challenge the national frame.  Finally, we noted the variety of local level actors 
within the ‘social movement’ spectrum and how an alliance with ‘institutionalised’ 




8 Movements, Europeanisation and Green    
      Futures 
 
 
‘Europeanization...relates to major developments affecting states, societies, and the 
European Union institutions.  It connects different levels of analysis and types of 
actors, thereby posing complex ontological issues, and it displays asymmetries 
across institutional settings and policy processes.  The relevance of Europeanization 
is significant in each of these respects’  





The aim of this thesis is to determine what europeanisation mean for the mobilisation 
strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement.  In investigating this 
question, I have identified a need for greater nuance in our understanding of the 
process of europeanisation.  Specifically, I have identified three distinct processes of 
europeanisation: 
 
• Direct europeanisation, caused by interaction between a national or sub-
national actor
64
 and the European Union; 
• Indirect europeanisation, caused by interaction between an actor and 
europeanised agents (policies, parties, institutions) at a national level;   
 
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 ‘Actor’ here refers to social movements, interest groups, political parties, institutions or states. 
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• Passive europeanisation, caused by the emergence of pan-European 
relationships without explicitly addressing the European Union’s national or 
supranational institutional impact.   
The innovation in this framework lies in its ability to capture europeanisation that 
takes place outside of the state.  Social movements, especially at a local level, may 
not show evidence of direct or indirect europeanisation because they do not mobilise 
in Brussels or appeal to domestic europeanised opportunities.  However, if they 
diffuse their beliefs and strategies about a European policy through a pan-European 
network they will still be undergoing a kind of europeanisation.  Operating at a local 
level, and working outside the state is an important characteristic of social 
movements, but this non (or extra)-state activity has remained largely neglected by 
the existing literature.  This thesis framework represents a re-orientation of the 
investigation of europeanisation to accommodate non-state, specifically social 
movement actors.  This framework further contributes to the scholarship in this area 
by disaggregating some of the concepts within ‘direct and indirect europeanisation’ 
such as ideas of intent to europeanise (Bache & Marshall, 2004) and formality of 
relationship with the EU (Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004).  
 
A second contribution of this thesis is to the literature on social movements.  In 
particular, I call for a focus in social movement literature on the specific arena of 
European integration rather than national or transnational processes more generally.  
The latter processes have received the largest share of scholarly attention, but an EU 
focus is revealing because it teases out the way in which social movement behaviour 
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shapes and is shaped by multiple layers of governance in an individual polity.  I also 
problematise the idea of social movements as ‘non-institutionalised’.  Although in 
social movement literature this characteristic forms the dividing line between social 
movement and non-governmental organisation, I show how in practice this line is 
blurred.  The local chapter of an NGO (such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth) 
will share many more of the characteristics of a local grassroots group than of the 
professionalised national or European seats of the organisation.  To discount these 
groups from the social movement category is to miss a key feature of many social 
movements.  The extent to which these local chapters can act as a conduit for 
opportunities or for the professionalisation of their grassroots colleagues is an 
important question for studying europeanisation within social movements.  It has 
been established in the social movement literature that actors are better able to 
connect to the state the more professionalised they are.  However, I have established 
that it is not always necessary to connect to the state in order to experience 
europeanisation.  In short, existing research on europeanisation is too state-centric.  
In the following sections I explore in more detail what this finding means for the 
larger debates in social and political science about the role of the state in European 
governance and the prospects for a europeanised green movement. 
 
8.2 Europeanisation and European Integration 

This thesis offers insights into larger questions regarding the role of the state in the 
process of europeanisation.  In particular, it is able to offer insights into theories 
about sub-state actors, their relationship to the European Union and the role of the 
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state in negotiating this interaction.  Its findings nest it within a larger body of 
literature on European government and governance, which I now outline before 
turning to the contribution this thesis offers to the debate.   
 
There are two mains areas of contemporary scholarship amongst those who have 
tried to define and theorise the process of European integration: 
intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance.  Both camps agree that the 
European Union is a complex actor with decision-making shared between vertical 
layers of authority (subnational, national and supranational).  But they diverge in the 
importance they attach to the role of the state in negotiating those layers of authority.  
For scholars of social movements, the pluralist multilevel governance perspective 
(Bache & Flinders, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Marks, 1993, 1997) is of 
particular resonance because it contends that we are witnessing a shift away from the 
power of the nation state and towards national and subnational authority.  Bache and 
Flinders define multilevel governance as: 
the increased interdependence of governments operating at different 
territorial levels, while governance signalled the growing interdependence 
between governments and nongovernmental actors at various territorial levels 
(Bache & Flinders, 2008). 
 
Although the state is still recognised as ‘the most important piece of the European 
puzzle’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2001: 3), it no longer monopolises the aggregation and 
representation of interests.  Political arenas are interconnected rather than nested, 
meaning that subnational actors are able to act in both national and supranational 
arenas and create pan-European networks in the process.  In so doing, these interests 
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are able to circumvent the national level in favour of the supranational (Fairbrass & 
Jordan, 2001: 501).  The multilevel governance approach is defined by this vertical 
and lateral flow of influence, and by a segregation of actor and institution 
(institutions determine the political context and actors try to shape the institutions). 
 
The interplay between these two perspectives and the importance they place on the 
role of the state as mediator raises some interesting questions for this thesis.  These 
theories are designed to accommodate subnational actors.  But what about social 
movements?  They are qualitatively different from national actors explored by 
intergovernmentalism or Regional Governments featured in multilevel governance.  
So do the arguments hold true? 
 
The first question posed by these broader debates about European integration theory 
is:  to what extent do our studies of grassroots social movement activity mirror the 
role of ‘interest groups’ in the multi-level governance framework?  The categories of 
actors at this level are numerous: regional government, trade unions, NGOs and also 
social movements.  Marks and McAdam argue that the inclusion of social 
movements within this category is unproblematic: 
Just as guilds, religious orders and other politico-organisational artefacts of 
the ancien régime had no standing in the emerging nation-state, neither do the 
rigid distinctions between interest groups and social movements mean much 
in the context of EU.  All stand in much the same relationship to the 
integration process. They share the status of 'challenging groups' which hope 
to contest and shape the emerging institutions and philosophy of the 
European Union’ (1996: 251). 
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The definition or role of social movements within European integration literature is 
not one that has been problematised elsewhere in social movement literature.  Other 
authors who have investigated environmentalism in the EU have interpreted interest 
representation to mean environmental NGOs.  Fairbrass and Jordan use the 
multilevel governance framework to examine the role of what they call ‘conservation 




 at a European level (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001).  
Poloni-Staudinger similarly uses data on environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, 
WWF and Friends of the Earth to explore political opportunities within a multi-level 
governance framework. 
 
But as this thesis illustrates, it would be a mistake to conceive of a social movement 
as a single unit when its membership may encompass the most international NGO to 
the most local protest camp.  The tactics of the professional NGOs involved in the 
French GMO campaign adopted different tactics to the faucheurs volontaires 
campaigning on the same issue.  These groups have access to very different 
resources (both material and symbolic) and so it would be unreasonable to theorise 
their mobilisation at a subnational level in a uniform way.  The differential 
mobilisation at a local level outlined in this thesis suggests that a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of the ‘social movement’ in multilevel governance would 




 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
66
 World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
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Furthermore the differential mobilisation between similar kinds of group in different 
countries underscores the importance of political opportunity structures in 
determining movement behaviour.  If we are to accept that there are different levels 
of governance, and that social movement actors may chose to address their concerns 
to subnational, national or supranational arenas, then it is political opportunity 
structures that help to funnel their concerns in a particular direction.  In the case of 
anti-GMO protest in Italy, the campaign addressed its concerns directly to regional 
government because the decentralisation in key areas of environmental policy gave it 
favourable local opportunity structures.  These conclusions support the work of 
Poloni-Staudinger (2008: 552) who surmises: 
Environmental nongovernmental organizations in Western Europe are presented 
with many avenues for action. They appear to use all of these avenues, yet vary 
their use based on the situation on the ground back home  
 
So one further conclusion that we might draw is that, in terms of the theories of 
European integration, while a multilevel governance approach is useful in helping to 
capture the social movement activity at an EU level, it also remains to explain what 
determines the choice of arena.  In the campaigns investigated here, the political 
opportunity structure at a local level is an important determinant of choices for local-
level campaigns. 
 
One final point must be made regarding the ability of a social movement to connect 
its campaign to the European level, whether through frames, political opportunity 
structures or any other mechanism of movement activity.  The ability to ‘connect’ to 
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the European Union might offer evidence of europeanisation but it does not equate to 
an ability to ‘influence’ the European Union.  In chapter one I argued that 
europeanisation was a reflexive process.  As the EU was able to shape domestic 
actors, so those actors are able to shape the direction of integration.  This remains a 
convincing argument, and one well exercised elsewhere (della Porta & Caiani, 2007; 
C. Radaelli, 2004).  But the findings of this thesis suggest that even when a social 
movement showed evidence of connecting to European or europeanised political 
opportunity structures or frames, they did not necessarily achieve their desired 
outcome.  The complaint that ARLP and SEPANSO addressed to the European 
Commission about the Natura 2000 species that would be destroyed by the A65 was 
dismissed and they did not appeal to the EU again.  Similarly, when the anti-GMO 
campaign in Devon realised that they worked in a policy area tightly bound by 
European legislation, they did not address their concerns to the EU.   Other authors 
working in the multilevel governance framework with much larger units of analysis – 
NGOs or regional governments – have also observed ‘it is always important to 
distinguish between representation and influence’ (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001: 514). 
Similarly, Jeffery notes ‘[m]obilisation and influence are not synonymous’(2000: 3).   
 




What does this thesis tell us about the chances that a pan-European environmental 
movement will emerge?  The literature in this area is divided.  In the arena of 
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environmental politics Rootes observes that environmentalism is a phenomenon 
particularly predisposed to international cooperation: 
[T]he nature of environmental issues encourages a transnational perspective, 
and environmentalists are, for the most part, modernisers and internationalists 
who instinctively aspire to transnational action and seek transnational 
agreements (Rootes, 2002a: 377). 
 
But enthusiasm for the transnational perspective has not necessarily been borne out 
in practice.  There is little or no evidence that the trajectories of environmental 
protest within EU Member States are converging.  Instead, studies have shown that 
protests appear firmly grounded in national issues and opportunities (Doherty & 
Hayes, 2007; Rootes, 2002a, 2002b, 2005).  The conclusions of this literature echo 
my own findings on entrenched national frames and the enduring preference to 
protest at the level at which policy is implemented.  The implications of these 
obstacles for passive europeanisation are underscored in the following pages.    
 
In the arena of social movements, the literature is similarly divergent.  Marks and 
McAdam suggest that, rather than the emergence of what one might call ‘super 
movements’, it is more likely that we will observe national movements simply 
having a greater choice of arenas in which to act: 
[W]e expect – in fact, can already discern – significant changes in the locus 
and form of social movements as a result of European integration....European 
integration combines elements of continued state authority, with the creation 
of decentralised subnational power and the development of supranational 
decision-making bodies...So instead of the rise of a single new social 
movement form, we are more apt to see the development and proliferation of 
multiple movement forms keyed to inherited structures and the demands of 
mobilisation in particular policy areas (1996: 275). 
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However, research by della Porta and Caini (2009: 170) points to the emergence of 
just such a ‘single new social movement form’: 
 
[W[e have observed the emergence of a transnational, European social 
movement addressing EU politics and policies...our data...have stressed the 
existence of emerging structures of a European social movement, made of 
loosely coupled networks of activists endowed with multiple (overlapping) 
associational memberships and sharing a common set of values. 
  
So while the European integration and social movement literatures point to new 
opportunities for social movement actors, the environmental movement literature 
points to the dominance of national action repertoires.  Over ten years ago, Ward and 
Lowe called for cross-national comparisons and individual case studies to help 
advance these debates about the europeanisation of environmentalism (1998: 164).  
This thesis represents a contribution towards this advance in our understanding.  
What do the experiences of the local and grassroots actors in the cases presented here 
tell us about the likelihood of a europeanised environmental movement?  First, they 
underline the need for nuance in this question: neither ‘europeanisation’ nor ‘social 
movement’ should be treated as homogeneous ideas.  Europeanisation may be 
manifest in different process (I offer three: direct, indirect and passive) and social 
movements may be composed of a wider variety of actors than the literature in this 
area accommodates.  I argue that if there is to be a European environmental 
movement, its creation will need to accommodate these more nuanced ideas of 
europeanisation and social movement.  The deepening and widening of social 
movement networks will facilitate all three processes of europeanisation, however, 
my conclusions indicate three significant obstacles to this process:   
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1) a fragmentation among social movement actors, (shades of green, disconnect 
with grassroots);  
2) the dominance of national frames and political opportunity structures 
(dictated by the legislation itself);  
3) a question mark about the desirability of such a movement for the actors 
themselves.  
On the face of it, conditions for European environmentalism would seem ripe. The 
same transnational issues are being considered by green movement actors every day 
across the continent.  But this thesis points to two fault lines within the ‘social 
movement’ at a local level.  The first of these is the variety of beliefs contained 
within one movement.  The spectrum of dark to light green ideology marks them 
apart from the anti-nuclear movement, for example, or the civil rights movement.   
And although the common understanding is that the more local or grassroots the 
social movement groups become the darker the shade of green (Dobson, 2000; 
Doherty, 2002), this is not always the case.  For example, at Bilston Glen the very 
dark green of the activists in the protest camp was offset by the relatively light green 
of some of the NAAG members who saw the road simply as an unwelcome addition 
to their village rather than a larger environmental problem per se.  Although this 
disjuncture did not prevent the two groups from working together on a common 
campaign, on other issues, or over time, activists’ differences could make a sustained 




A further point of difference within the movement is the degree of institutionalisation 
amongst the actors.  In particular, the spread of institutionalisation among 
environmental movement organisations and NGOs such as Friends of the Earth 
makes a cohesive ‘movement’ more difficult.  This research has found that the 
relationship between an organisation and its local chapters varies between 
organisations, but it is largely a distant and disconnected relationship.  Local chapters 
may be free to choose their own campaigns and if they do not align with the national 
campaign will not benefit from the resources (posters, badges, dossiers, profile) of 
the organisation.  Many of those interviewed felt as though the national or European-
level tiers of their organisation had nothing to offer them at a strategic level.  The 
consequence of this was that alliances between local chapters and grassroots groups 
rarely brought any of the advantages of ‘professionalisation by association’ that 
might have been expected.  With the exception of the French road campaign these 
alliances did not make grassroots groups more likely to connect to European political 
opportunity structures or frames.  Therefore the isolation of local EMO chapters 
impedes the chances for these groups to connect to what is a ready-made network of 
similar groups, co-ordinated by a national or international organisation.  This 
isolation also makes it difficult for any ‘europeanisation by proxy’ to occur at a local 
level because the advantages of institutionalisation enjoyed by NGOs and EMOs 
may not trickle down to grassroots groups. 
 
A second obstacle to the creation of a europeanised environmental movement is the 
dominance of national frames and political opportunity structures.  This research has 
illustrated the enduring importance of national political opportunity structures in 
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determining social movement behaviour.  To illustrate, the decentralisation of GMO 
policy in Italy created a very different set of opportunities in Tuscany than in 
Aquitaine in centralised France.  As a result, there were more grassroots actors in 
France than in Italy, where the Regional Government’s activities squeezed out the 
opportunities for less professionalised actors.  
 
The dominance of national masterframes was also underscored in this thesis.  In 
particular, we noted how the europeanisation of social movement frames worked 
along the ‘goodness of fit principle’ – the better the fit between the protest frame and 
the national masterframe the less likely that europeanisation was to occur.  It should 
be noted that these frames are negotiated rather than pre-determined, so a social 
movement can manipulate their access to europeanised opportunities.  In the case of 
the A65 in France and the Corridoio Tirrenico in Italy, these frames were 
manipulated to shape the level of governance being addressed by the campaign.  
Nonetheless, the national opportunities and frames were clearly dominant in the 
cases studied.  This national specificity presents a barrier to the creation of 
international networks.  If the manifestation of the same EU policy is being framed 
and implemented differently in each country, then the experiences and strategies of a 
movement group’s campaign become less useful outside of their home territory.   
 
Finally, questions about the EU’s legitimacy raised by this thesis throw into doubt 
the idea that a europeanised green movement would even be desirable for social 
movement actors.  In two of the six case studies, the local actors chose to reject any 
290 

European dimension to their campaign, although for different reasons.  The Bilston 
protest camp had a strong ideological element to their campaign, based on a rejection 
of existing patterns of production and consumption and political practices.  This 
meant that its critique extended beyond simple incidences of perceived injustice 
(such as the road) into larger and more systematic critiques of the political system in 
which they were participating.  The camp was, therefore, opposed the very notion of 
the EU because it was seen to replicate existing faulty power structures.  In Tuscany, 
however, SOS Maremma saw the introduction of any European dimension into the 
debate as a challenge to the local level of their campaign.  It rejected any idea that 
the road was a European project as a way of discrediting the proposal – here the EU 
was seen as lending an implied legitimacy to the road.  In light of these findings, it 
should not be assumed that local green actors will see europeanisation as a positive 
force that strengthens their social movement.  
 
This thesis has shown that the greatest opportunity to develop European 
environmentalism and expand of the process of europeanisation lies in the creation of 
social movement networks.  European environmentalism must be a collective 
endeavour.  I have identified a number of obstacles to this goal, but also teased out 
the role of passive processes of europeanisation for social movement actors who do 
not seek to address European opportunities at a national or European level.  Further 
research in this area would prove useful in deepening our understanding of how 
social movement networks help to shape the effects of European integration in 






To conclude, the recent turn in europeanisation research has breathed new life into 
long-standing debates about Europe.  It has also spawned studies into the multitude 
of policies and polities that are shaped by, and seek to shape, the processes of 
European integration (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000: 7).  It is only recently, however, 
that attention has been turned to the europeanisation of non-state actors. Even less 
attention has been dedicated to social movements at a grassroots level.  This thesis 
has attempted to bridge that gap in understanding.  This endeavour allows us to point 
to new areas of exploration.   
 
In examining the processes of europeanisation at work at a local level, I have 
problematised the role of the state in the process.  I developed a framework for 
identifying European or europeanised political opportunity structures and frames.  
Actors may connect either to opportunities and frames at the level of the EU 
(favoured by campaigns tightly bound by European legislation), or they may connect 
to opportunities at a domestic level and replicate europeanised frames between 
countries (favoured by smaller actors and campaigns less tied to EU legislation).  
Grassroots europeanisation may then be vertical, or lateral.  But I also noted that 
‘connecting’ to these domains is not the same as exercising influence there.  Further 
research is required to understand the extent to which this state-centric 
europeanisation may be more consequential than passive europeanisation that occurs 
outside the state. 
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Secondly, social movement literature has long established that the country in which a 
campaign takes place is important in defining its political opportunity structures.  
This thesis has also shown that nationality matters for frames.  Being able to connect 
or disconnect the campaign frame from the national masterframe will alter the 
possibility to connect to European or europeanised opportunities.  This raises 
questions about the relationship between passive europeanisation and the 
europeanisation of frames.  To what extent does passive europeanisation, through the 
creation of networks, facilitate the europeanisation of shared beliefs, strategies, and 
practices?  While this thesis has provided an important initial exploration of passive 
europeanisation, further work is required to understand what its dynamics – 
especially the creation and operation of networks – mean for the diffusion of ideas or 
‘soft’ europeanisation. 
 
Finally, I have demonstrated that the degree of institutionalisation of actors is 
important in determining the extent of europeanisation.  Yet, for a grassroots group, 
working alongside a more institutionalised and europeanised group does not 
automatically afford them access to europeanisation.  Other factors are more 
important in determining the degree of europeanisation at a grassroots level, such as 
the area of policy in question and the country in which the protest is taking place.  
The relationship between local chapters and grassroots groups is inadequately 
addressed by the literature and it certainly raises important questions for students of 
europeanisation.  While this thesis has identified core dynamics in that relationship 
more research is needed. In particular further empirical study of environmental 
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protest at a local level could tease out the effect that these alliances have on the 
trajectory of local movement protest. 
 
This thesis has posed several questions, offered some answers and in turn posed 
some more questions of its own.  Importantly, it has cast a spotlight on the effect of 
europeanisation on grassroots social movements.  More generally, it has identified 
new opportunities, new frames, and fresh ways of thinking about the environmental 












The research design of this thesis adopts a qualitative approachand this is reflected 
int eh research methods chosen.  I rely on a triangulation of methods to enhance the 
robustness of my findings: case studies, semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis.   These methods are discussed now in more detail below. 
 
Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis or the ‘documentary research method’ (Mogalakwe, 2006: 
221) has established itself as an important feature of social and political research. 
This process involves the study of documents ‘either to understand their substantive 
content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be revealed by their style and 
coverage’ (Ritchie, 2003: 35).  Ritchie goes on to note that ‘[d]ocumentary analysis 
is particularly useful where the history of events or experience has relevance, in 
studies where written communications may be central to the enquiry...and where 
‘private’ as well as ‘public’ accounts are needed’ (2003: 35).  In the case of social 
movement research this ability to capture all three of these elements is important. 
 
I collected both primary and secondary documents for the research project detailed 
here, although this was weighted heavily towards the former because I was most 
interested in how the social movement actors portrayed the issue and themselves, 
rather than the way in which they were portrayed by others.  I understand documents 
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to mean ‘written text’ (Mogalakwe, 2006) and so the range of sources I used was 
large.  I took the text from social movement websites, from flyers and leaflets, from 
campaign dossiers, newsletters, email lists, press releases and other official 
communications.  Accessing these documents was not problematic because many 
were already in the public domain, although in some instances, particularly relating 
to previous anti-GMO actions I relied on my interview participants providing me 
with copies of campaign material that they had archived for their own use.  Although 
this represented only a small percentage of the documents that I used it does mean 
that they were self-selected by social movement actors.  To overcome this bias as 
much as possible I requested to select my own materials from their archives.  I also 
recognise the symbiotic relationship between text and the images that accompany it, 
particularly in the context of social movement materials and so I also recorded the 
images alongside the text for analysis. 
 
In analysing each of the documents I noted down both the substantive content – what 
kind of protest activity was going to take place for example, who was involved?  I 
was also interested in the more subjective meanings within the document – what kind 
of language were they using?  Did any words or themes or images reoccur?  Where I 
required additional information I supplemented the data with secondary sources- 








The second method of data collection used in this thesis was semi-structured 
interviewing.  Interviews ‘provide an opportunity for detailed investigation of 
people’s personal perspectives, for in-depth understanding of the personal context 
within which the research phenomena are located, and for very detailed subject 
coverage’ (Ritchie, 2003: 36).  The ability of  these interviews to capture personal 
understandings and context meant that they were particularly useful in helping to 
capture the way in which issues were being framed, as well as supplementing and 
helping to corroborate the documentary analysis.   
 
 
A total of 40 interviews were conducted for this research project, taking place 
predominantly in 2008 and 2009 – a small number of UK interviews were conducted 
in 2010.  I employed a snowballing technique in order to identify suitable actors to 
interview.  This technique is one that is particularly well suited to social movement 
research because it ‘yields  a study sample through  referrals  made  among  people 
who share or  know of  others who possess some characteristics that are of research 
interest’ (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981: 141).  I therefore used the websites of the 
various campaign groups to identify one or two individuals with whom I pre-
arranged interviews.  Once I met them I asked them to recommend others with whom 
I might meet, and my interview participants grew in numbers. 
 
Where I had an email address for a participant I circulated two documents in advance 
in their native language – a Project Overview which explained the purpose of the 
298 

research and confirmed my provenance, and an Interview Outline that sketched the 
kinds of topics I intended to cover in the interview (See Appendices 2 and 3).  In 
light of the sometimes sensitive nature of the campaigns (for example GM crop 
protest) it was particularly important to be transparent in the purpose of the research 
and the kinds of subjects that they would be invited to discuss.  Where possible, I 
also sent an email to each participant after the interview to thanks them for their time 
and inviting them to contact me with any queries about the research in the future. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured so whilst there were a set of guideline questions 
from which I worked, I was able to pursue individual themes with participants as 
they emerged. 
 
Each interview lasted for around one and a half hours, although the interviews of 
17.11.2009 and 02.11.2009 lasted for around three hours because of the participants’ 
travel arrangements.  Each interview was conducted in the native language of the 
participant, and for interviews conducted in French or Italian permission was sought 
before we began to record the conversation in order to help with the transcription of 
notes at a later date.    Nobody refused to be recorded, although some participants 
also chose to make ‘off the record’ observations.  Notes were written during the 
course of the interview, and I also provided pens and paper for the participants to 
note down anything that they thought would be important, for example to sketch the 
other actors with whom their group was affiliated.  These notes and recordings were 





Because of the sometimes sensitive nature of the issues being discussed – GM-crop 
destruction for example – all of the interviews were non-attributable.  Where 
interviews were conducted within very small communities of actors this also helped 
to protect anonymity because individual identities could be quickly retrieved by a 
process of deduction.  I believe this approach helped the participants to speak more 
freely.  The only exception to individual anonymity was in the recruitment of 
individual interview participants.  Where another camapaigner acted as a gatekeeper 
I used their name with their permission to gain access to other interview participants. 
The secure storage of the research data was another ethical consideration.  In line 
with the protection of individual identities, the spreadsheet containing details of the 
interviews conducted was password protected, as were the digital recordings of 
interviews.  The written notes from each interview were kept locked in a filing 
cabinet. 
 
Finally, the transparency of the project was an important ethical consideration.  All 
communications were in the participants’ native languages, and a summary of the 
project and interview guide also in their native language were distributed via email in 
advance where possible.  All participants were provided with my contact details and 
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